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ABSTRACT
The thesis examines some of the methodologies used for conflict 
study and analysis; it reviews Operational Research based 
approaches and methodologies from other areas of study that have 
been, and are still being used for the study and analysis of 
conflict situations in complex systems. The thesis argues 
against the prevalent use of single methodologies for such 
systems, and calls for the adoption of approaches that allows the 
use of multiple methodologies, which would place the emphasis on 
the "problem" rather than on any particular approach or 
methodology.
The nature, causes and effects, ecology of conflict, and the 
concept of issue relevance and irrelevance are examined as well 
as the role of perceptions. The factors determining the 
development, level and scope of conflicts are reviewed with the
aim of ascertaining their importance to conflict outcomes and 
when meaningful intervention could be made during conflict 
situations. Various outcomes of conflict, primarily management,
dissolution, and resolution are discussed and their relative
strengths and weaknesses as strategies for handling conflicts.
Case studies are used to examine and support arguments about how 
different conflict outcomes arise and some proposals are made for 
the study of alternative futures. It is argued that undesired 
conflicts could be reduced or prevented in complex interaction 
systems through the deliberate design and incorporation, into 
such systems, of structures and mechanisms that will serve as 
integration systems. These integration systems involve all the 
parties in an interaction system and are intended to reconcile 
views, clarify positions, inform the parties about each other and 
assist in the formulation of joint responses to negative internal 
and external stimuli.
An outline structure of an integration system is given and how it 
could be developed in a system. Many methodologies and 
approaches are based on the premise of a "prima facie" existence 
of a conflict; a tool is suggested in the thesis that will assist 
analysts, observers, or any interested party to monitor the 
relationship in an interaction system. This tool concerns what I 
have called the Y-points and Y-diagrams. The Y- concepts are 
based on the notion that there are periods in an interaction when 
a decision can be consciously taken to escalate or de-escalate a 
situation.
The approach advocated in the thesis is based on two assumptions: 
the first is that the parties prefer a "normal" relationship to a 
conflictual one, the second is that the parties in a conflict 
would prefer the resolution of a conflict and its attendant 
stability to an unending management of the situation. 
Consequently, the main thrust of the arguments in the thesis is 
on conflict resolution and the design of stability into complex 
interaction systems.
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CHAPTER 1
General Introduction
Conflict is a feature of all dynamically interacting systems, 
particularly of social systems with their multiple objectives, 
goals and dimensions; conflict situations thus become 
multidimensional and multiattribute. The permeating and 
pervasive effect of conflict on all interacting systems 
(physical, natural and conceptual) has meant that it has been and 
is being studied by researchers from several disciplines 
concerned with interacting systems, in the Arts as well as the 
Sciences, from philosophy to the physical sciences, from Aviation 
to Zoology.
I have used an Operational Research (OR) approach for this 
research because it allows the use of multidisciplinary 
methodologies and analytical tools suitable for individual 
situations without the constraints of particular disciplinary 
purity as long as there are available methodologies for the 
problem; and my conviction is that conflicts in social systems 
are relativistic rather than isomorphic or homomorphic, as many 
of the available approaches appear to suggest. Consequently 
conflict is more appropriate to be studied and analysed on the 
basis of the situation rather than on the basis of available 
"solutions" or particular methodologies.
This adoption of a relativistic idea of conflict is based on my 
acceptance of the ideas of Ackoff[1974], Beer[1962], Bowen[1983], 
De Reuck[1984], Emery,Trist[1965], Galtung[1965] and Spink[1977] 
who, using different approaches and in different contextual
settingsy demonstrated the interconnections and interdependence of 
multiple causes with multiple effects in conflict situations.
The research has entailed,(detailed literature review of available 
methodologies in OR, and a review of Political Science 
literature. It has also involved interviewing \n several 
organisations which have been or are still involved with 
resolving conflicts in complex systems and seeking the common 
factors in successful resolutions.
In the course of the research, a structure was evolved which 
could assist organisations in maintaining their stability by 
preventing malevolent conflicts or, should one develop 
inadvertently, minimising its negative effect. Following this 
general introduction, the argument is in five parts and each part 
or chapter has its own detailed introduction.
Chapter 2 examines the nature of conflict by reviewing various 
interpretations of conflict from different viewpoints, commenting 
on the limitations of these views as well as coming up with a 
working definition of conflict regardless of its contextual 
setting. This chapter also looks at differences between hard and 
soft systems and the causes and effect of conflict, tracing 
conflict's development over time and its relationship with the 
concept of conflict space.
Chapter 3 reviews some of the available methodologies, such as
Game theoretic-based approaches (metagames and hyper-games),
Cybernetics, Soft Systems Methodology (SSM), Problem Formulation,
Causal Texture, Problem Solving Methodology and Robustness 
Analysis. In classifying them into Preventive, Managing and
Resolving approaches, an argument for their joint use, rather
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than the individual uses that are common at present, is 
developed and defended.
In this Chapter, an examination of the process of perception 
formulation, before, during and after an overt conflict 
situation, is attempted. The concepts of legitimacy, ownership 
and relevancy, especially within the notion of intra- and inter­
system conflicts are expounded.
Chapter 4 deals with some real-life systems with inherent 
potential conflicts, and reviews how situations have been and are 
still being resolved and managed. Some common factors were 
elicited from these situations and used in addition to other 
deductions to evolve some concepts and finally a structure for 
studying systems and designing stability as an integral part of 
an interaction system.
Chapter 5 explains in detail the proposed structure which is the 
main contribution of this research to the field. ' Chapter 6 -,
includes the general conclusions of the research and is followed 
by the list of references.
Schelling[1980], classified conflict research into two broad 
schools of thought with one school aiming to treat conflict as 
"...a pathological state and seek its causes and treatment", 
while the other school would treat conflict as given i.e "...take 
conflict for granted and study the behaviour associated with it". 
My research has attempted to reflect the views of both schools of 
thought in that conflict is treated as a consequence of system 
interaction and as a phase in an interaction relationship that 
could be designed and built into a system consciously or 
otherwise. I believe that, like other aspects of interaction,
11
its development could also be monitored and actions taken to 
promote it (if it is considered and judged to be in the system's
interest to do so), or minimise its negative effects (if this is
considered to be in the interest of the system). In the thesis
therefore, I have attempted to examine conflict as one of a
possible number of states in a system.
12
CHAPTER 2 
NATURE OF CONFLICT
Introduction
This chapter examines the various definitions of conflict from 
different conceptual points of view; it also looks at the 
explanations given for the development of conflict and some of 
the diverse approaches to the development of models for conflict 
situations. It examines the usefulness or otherwise of these 
approaches to the modelling of conflict situations in complex 
human activity systems, and advocates the adoption of approaches 
which are based on the ecology concept where situations are 
holistically studied, and issues are examined both individually 
and jointly in order to determine the effects of each issue on 
the other issues. Decisions could thus be made with 
qualitatively and quantitatively superior information. some of
the concepts used in the thesis like Cybernetics, Ecology, Stability etc are 
briefly explained on page 17, and later on pages 204-205.
2.1 Definitions and Explanations of Conflict
Conflict is a concept or process that permeates all interacting 
systems at all levels of recursion and thus has been studied, 
analysed and commented upon by people from diverse disciplines, 
with the consequence that there is no universally acceptable
13
definition of conflict. However, there are certain conditions, 
parameters and behaviours which, if present in an interacting 
system, seem to qualify the system to be described as "being in a 
state of conflict".
This problem of defining or explaining conflict situations is 
encountered not only by the people studying human activity 
systems but, to various degrees, by those studying physical, 
mechanical and electronic systems or combinations of systems. 
Some of the factors that are responsible for this problem are the 
following.
(a) Conflict is a continuous process/state rather than a 
discrete state.
(b) It could be multidimensional(i.e., occupy several spaces 
simultaneously).
(b) It could be a psychological or physiological state.
(c) It could be sociological or mechanical; and
(d) It could also be within a system or between systems
These factors and others ensure therefore that when the study of
conflict is carried out in diverse disciplines, the different
disciplines produce different definitions and explanations for
causes of conflict in their respective languages, with the
inherent bias that will be attendant in such an approach.
In aviation studies for example, Whitfield and Bird[1977], 
explain conflict as "the loss of legal separation between two or 
more aircraft" while flack, and Snyder (1957), in political
14
context, attribute conflict development to "position scarcity" 
and "resource scarcity" in an organised society with an organised
structure of rewards. Marcuse[1955], Calhoun[1962 ] ,
Milgram[1963], Storr[1968], and many other psychologists trace
conflict to "death instinct in man", "frustration", "obedience to
authority", "crowding", "stress", and so on. Lorenz[1966], in
biology, asserts that conflict could be explained as due to
"territoriality instinct", which is essential for the survival of
the species. Marx[1964], von der Mehden[1964], in politics and
political economy, regard conflict as a consequence of the "class
structure within the society" as well as the "uneven distribution
of wealth and power".
These statements, although simplified interpretations of 
elaborate theories, portray the extent of the diversity of views 
on conflict, as perceived by separate disciplines. While
acknowledging the contextual validity of these definitions, I 
nevertheless submit that these views are too narrow for empirical 
applications.
Galtung[ 1965 ] , defined conflic.t as a situation in which "...an
action system ... has two or more incompatible states", while 
Harris[1974 ] , defines it as occurring "... when two or more 
systems are perceived as pursuing aims, policies or activities, 
some of which are mutually incompatible". These two definitions 
are more applicable to systems than the earlier ones, but for my 
studies were still inadequate; in the case of the former, it is 
incomplete, as conflict could occur with only one incompatible 
state, depending on its interpreted relevance, and for the latter 
definition, a conflict situation could arise because of means 
rather than because of goals.
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My working definition of conflict is that there could be said to 
be conflict within a system when the perceived actions, espoused 
views, declared or perceived objectives of definable parts of the 
system are identifiable, or capable of being interpreted by 
observers, as deviant from those of previous or expected normal 
relative situations. In such a case, aspects of interaction 
become mutually incompatible and converge outside the normal 
interaction space.
Some common features of all interacting systems are pointers to 
the nature of conflict situations ; in addition to the earlier 
listed ones, they include the following.
Although continuous rather than discrete, there are discrete 
seminal points during the course of conflict which mark 
important phases or transitions.
There is a need for some common purpose or objective in the 
system before a conflict situation could develop, because as 
Galtungt1965] argued, "an aggregate of "n" systems is not an 
action system unless and until there is a certain unity of 
ends and means" (his action systems are human activity 
systems).
Conflicts, like most interacting processes, are time and 
space bounded. They are legacies of past actions, inactions, 
policies, principles, ambiguously settled issues, unaccepted 
decisions and unclarified assumptions. In such situations, 
boundary demarcation of systems is difficult.
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These features determine, to a significant degree the nature of 
the systems, and lead to the type of conflicts likely to be 
experienced by them.
Some definitions of key words
Cybernetics is used here to mean the method of control that is
based on the feedback principle with causal relationships, ie. 
goal-seeking and self-controlling behaviour.
Game-theory is used to refer to the application of rational 
thought in interaction between 2 or more actors or players, 
rationality itself indicating the striving for maximum gain or 
minimum loss.
Decision theory is used to mean the analysis of rational 
choices within organisations, based on the examination of given 
situation and its possible outcomes.
Stability is used in the thesis in the sense of the Cybernetic 
meaning of the word, i.e a system is said to be stable if it 
maintains its equilibrium despite internal or external 
disturbances (or, in case of any loss, the return to 
equilibrium). |
Stability in the game-theoretic sense refers to the intentions 
of actors/players, i.e a scenario is said to be stable if each 
of the parties (all the actors/players) expects it to happen. 
Ecology as used in the thesis is defined on page 49 and is 
broadly similar in outline to the biological concept where it 
is used to describe the total environment affecting a species 
or particular situation.
Conflict space is used to describe the area of interaction 
over which conflict exists. Thus it is a sub-set of the total
interaction area.
Interaction space is used to describe the total area of 
interaction between parties and covers all aspects of 
relationship between the parties, whether 'normal*, competitive 
or conflictual.
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2.2 Conflict in Hard and Soft Systems
Conflict research is an area where the dichotomy between hard and 
soft systems is rather pronounced, not only in their 
constitution, but also in the approach to adopt in the study, 
analysis, management or resolution of any conflict experienced by 
them. Complexity and complicatedness are two terms that could 
help clarify the distinction between hard and soft systems. 
Casti[1984], defined complexity as "the number of non-equivalent 
ways that 0 can see S...the number of alternate, possible counter 
intuitive modes of interaction that S can have with 0..". The 
labels "0" and "S" in this instance are used to denote 
complex interacting systems with autonomy which are capable of 
theoretically infinite probable numbers of relationship. 
Complicated systems on the other hand have finite states which, 
although similar to complex systems, are nevertheless capable of 
being precisely modelled and represented.
At one level of interacting systems on a hierarchical scale are 
"hard" systems which, by definition, will include mostly human- 
designed technical systems which are mechanical and deterministic 
in nature by design. These systems have no capability for 
conflict, although there is always the probability of breakdowns 
due to incompatibilities of state.
The incompatible states that are likely to develop within these 
systems are predictable and technically resolvable provided that
18
there exists a true and representative codification of the 
system's structural and internal design; these "problem" states 
could even be pre-empted and back-ups provided to prevent a total 
breakdown of the system; thereby ensuring a certain level of 
overall system effectiveness. These types of system could 
therefore be justifiably referred to as "complicated" rather than 
"complex" like the systems earlier defined by Casti[op cit].
Simple mechanical systems of this type could have a corresponding 
one-to-one relationship between cause and effect in their problem 
states as shown in Fig.2.1(a).
19
i|-relationship in a simple mechanical way. (Causefig. 5.1(a) iCawsa_ 
could be within the eystem.)
Environment
single cause
single effect
system
Single cause
SystemEnvironment
-ig. 2 .1 (b) Causal relationship in a complicated mechanical or 
7sImp ie ' aocio-technical system.
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On a higher level in the hierarchy of interacting systems, and 
characterised by a high degree of interaction and interdependence 
in the functional relationship between human beings and the 
electro-mechanical components of the system, are socio-technical 
systems, in which, the introduction of human components has 
increased the number of possible relationships. Complexity 
(rather than complication) and conflict are thus introduced into 
the system through' , the human sub-system.
Any incompatibility of states or conflict between these 
components might lead to a breakdown or failure of the system. 
Ergonomics is the study area that is concerned with the attempt 
to minimise the adverse effects or prevent the failure or 
breakdown of such systems. This resolution of differences 
between men and machines is effected by the design of better 
interfaces and improved communication links between the system's 
components of man and machine. It could also be achieved by 
improving the ability of the human component of the system or the 
design of the machine.
The effect of conflicts or incompatibility in simple socio- 
technical systems could be said to be broadly similar to the 
effects of incompatibilities in complicated electro-mechanical 
systems. This could be depicted as in the earlier figure. 
Fig.2.1(b), which has a one to many causal relationship.
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The system becomes, at this stage, stochastic rather than 
deterministic as in the earlier example, but it should be noted 
that this system is still not representative of the more complex 
socio-technical systems.
On the highest level of complexity known so far are social
systems/human activity systems which have multi-dimensional,
multi-layered, multi-spatial intra- and inter-system
relationships that are so complex as to yet defy complete
understanding and therefore modelling with the use of most types
of approaches. Even holistic approaches which have proved to be
appropriate for other systems have not achieved the same degree
of success with this class of systems. The study, analysis and
modelling of such systems has to rely on the use of reductionist 
nevertheless,
approaches; 1 explanations have to be based on functionalism
expressed empirically.
The causal relationship of conflict in simple social systems could 
be said to be on a 'many-to-one-to-many' basis in that multiple 
causes can develop into a major effect which could in turn become 
a cause generating several effects. In complex socio-technical 
systems, this is also a common feature and it could be 
diagramatically represented as in the following figure. (Fig.2.1c)
Multiple
causes
System
-o
Multiple effects
Environment/Wider system
Fig. 2.1(c) CauflteJ^  relationship In a complex socio-technical systynor lt l
'simple' social/human activity system. (The Chernobyl nuclear
usW
accident could be cited as an example of this type of system 
casual relationship.)
Fig.2.1(d) below shows a system which is a purely social system 
and which with multiple causes directly yields multiple effects 
without the transformation of any major cause or effect, but with 
all the causes playing significant roles in influencing each 
other and any of them could become a catalyst of a potential 
conflict situation.
Environment/Wider system
System
Multiple effectsMultiple causes
Fig: Z K d )  
system .
relationship in a complex social/human activity
The systems in Figs2.1(c) and (d) become more probabilistic, and 
the effects more uncertain as the complexity develops. In most 
hard systems, there is an empirical validity of states which 
enables similar systems to be engineered regardless of context, 
with minor variations in result: major deviations probably
reflect an aberration or the introduction of new elements or 
variables into the system. Repeatability cannot be guaranteed in 
human activity systems because of the increasing level of 
complexity and the number of unquantifiable variables inherent in
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such systems. While it must be acknowledged that there is 
considerable overlap between the upper levels of one class of 
system with the lower levels of a higher class, it could safely 
be concluded that human activity systems are inherently more 
complex than other systems.
Advances in Artificial Intelligence and Intelligent Decision 
support systems are blurring the division between complex socio- 
technical systems and social systems; but, inasmuch as the final 
decisions are still being made by the social system (and because 
these decisions are time-bound), it is still reasonable to 
conclude that social systems are more complex. This linked 
variability in the complexity of cause and effect over time is 
what makes social systems unique, and is the major difference 
between hard and soft systems.
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The ability of conflict to remain covert until certain
circumstances enable it to manifest is closely linked with its 
dependence on time and space. An overt conflict could become 
covert over time if one (or more) of the parties is forced by 
circumstances towards a situation in which its continued 
existence as a system is threatened (due to its own inadequacies 
or the overwhelming superiority of opposing parties).
The development, intensity, scope, duration and level of 
conflicts depend on the interplays between various factors among 
which are:
(a) complexity of the system's relationships/interactions;
(b) availability of resources that could be commited to
conflict;
(c) intra-party solidarity;
(d) support from key parties within the wider system;
(e) effect of conflict on the wider system;
(f) opinion of the wider system;
(g ) capacity for and commitment of parties to conflict;
(h) objectives of the parties; and
(i) the gap between the "status quo" and expected 
future states.
These and other factors influence the externalisation of the 
conflict process to such a degree that the lack of overt 
conflict, as Coser[1956] pointed out, might be a sign of 
hostility born out of repression rather than peace; lack of an 
overt conflict could also be borne out of the fear for the
25
reactions or repercussions that might follow an overt expression 
of conflict, especially if one of the parties is disadvantaged by 
some of the factors listed above.
The following figure (Fig.2.2) depict in diagrammatic form how 
conflicts become externalised from a covert position during 
interactions and how it could revert to covert conditions under 
different circumstances or how new differences might develop into 
a new conflict after a "normalisation” of interactions. The 
problem of representing this tyne of concept in a diagrammatic 
form is partly due to the large number of possible interaction 
states in complex systems.
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Intervention
and
normalisation
Intervention and 
normalisation
Externalisation
P New differences
Intervention and 
normalisation
Intervention and 
normalisation
Externalisation
issues,
causes, etc!
COVERT OVERT
CONFLICT
INTERACTION  
Fig. 2.2 Conflict interaction pattern.
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In the diagram, there is a loop depicting the development of 
situation over time. The diagram assumes that interactions are 
started on a "normal" basis but the situation could become
potentially conflictual due to differences on issues, opinions 
etc. The first phase of the disagreement could be described as 
being a covert phase where the differences are not yet formally 
or mutually acknowledged and publicly dicussed. The second phase 
is the externalisation of the differences and the formal 
declarations of stances, positions and opinions by the parties.
This phase could also be characterised by ill-concealed or
undenied hostile actions etc.
Formal or Informal intervention could lead to "normalisation" or 
the continuation of the conflict on an overt basis. The 
conflict could also be driven to a Covert existence by 
circumstances only to re-emerge at a future time when one of the 
parties consider it to be appropriate for externalisation. This 
loop will continue until the conflict is resolved. "Normal" 
interactions could also exist after an intervention until new 
differences emerge to start a new cycle of conflict interaction 
pattern.
The figure shows the emergence of a conflict situation and the 
reversion to "normal" situation, and a later lapse into an 
ongoing conflict situation until resolution.
Galtung[1965], argued that conflict is time-dependent and 
develops over future states or preferred values rather than about 
the status-quo or existing values. He also contended that 
although it is possible for conflict to develop over preferred 
values alone (i.e. there might be agreement in the system on the 
inadequacy of the existing value system but disagreement over
28
preferred values or means), the existing system or value could 
not be said to be contentious because "....there is no 
incompatibility in what is".
If we adopt the description of an overt conflict situation as 
being one in which visible, identifiable and undenied actions 
and/or statements by one or more parties in an interaction system 
are intended to be potentially or actually damaging to other 
parties in the system, we could then use Davies's[1962], J-curve 
diagram to illustrate how conflicts develop over time. This is 
depicted in Fig. 2.3 below:
Unacceptable level 
of difference
Preferred value
acceptable 
Level of difference
Status quo
Conflict pointj .  Time
Fig. 2.3(Curve expressed in conflict terms. (Davies, J.C. 1962 .)
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Galtung(op cit) noted that the first condition for a conflict to 
develop is that the areas of incompatible goals in the system's 
spaces of interaction be occupied by issues being pressed by both 
parties. The second condition, he continued, is "...ensuring 
that the goal-states of the parties are at a maximum distance 
from the compatibility space...".
In the light of these statements and my earlier points, conflict 
could then be said to develop as a consequence of the differences 
in perceptions of what is, what should be or what might be (i.e. 
over the preferred future state of a system, especially if there 
are some values attached to it). Fig.2.4 is a representation of 
Galtung's goal-space showing the two interaction spaces of 
compatibility and incompatibility.
X Objective
G2
Incompatibility
Compatibility
y Objective\  G1
Fig. 2.4 The goal state space. (Galtung, J. 1965)
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In order for conflict to develop therefore, the parties have to 
stay as close to G1 and G2 respectively and move from the left 
interacting space to the right space of Fig.2.4. A 
representation of how this movement takes place over time and the 
points (in reality^phases) that lie in between the two extreme 
spaces at which the conflict situation could be prevented from 
developing is depicted in Fig.2.5. These decision "points" in an 
interaction system are the Y-points in the diagram. They are the 
points in an interaction process where the transition from 
competition or currently normal relationship to conflict may 
occur. They are also potential stability points where meaningful 
and possibly successful intervention could take place; the lower 
of the two points shown is clearly an important one, both for 
decision by the parties to conflict and for intervention by 
others ( Full details about the construction and use of the Y- 
diagram is given in 5.6).
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Fig. 2.6 V-diagram  of conflict development
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The development of conflict is also dependent (in addition to the 
factors earlier listed) on the size and content of the conflict 
space in comparison with the "normal" interaction space. The 
conflict space could be broadened or narrowed by any of the 
parties or coalitions to include or exclude issues considered by 
them to be relevant or irrelevant to the conflict. This 
relevancy or irrelevancy of issue is a major determining factor 
of the scope of conflicts. Because the choice of issues to be 
included in a conflict space are arbitrary, parties/coalitions 
opt for those issues that will increase their support in the 
wider system or that might yield a favourable outcome for their 
respective positions. This freedom of choice also ensures that 
other parties may accept or reject what these issues imply; 
consequently, the conflict space might be broadened to include 
issues which are not in themselves seriously conflictual, but 
which will serve as bargaining issues for future trade-offs.
The role of the wider system is also very crucial in conflict 
development because key parties in the system might stand to 
benefit from a conflict situation or lose if one occurs. Since 
the original parties in most conflict situations depend very much 
on support from the wider system for the continued prosecution of 
any conflict, control over the outcome is almost always 
surrendered unwittingly to the wider system represented by some 
key parties. Once control has passed to the wider system, the 
probability of escalation before resolution increases, because 
the wider system is much less likely to have any recognised 
decision-maker or adequate control mechanism to resolve 
conflicts. Although it could manage situations to some extent, 
its major incentive-for conflict resolution only occurs when its
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own interests become threatened. Interaction system in many cases 
lack adequate control systems and this inadequacy is one of the 
issues that exacerbates conflicts and is examined in this study.
From the foregoing, certain empirical statements could be made 
about conflict developments over time.
i) It is possible for interacting subsystems to adopt 
opposite views on various issues without conflicts 
developing.
ii) Classification of issues into "normal" and conflictual 
within an interaction space is arbitrary, and time-and 
situation-dependent. It is also subject to unilateral change 
by any of the parties or bilateral changes by the parties if 
it is in their interest to do so.
iii) A single party in an interaction system could initiate 
a conflict but the outcome and termination of the situation 
depends on all the parties that have become involved during 
the course of the situation.
iv) In complex conflict situations, the views of the 
original parties do not necessarily carry any more weight 
than the views of the other key parties who have become 
involved.
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2.3 Conflict Development (over time) and Characteristics of 
Parties in Conflict Situations
i Mack, and Snyder[ 1957] portrayed conflict as an adjunct to 
competition, interpreting competition to mean the "striving for 
scarce resources according to sets of rules governing the tactics 
to be used by competitors", while conflict was interpreted to 
mean a situation in which "...competitors disregard rules or when 
they seek to destroy each other in their quest for scarce 
resources". Pi rages[1976] opined that "... competition-conflict 
relationship is best visualised as a continuum ranging from 
competitive-nonviolent-non destructive behaviour in conformity 
with rules at one extreme, to conflict-violent-destructive 
behaviour in violation of established norms at the other, with 
much of the intervening behaviour being neither clearly 
competition nor clearly conflict". He went on to conclude that 
"...a clear distinction between competition and conflict cannot 
easily be made in the real world".
I will argue against some of these opinions and claim that,in the 
case of Marck and Snyder, conflict situations could develop not 
only about rules but also about the "game" or "relationship" for 
which the rules have been formulated. I will also assert that, 
contrary to Pirages' conclusion, conflict behaviour could be 
distinguished from competitive behaviour, but that the problem of 
distinction is being able to recognise the transition from a 
"normal" or competitive phase of interaction to a conflict phase. 
This difference could be attributed to the fact that conflicts 
could be covert or overt and until it becomes covertly malevolent 
or overt, it might continue to be classified as competition in 
Pirages' sense.
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The characteristics of parties vary during the course of a 
conflict but this variation could be said to be due to several 
factors. Among these factors are the following
a) perceptions of the situation;
b) raison d'etre for the conflict;
c) intensity / level of conflict;
d) scope of the conflict;
e) communication links with opposition parties;
f) views and roles of wider systems; and
g) cognitive complexity.
Harris[ 1974 ] , developed a classification of military conflict 
scales from normal interactions to total nuclear war; part of 
this diagram is reproduced in the following figure (Fig.2.6.).
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The full classification showed the various responses of parties 
to different levels of interaction and, although it was developed 
for military use, it could with some modifications be made 
applicable to non-military situations. No specific use has been 
made here of this classification other than to ensure that 
similar stages for civil situations are borne in mind. It is 
necessary to take note of the importance of the factors earlier 
mentioned and their role in the development of conflict and in 
their contributions to the formation of the characteristics and 
responses of parties at various stages of a situation. The levels 
of conflict at various phases, and the subsequent "successful" 
prosecution of the process by one of the parties/coalition, 
depends very much on a favourable mix of these factors (and of 
course other factors which tend to be totally outside the control 
of the conflicting parties).
The analysis of these factors, and the effects of subsequent 
decisions on the situation may, be said to be as "good" as the 
model from which they are derived and this model itself is only 
as "good" as its completeness and the accuracy of the data used 
in its design (completeness is used here to mean the degree to 
which the model represents reality of the situation which is 
being modelled). Therefore, in order to have a reasonable and 
balanced view about a situation, the model to be used must be 
"fairly" complete and "reasonably" accurate. The vagueness of 
such a prescription is intentional and indicates the unavoidable 
subjectivity in conflict modelling.
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2 . 4 Conflict Modelling
In order to understand the modalities of a system, it is 
essential that a model of the system should be developed and 
studied. For the model to be valid however, it should as far as 
is possible, be complete, accurate and representative. In 
technical systems, this is achieved by the physical reproduction 
of the system, complete in every detail even though it might be 
on a very much reduced scale (prototypes); these models are then 
studied, tested, and evaluated, with future decisions being based 
on the results obtained.
In socio- technical systems, a model of the technical aspect of 
the system will also be constructed while a selected sample of 
the human component will be assembled to operate the mock-up 
system (a recent example of this type of system is the newly 
approved Sizewell B nuclear plant). Because of the complexity 
introduced via the human element, total reliability on these
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types of tests and results is unrealistic and impractical as the 
Hawthorne experiments of Mayo[1960], and the subsequent reports 
on it have shown. Dando[1981] also appeared to be questioning the 
reliability of some socio-technical system studies when their 
results are implicitly assumed to be valid for real-life 
situations.
Another example of socio-technical system modelling will be 
battle simulations to test weaponry, personnel, strategies, 
flexibility of response etc under various conditions.
Human activity systems or social systems are difficult to model 
in a holistic manner but reductionist approaches tend not to be 
truly representative and thus decisions based on these approaches 
could be said to be flawed. Most of the disciplines listed in 2.1 
have been engaged in conflict modelling to different degrees, but 
many of the developed models could be classified as Isomorphic or 
Homomorphic models.
2.4.1 Isomorphic models
An isomorphic model could be described as a model which 
represents the object being modelled on a one to one mapping 
basis. This involves the ability to represent "reality", element 
by element in all aspects and at all levels so that each 
component of "reality" is individually represented. Beer[1962], 
gave an example of an isomorphic model as a football match
"...where a particular man on one team  attend(s) to each man
on the other team". Models based on this approach are more 
applicable to purely technical systems which are predictive by 
design and nature. Its applications to social or economic systems
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are however inadequate and probably impossible as the synergy of 
the various interaction subsystems would make it virtually 
impossible to model all the individual parts. One major 
limitation of would-be isomorphic models is that several complex 
subsystems tend to be lumped together and treated as single 
systems rather than complex entities in their own rights. The 
peculiarities and uniqueness of the subsystems are thus lost in 
the vastness of the whole.
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2.4.2 Homomorphic/Contigency models
Homomorphic models can overcome some of the above problems.These 
models are built on a mapping of reality on a many-to-one basis 
of transformation, and enables the retention of some of the 
relationships between the causes and subsequent effects. In 
order to use a homomorphic or contingent model for conflict 
study, issues and causes are first identified and isolated. These 
issues are then analysed individually with the aim of identifying 
the immediate cause of a conflict situation through the additive 
consequences of the isolated issues (i.e. synergy) in a rather 
deterministic cause and effect manner.
This is the sort of modelling used by various single-discipline 
approaches to conflict study. It can lead to situations where 
conflicts are studied, modelled, and consequently analysed on 
narrowly defined premises, or on singular points of view, which 
might not be wholly or reasonably representative of the whole 
situation. Although it could be argued that issues are best 
understood when individually and separately examined and 
analysed, it could also be argued that the compartmentalisation 
of causes into distinct and isolated issues leads to the 
unreliability and inadequacy of such models. This argues against 
its continued use for conflict study.
The use of homomorphic models for the study of non-trivial 
conflict situations in several cases yield simplistic 
explanations of the situation based on the additive approach 
earlier mentioned which excludes the influence of the inherent 
dynamism of interaction systems. Fig.2.7 is an example of
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Fig. 2.7 Homomorphic model of the U.K. miners strike.
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homomorphic modelling applied to the 1984-85 miners' dispute. 
This diagram is part of an earlier analysis of this conflict 
carried out during the research programme with some assistance 
from the Advisory, Conciliation, and Arbitration Services (ACAS).
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A cursory look at most of the analyses, reviews, and comments on 
the dispute by various bodies shows that most of the analysts, 
parties and commentators used models based on this or similar 
concepts, mainly using a homomorphic/contingent approach to 
examine the dispute. A review of some of these analyses, 
commentaries etc revealed the incompleteness and inadequacy of 
the models and the analysis. Undue emphasis was placed on the 
cumulative effects of the causes rather than on the interplay and 
interrelationships between them.
Homomorphic models could nevertheless be said to be very useful 
for complex technical systems and to a lesser extent for some 
socio-technical systems. However, in large social systems, the 
application of such models are likely to be problematic not only 
because of the reasons earlier mentioned, but also due to their 
inadequate recognition of and attention to the dynamic nature of 
systems. These are important causes of failure for such models 
(which are intrinsically deterministic), because changing 
circumstances can not be adequately reflected.
Their bias towards unique solutions (best or optimal), for problem 
situations is problematic in itself because in complex social 
systems, the unique solution might be for a symptom rather than 
for the problem and this solution might create other problems. It 
is with the aim of correcting these limitations that models using 
the relativistic approach with a multidisciplinary rather than a 
uni-disciplinary scope, are recommended . Relativistic approaches 
or similar models map systems on a many-to-many relationship. 
This allows issues, views and levels of situations to be 
represented in varying circumstances, thereby giving a more 
"complete" representation of "reality".
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2.4.3 Relativistic models
Relativistic models [RM] adopt a holistic approach to the study 
and analysis of conflict in complex systems. They are mostly 
based on the concept that conflict situations are best understood 
if analysed as affecting a linked set of sub-systems interacting 
to form a whole rather than whole systems in isolation. Emery
and Trist[1965], argue that this approach will enable situations
to be viewed as " symptoms arising from a network of causes
rather than ...specific problems with specific solutions....".
Most conflicts are multifaceted and although their
externalisation may be attributed to one or more immediate 
factors, analysis will probably reveal that the " immediate cause" 
might only be the catalyst which, in the words of Ackoff[1974] 
"...is necessary but not sufficient" to cause the situation, the 
situation may require an interplay between other factors that 
might not be easily identifiable or even acknowledged, but which 
may be equally important.
With its network basis, relativistic models could be used to 
show patterns of relationships to depict various influences and 
effects of causes on each other as well as their relative bearing 
on the conflict. This will, in consequence, enable the analyst
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to represent "reality" in a more realistic and "complete" manner. 
This approach is feasible only with disciplines with "good" and 
"easy" interfaces with other disciplines. The Operational 
Research and Systems Analysis (OR/SA) approach (see chapter 3), 
is one of the disciplines that fulfils these criteria.
There is always a risk that irrelevant data/information might 
swamp an analyst in attempts to reflect all pertinent issues 
relating to a situation, but I will argue that a greater risk is 
involved if significant issues are overlooked during analysis. In 
most OR/SA analysis, reasons have to be given for leaving 
factors/issues out of the analysis, and also, in the cases of 
initially complex models, for not giving all factors or issues 
equal weight or their not being studied to the same depth. The 
essential thing, therefore, is to ensure that the developed model 
is validated for the uses to which it will be put.
Relativistic models are also continuously modified: i.e various
phases of analysis use diverse techniques and tools in order to 
reflect the current situation adequately. Although OR/SA has 
been described as "solutions in search of problems" by various
critics, the approach adopted for this research is more of a
process for seeking expertise from whereever it is available than 
a prescriptive set of solution processes for possible conflict 
situations. Relativistic modelling forms the basis for the 
direction of my research and this thesis, with the ideas 
enriched by the concept of conflict ecology.
The conflict ecology concept is dealt with in the next section 
but could be briefly explained as the notion that conflicts grow 
out of particular environmental interplays dependent on the 
dynamic interactions in the defined system. Fig.2.8 is a
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modified model of the miners' dispute using the same data as
used in Fig.2.7 but mapped on a relativistic instead of an 
homomorphic model.
Figure 2.8 Casual Textu re  (Ecology) model of the M iners'strike.
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It could be seen from this diagram that all the causes are 
directly interacting and influencing each other, and therefore, 
the study of these causes individually without the effects of 
their interactions could only yield an incomplete model.
2.5 Ecology of Conflict
This concept extends the use of relativistic models and the 
causal texture concept of Emery and Trist[1965]. The approach 
regards conflict situations as developing and growing out of 
specific environments rather than as inevitable results of 
systems interactions. Ecology as used here, could be defined as 
the interfaces, interrelationships, interdependences and 
interplays that constitute an interaction system. Emphasis is 
given to the study of the ecology of a situation before any model 
is developed, and detailed attention is given initially to those 
environmental factors that could, through action or inaction, 
influence the behaviour of the system.
The set of interacting relationships between and within 
interaction systems could not be described as linear and their 
additive consequences could not, for most conflict situations, be 
used to define the total cause and effect of conflict in human 
activity systems (although this might be acceptable for lower 
levels of complex systems). The continued interactions and 
linkages could lead to the formation of a network of causes, 
which in turn might produce certain effects in perpetual 
reinforcing loops until an intervention breaks the loop or a 
conflict ensues.
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It is apparent from these explanations that, in addition to the 
causal texture concept, the approach has also relied on Singer's 
notion of the producer-product relationship as used by 
Ackoff[1974 ] , as well as the works of Spink[1977]. A major 
difference between this approach and the others is the basis of 
analysis; other approaches are applied to identify, study, 
analyse and explain conflict situations through the isolation of 
identifiable factors or parameters which are indeed co-producers 
and therefore should be considered as a whole.
This approach, on the other hand, is applied to the study and 
analysis of situations in a holistic manner whereby all 
identifiable co-producers are examined in relation to each other 
and to the system as a whole.
One inescapable conclusion that could be drawn from this and 
previous arguments is that, in real-life conflict situations, 
there are no spontaneous conflicts. What we have are developing 
situations maturing over time in a set of circumstances whose 
effect at a point in time is interpreted within the interaction 
space as conflictual rather than cooperative or "sensibly" 
competitive.
It could also be said in the light of previous statements, that 
there are no single causes of conflict. There are only multiple
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causes. I will assert that despite the fact that conflicts could 
only develop from certain environments, not all similar 
environments are conducive to conflict development.
I will illustrate the validity of these statements with two short 
examples, but before that, I will depict how multiple factors 
influence each other, again using the miners' dispute as an 
example. Fig.2.9 is a modified version of Easton's[ 1965 ] 
influencing diagram and shows how the output of one subsystem 
becomes the input of another subsystem in a continous closed loop 
but at each completion of the loop, the causes gather momentum 
through the addition of other causes or the exclusion of other 
causes due to fulfilment or realisation, until an intervention 
breaks the cycle.
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Another advantage of the conflict ecology concept over more basic 
relativistic models, is the flexibility which it allows for the 
use of various combinations of methodologies from diverse 
disciplines. This helps to elicit the root causes of conflict 
situations rather than the apparent causes, which might later be 
revealed by analysis as symptoms of the causes and not the "real" 
causes themselves. Fig.2.10 shows the use of an Affect/Effect
diagram to depict at a lower level of detail the causes and
course of the miners' conflict development. The relationship
between causes and effects is shown over time on the model and is
based on the conflict ecology concept.
The diagram could be further developed to map other factors and 
trace their interdependency and relationships over time.
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I now return to my earlier assertion that conflict development is 
very much dependent on the ecology of interactions. The two 
examples of interaction systems used for these illustrations are 
extreme , but very relevant in order to highlight the validity of 
the arguments in this section . The examples are drawn from 
international affairs and matrimonial relations interaction 
systems.
In the prevalent political and military ecology of today, if an 
American aeroplane were to be shot down over the Federal Republic 
of Germany or over Turkish territory, this would not be 
sufficient to cause a major conflict between the USA and the NATO 
country concerned ; this is because there are no issues in their 
interaction spaces that would cause this act to be interpreted as 
a hostile one rather than a mistake. If the same aeroplane is 
however shot down over the German Democratic Republic [GDR], or 
Hungary, a conflict might develop. This is in essence due to the 
ecologies of the various interaction spaces. The ecology in 
relation to economic conflicts would involve different 
interaction spaces: in that contextual setting, EEC's perennial
disputes over the community farm policies and the USA-Japan trade 
disagreements could also be cited and analysed to depict the 
necessity of a particular environment for conflict.
Personal relationships are governed by laws and
to those SLTiiiar
regulationsA^that govern all interaction ^sterns ; the development 
of conflict situations in a matrimonial system also requires a 
particular ecology. Let us assume that one of the parties in a
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matrimonial system has seen the other walking arm-in-arm with 
another person of the opposite sex whom the spouse does not 
recognise or recall knowing. This act is in itself unlikely to 
lead to a conflict unless there has been previous 
incidents (factors), suspicions, rumors etc which together 
constitutes the ecology of interactions within which the incident 
of walking arm-in-arm takes place. If a conflict should
develop, it is patently wrong to attribute this to the single 
incident which, is only a catalyst. These observations might 
seem trivial and the deductions simplistic but, in several 
analyses of real-life conflict situations. e.g the Fiji crisis, 
the Iran-Iraq war etc, such simple cause and effect models were 
used. Sufficient formal notice was not taken of these trivial but 
key observations: this led to incomplete models being designed
and analysed, with faulty and questionable decisions being made 
on the basis of these models.
considered to be
Complex systems are/(^recursive by nature, and, although conflicts 
could be classified as intra or inter-system, the underlying 
themes are much the same. At whatever level of recursion a 
situation develops, the ecology will possess similar properties 
to the ecologies of other conflicts, regardless of size or 
contextual setting. Ashby[ 1964-] , Beer[ 1962,1981 ] and 
Espejo[1979,1982 ] , all argue that interacting sub-systems are 
systems in their own right within their defined environment and 
subject to any systemic laws or regulation that apply to other 
complex systems. Bowen[1977,1983], Checkland[1981] and 
de Reuck (1983) also supports this observation because, from
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different methodological premises, they individually developed 
methodologies whose philosophies are compatible with the 
observation. In addition, these methodologies could be used in 
the identification, problem formulation and analysis phases of 
study on the sub-systems and the systems.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGIES FOR THE STUDY OF CONFLICT 
Introduction
This chapter examines the evolution of different methodologies 
from some of the disciplines that are involved in the formal 
study, and analysis of conflict in complex systems. It traces 
the roles of the different methodologies and their "bias" or 
orientation and represent approaches from OR/SA, Political 
Science, Cybernetics and Philosophy. It also reviewed as briefly 
as possible, the potential contributions of the methodologies to 
conflict study and some of their limitations as well as the 
possible enhancements that could improve these contributions. The 
methodologies are drawn from various disciplines and classified 
into three approaches. The factors that influence the 
development, scope and duration of conflict situations are also 
examined in detail in this chapter &
3.1 Evolution and Role of Methodologies
Various disciplines like Political Science, Psychology, 
Sociology, Mathematics, Cybernetics etc have individually 
developed methodologies for examining conflict situations. Many 
of these methodologies are qualitative by nature, while some are 
quantitative and others combine both features for situation 
modelling. It could be argued however, that while methodologies 
could be individually classified as descriptive or prescriptive, 
most of them are formalised procedures’ or processes for conflict
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study developed from specific disciplinary points of view.
Because most of these methodologies are discipline-based, and 
consequently discipline-bound, the models developed from them, 
and decisions based on them, are implicitly dictated by, and 
limited to, the discipline of the analyst or the dominant 
paradigm in the analyst's profession. A major consequence of 
this methodological insularity is that emphasis is shifted from 
the "problem" to the technique or method for problem-solving, 
thus subordinating the problem to the methodology rather than the 
other way round. Another consequence is that ideas tend to 
revolve within the disciplines, creating some sort of 
"disciplinary in-breeding" whereby advances or development of the 
area of study by one discipline is not readily available to (or 
where available, not readily adopted by) analysts or researchers 
from other disciplines working in the same area.
The study of conflict in complex systems has been primarily 
concentrated on the following aspects of system relationships:
(a) the structural and hierarchical relationship in systems 
as well as the power distribution between the various 
sub-systems ;
(b) the production and distribution of wealth, goods, and 
services in the system; and finally,
(c) the interpersonal relationships and interactions within 
the system.
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Most political-science based methodologies examine conflict 
situations from the perspectives listed in (a), while the 
approaches based on Economics or related subject areas use the 
factors in (b) as the basis for their analysis and sociology 
based approaches emphasise the factors in (c) in their studies 
and analysis. One problem, already mentioned in Chapter 2, is 
that, as the level of complexity in interactions increases, the 
ability of any individual methodology or even discipline to 
faithfully model and effectively attenuate this complexity 
becomes correspondingly decreased. This view has been argued by, 
among others, Bertallanfy[1954], Beer[1962] and Phillips[1979].
The awareness of this phenomenon in the physical sciences led to 
the development of meta-subjects like Biochemistry, Electronics, 
Biotechnology and Chemical Engineering, etc.
In the Arts and Social Sciences, this awareness also led to the 
development of subjects like Econometrics, Psychology, 
International Relations, etc. These subjects and other meta­
subjects were all developed to explain observed phenomena and 
solve perceived problems which could not be adequately explained 
or resolved through the use of existing paradigms. 
Von Bertallanfy[1954], argued that existing subjects are 
inadequate to cope with systems problems, and called for a 
"general systems theory", to serve as a synthesizing subject 
that would be of a multidisciplinary nature and which will focus 
on the "problems" rather than the discipline.
Conflict, like other possible situations in complex systems, 
require a systemic approach to focus on the problem instead of 
the methodology. The development of methodologies for conflict 
study has nevertheless been systematic and mono-discipline rather
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than systemic and multidiscipline. There are notable exceptions 
to these developments however, and these exceptions include Von 
Neumann and Morgenstern[1944 et seq], who developed Game Theory 
from Mathematical and Economic principles. They also include 
Howard[1971 et seq], who developed Metagame Theory from Game 
theoretic and Political principles, Ackoff[1974], who argued for 
an interactive approach to problem solving, and Schelling[ 1960 et 
seq] who applied most of these principles in his treatise on 
conflict. The possibility of involving diverse disciplines in 
seeking solutions to perceived problems is one of the principles 
on which Operational Research and Systems Analysis (OR/SA) is 
based.
3.2
Operational Research(OR) and System Analysis(SA) Methodologies
OR as an activity evolved as a direct response to a major 
conflict situation (WWII); it was developed in circumstances 
similar to those mentioned in the last section, i.e existing 
individual approaches were perceived to be inadequate for the 
solution of the current and anticipated problem situations. OR is 
therefore, unlike most disciplines for conflict study, a 
consciously-evolved meta-subject evolved for problem solving with
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contributions from several subjects, the emphasis being on the 
problem instead of any particular subject. The initial problems 
tackled by OR were mainly at the operating (often called 
operational) level rather than at tactical or strategic levels. 
Nevertheless, methodologies and techniques were appropriated from 
any relevant discipline and used to evaluate the factors that 
influenced a situation in order to produce reasonably 
representative models which could serve as aids to decision 
making.
When the nature of the problems changed from the operating to the 
tactical and strategic levels however, most OR/SA practitioners 
continued to use tools developed for operational level problems. 
This could only be achieved in one of two mutually exclusive 
ways, either to reduce the complexity of the problem to the level 
of the available tools or to increase the complexity of the tools 
to match or surpass that of the problem. Different practitioners 
took different options. In cases where the first option is 
taken, the problems are not really solved as a solution 
inevitably leads to other problems. The second option was adopted 
by other practitioners who developed very sophisticated tools in 
their attempts to obtain solutions.
One major limitation of the majority of these new tools is that 
they are still primarily suited to the operating level of system 
interactions. The situation became one in which there are 
sophisticated models based on simple and operational assumptions 
rather than simple models based on sophisticated, strategic or 
tactical assumptions. Although enhanced with some features for 
tactical and strategic level situations, the results were not 
robust enough to ensure the acceptance of these approaches for
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higher levels of decision making.
This aspect of OR/SA development caused some users to perceive
its relevance as applicable to operational level only and 
inappropriate for use in complex human activity systems. 
Frosch[1969], asserted that SA-based approaches "... are .... part 
of the problem, and indeed causative agents". Zadeh(1972] argued 
that the techniques are inappropriate for dealing with real-life 
situations because "...precise quantitative analyses of the 
behaviour of humanistic systems are not likely to have much
relevance to the real-world..... problems which involve
humans....as individuals or in groups". Mitchell, in a comment
earlier last year [1987], said that he is "..yet to be convinced
of the appropriateness of quantitative approaches to conflict
study".
Hoos[1976], in an outright dismissal of the whole systems 
paradigm, and its usefulness to social systems concluded that 
"...mathematical precocity has saddled us with outrageously 
costly programmes that assure neither peace nor prosperity:
technical virtuosity subvert(s] social planning". She
continued about these approaches that "... they simply were not 
appropriate to the myriad of social tasks to which they were 
being assigned ". These and other criticisms about ORSA led to 
major discussions among the practitioners with many of them 
agreeing with many of the criticisms. Ackoff[1976] agreed with
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most of the criticisms made against OR/SA approaches and argued 
that OR has become a discipline like any other and thus has lost 
its uniqueness as a multidisciplinary activity; the importance of 
such an activity was earlier stated in Ackoff[1966].
Ackoff[1976] explained the reasons for OR's predicament in the 
following words, " In its early days, the nature of OR was 
dictated by the nature of the problems it was asked to solve and 
by the nature of the science it brought to bear on those 
problems. Today the techniques of OR dictate the nature of the 
problems it deals with, and OR has become insensitive to relevant 
developments that are taking place on the frontiers of science 
and society ". OR was becoming at that stage as paradigmatically 
insular as most of the other disciplines, Raitt[1979], however 
asserted that OR has no distinctive subject matter in the way 
physical sciences like Physics have and that "OR does not 
provide an accumulation of theoretical knowledge about the 
world". Dando and Bennett[1979], in the same vein, argued that 
"OR does not generate its own distinctive paradigm in the 
original Kuhnian sense". Nevertheless it was becoming 
increasingly clear that OR was generally perceived as a 
discipline (in the applied statistics mode) rather than as a 
multidisciplinary activity.
The internal debate about the role of OR was continued by 
Ackoff[1979a&b], Bowen[1977] and Dando & Bennett[1981], who
concluded that the classical OR approach with its positivistic 
and quantitative bias "...has foundered on problems... that are 
complex, strategic, behavioural and social". OR was therefore 
ill-equipped to cope adequately with these problems because it 
had become a discipline with a prescribed set of tools rather
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than developing its original meta-disciplinary nature. Recent
developments however indicate that attempts are being made to
revert OR/SA to its multidisciplinary nature and thus enable it
to deal more effectively and efficiently with complex social
systems. These developments are based on the flexibility of
"soft" methodologies now increasingly being used in structured
forms. Despite all the problems enumerated here, the ORSA
approach is still suited to conflict research because of its
These f e a t u ^
inherent power and suitability#/^ coupîed with its regained 
methodological flexibility^^ aid5in the study and analysis of 
complex systems.
3.3 General Conflict Methodologies
These methodologies are not necessarily solely related to 
conflict study or analysis nor necessarily developed for that 
purpose but they are treated here-in the context of the study of 
conflict. Although the choice of methodologies for review was 
determined by the need to draw attention to work done outside and 
inside OR, I reviewed their applications and how they could be 
used to enhance each other in a manner which I consider to be in 
the best tradition of OR. Most of the available methodologies 
for examining conflict situations are formulated for different 
aspects or phases of conflict with their main thrust directed at
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these phases. The methodologies are mostly developed by people 
who perceive some deficiency in currently used ones to adequately 
deal with the phases and therefore develop new ones or add new 
features to the old methodologies.
Some of the factors that could be said to have influenced the 
development of methodologies for examining conflicts are as 
follows :
(a) the " prima facie" existence of a conflict situation
(b) the need to study and analyse conflict situations 
generally
(c) the need to quantify values in a situation for 
analysis and choice of options.
Methodologies based on factor (a) will in most cases, be 
primarily concerned with the management and possible resolution 
of conflicts. Those approaches based on factor (b) will equally 
aim to assist in all phases of conflict whether prevention, 
management or resolution, while factor (c) based methodologies 
are likely to place emphasis on "winnin g" the situation, or at 
least minimising losses.
The methodologies that evolve from factor (a) situations are 
likely to be problem-oriented and pragmatic but without much 
theoretical formulation or background. The theoretical 
explanations for this type of methodology will, in most cases, be 
developed after real-life applications of the process and 
procedures involved. By problem-oriented, I mean that these 
methodologies are the subsequent codification of the procedures, 
processes, notations and expressions, etc that have been 
successfully applied in previous situations, which are now
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presented in a structured format. The theoretical explanation 
for these methodologies are likely to be qualitative and 
descriptive rather than quantitative and prescriptive. These 
approaches are however, limited by the circumstances of their 
development, the developers' familiarity with, and knowledge of, 
other approaches that could be used to improve the methodology.
Methodologies derived from factor (b) are likely to be 
discipline-oriented although probably applicable to conflict 
situations on an empirical basis. The theoretical formulation 
for this type of methodology will usually precede its application 
to real-life situations. The codification of notations, 
expressions and procedures, etc., for discipline-oriented 
methodologies are initially applied to past situations [post-hoc] 
to test their efficacy before application on real-life studies. 
The classification of these methodologies as descriptive or 
prescriptive, quantitative or qualitative, will depend very much 
on the developers. Such categorisation is irrelevant for the 
purpose of this thesis because, for example, analysts and 
researchers have developed quantitative and qualitative 
methodologies from the same basis.
The theoretical formulation for methodologies based on factor (c) 
are also developed prior to possible real-life applications and 
will in most cases be quantitative and prescriptive. These
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methodologies are primarily directed at coping with conflict 
situations rather than studying them. These classifications are 
not exclusive as many methodologies are based on two or more 
factors and therefore do not neatly fit into one specific class.
A possible classification of these methodologies is given in 
Fig.3.1 .
Due to recent developments in some of these methodologies, the 
classification is incomplete, but it is reasonable to suggest 
that factor (a)-based methodologies will, to a large extent, be 
developed by practitioners. Factor (c) methodologies, on the 
other hand, are more likely to be developed by academics. Factor
(b)-based models could be developed by either. In the next 
section, I examine some of these methodologies regardless of the 
factors on which they are based; but as indicated earlier, the 
classification is somewhat arbitrary and the classes are not 
distinct but overlap with each other on a continuous scale. The
methodologies selected for review are drawn from seven main areas
and are as follows:
International relations Problem Solving Procedure
Sociology Institutionalised Conflict Resolution Mechanism
Operational Research Soft Systems Methodology
 Problem Formulation Methodology
Cybernetics------------- Viable System Model
Decision theory---------Robustness Analysis Methodology
General systems---------Ackoff's philosophy
Game theory-----------Metagame Theory and Analysis of options
 Hypergames
This selection is considered as a reasonable sample of available
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methodologies for conflict study: others will be mentioned as
appropriate in later chapters. Ackoff's ideas are discussed as a 
general systems approach because so many of his models are drawn 
from areas which are considered to be outside the "classical" or 
orthodox OR/SA areas of study e.g. philosophy.
3.4 Review of some Existing Methodologies
3.4.1 Problem Solving Procedure (PSP)
This methodology was developed at the Centre for the Analysis of 
Conflict. The model demands a high level of interaction between 
a team of experts and opposing parties. Burton[1969] postulated 
the original concept for the approach based on experiences gained 
in real-life intervention in conflict situations. The original 
concept was called "controlled communication" and involves having 
a group of experts and parties in a conflict or potential 
conflict situation come together, and through a series of 
meetings and joint analysis , evolve a change of perceptions in 
the parties so that the conflict is perceived as a problem facing 
all of them rather than as a conflict with the other parties.
The key to the methodology's successful application is
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therefore in the ability of the experts to change the perceptions 
of the parties through the representation of the problem in 
terms, words and concepts that are satisfactory to all the 
parties for the subsequent joint analysis. Mitchell[1981],
examined the roles and relationships between the group of experts
and the parties. It should be noted that because the methodology 
is a factor (a)-based approach, it originally had little 
theoretical support and literature backup.
The steps involved in PSP are as follows:
(a) assemble group of scientists;
(b) bring opposing parties together;
(c) bargain /negotiate;
(d) joint analysis by all the parties;
(e) resolve.
The determination of these steps has led to the evolution of 
a discernible structure for the methodology. de Reuck (1985) 
represented this structure diagrammatically as shown in Fig.3.2 
There are three distinct phases in the diagram corresponding 
to the different interaction phases between the analysis and 
the parties over time.
70
CONCORDANCE OF
T
Progressive Integration of 
social attention structures.
AND CO G NITIVE FRAME
Phase 3.
Phase 2.
Phase 1.
C o llab o ra tive  shared  
superordinate Cognitive  
fram e
Parties A and B 
consultants ÇAC OB
Conflicjtual mutual 
exclusive frames
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In phase 1, the parties are said to be " talking at" each other 
through the consultants instead of "talking to" each other. 
Mitchell[1981 ] , described this phase as " ventillating" because 
in this phase, the parties air their grievances and seek 
possible sympathy from the consultants. Phase 2 marks the
beginning of the analysis of the situation, it is made up of two
functions of analysis and negotiation/bargaining in alternating 
sequences depending on the progress of the "talks" and the 
attitude of the parties. In phase 3, the process becomes fully
integrated and collaborative based on the assumption that the
metamorphosis of the conflict situation to a joint problem has 
been achieved in phase 2.
de Reuck[1984] defined a conflict situation as "one in which the 
activity of one party actually or foreseeably comes to impose 
unacceptable costs, material or psychic upon another". He goes on 
to distinguish between conflicts of value and conflicts of 
interest, although he acknowledges the difficulty of determining 
the difference. The difference presumably decides how the 
transformation from phase 2 to phase 3 could be achieved by the 
consultants and the parties.
PSP is formulated on the notion that conflicts are "dynamic 
processes constantly absorbing new parties and exposing new 
issues". It attempts to aid the parties in redefining the issues 
so that only genuine issues are introduced into the conflict 
space and resolved. The PSP's classification of conflicts into 
"realistic" (extrinsic) and "unrealistic" (intrinsic), is very 
much similar to Coser's[1954] conflict classification. Coser 
interprets "realistic" conflicts as situations where there are 
genuine incompatibilities between the objectives or goals of the
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parties. Unrealistic conflicts are said to be "illusory", where 
there is a lack of "rational" justification for the situation.
de Reuck[1985] argued that because conflict is a decision process 
that leads to change which in turn leads to further conflict, an 
intervention is required to break this continous loop because 
conflict inevitably becomes a "...symptom of movement in the 
system.... between those who seek new relationships or fresh terms 
of trade and those who prefer the status quo". PSP is thus an 
intervention strategy devised to evolve new relationships between 
the conflicting parties.
The main aim of PSP is conflict resolution rather than management 
or compromise. This aim is to ensure that the solution is self- 
supporting after the consultants have finished with the project, 
de Reuck[op cit], contended that this resolution is sought in the 
relationships between the parties through deciding between 
probable "alternative structural connections" A system's 
structure is considered in PSP to be of relatively consistent 
patterns, while relationships within the system are regarded as 
dynamic and fluctuating.
PSP analysis is more directed at relationships than structures, 
because in its paradigm, structure is viewed as an independent 
entity while relationships are viewed as dependent variables. 
Attempts are therefore made to change or modify the views of the, 
parties from narrow individualism to "rational" holistic views.
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The approach recognises the dynamic nature of systems and the
subjective nature of views and costs of conflicts. de Reuck 
concluded that system's boundaries "...neither coincide nor
remain static" and that costs and views are constantly re­
evaluated in "generally upward" appraisals.
I accept the broad principles of this methodology, but note my 
reservations about the following features in the approach.
(a) The emphasis of the approach on relationship rather than 
structure goes against my opinion that these two aspects 
of systems are too linked together for separate 
analysis. Relationship is determined by structure and 
structure is determined by relationship.
(b) It advocates groups of social scientists specifically as 
the experts best qualified to act as consultants to the 
parties in conflict. This neglects the appropriateness 
of the expertise available from other areas like OR, 
Philosophy, Mathematics etc. and limits the expertise 
available to the group. In other words, why social 
scientists only ?
(c) The analytical methods being used were not explained for 
comparative study or application : much emphasis is
placed on communication. The analytical tools used by 
the consultants (if any) for helping the parties to 
clarify their options should have been included in the 
published literature as it is clear that every problem 
could not be solved by simple communication: that is
real differences could not be communicated away in a 
simple and direct manner.
(d) Most of the methodology is based on and explained almost
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exclusively in Political Science, International 
Relations and Sociology references. Problem solving 
approaches from the business and scientific subject 
areas like Decision Theory, System Dynamics, OR/SA were 
conspicuous by the lack of references to works done 
under their aegis. In these areas, substantial research 
has been and is being carried out on the same theme.
I have already quoted Mitchell[1987] as saying that he is yet 
"to be convinced of the appropriateness of quantitative 
approaches" like OR/SA in this field of study. This comment 
might also serve to explain the absence or under-utilisation. of 
these approaches in studies conducted by other disciplines and 
reinforces my earlier comment on methodological insularity.
3.4.2 Institutionalised Conflict Resolution Mechanism (ICRM)
This approach was proposed by Galtung[1965], in an effort to 
build a mechanism for minimising the negative effects of conflict 
situations, while amplifying the positive aspects that conflicts 
contain. In chapter 2, I gave Galtung's definition of conflict
as follows: "An action system is ..... in conflict if the system
has two or more incompatible goal-states ". He distinguished 
conflict from frustration which he defined as "..the more general 
case where goals are not achieved for some reasons...", but added 
that frustration could lead to the development of conflict. The
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distinction is essential because, if efforts by one party or 
others to obtain some value or objective is being thwarted or 
perceived to be so by other parties in the system, this might, 
over time lead to frustration and eventually to conflict. ICRM 
also distinguishes between inter-system and intra-system 
conflicts, and by implication, the means of resolving these 
situations (these are discussed separately). He defined inter­
system conflicts as "...splitting the system in parts with each 
sub-system standing for its goal-state", and defined intra-system 
conflict as "...a conflict that can be found in the smallest sub­
units of the system down to the individual player".
In the Ackoff[1974] sense, an intra-system conflict could be said 
to occur when sub-systems or components of a defined purposeful 
system are in conflict with other components or sub-systems in 
the defined system or in conflict with the defined system itself. 
Inter-system conflict however, could be explained in the same 
sense as a situation that occurs when autonomous and definable 
systems are in conflict with each other. This definition is based 
on the concept of recursion in .systems. It should be noted that 
because ICRM is based and espoused on a behavioural notion of 
conflict, its expressions and terminology has had to be adapted 
to some extent, to systems language for use in this thesis. Fig
3.3 depicts various types of systems in conflict and their
relationship as identified by Galtung[op cit] in the formulation 
of ICRM.
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Another distinction made by Galtung[op cit] is between conflict 
behaviour and destructive behaviour, Conflict behaviour is 
regarded as not necessarily negative or destructive. 
Coser[1954], argued that conflicts might even "..play some
unifying roles in coalition formation,.....  and the maintenance
of the balance of power between opposing parties " . In the ICRM 
paradigm therefore, conflicts become problematic when the 
behaviours of the parties turn from conflict behaviour to 
negative and destructive behaviour.
The approach also notes that because conflict has a tendency to 
broaden in scope over time, bringing in more resources to fuel 
itself until the available resources become gradually exhausted, 
unmanaged or ill-managed conflicts tend to introduce destructive 
behaviour contrary to their former status. This transition from 
conflict behaviour to destructive behaviour is according to 
Galtung, due to "the frustration-aggression cycle" which is a 
continuous loop because "destructive behaviour tends to be self­
reinforcing". This classification of behaviours into conflict and 
destructive is broadly similar to Ackoff's systemic 
categorisation of conflicts into benevolent and malevolent types 
of conflict. The consequences of unmanaged or ill-managed 
conflict situations on a system when the behaviour becomes 
destructive or the conflict becomes malevolent is depicted by 
Galtung[op cit], as shown in Fig 3.4.
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ICRM is developed on the basis that there are two methods for
managing conflict situations, namely Behaviour control and
Conflict resolution. Galtung[1965] advocated the adoption of
conflict resolution methods instead of conflict management 
approaches and defined conflict management as "...efforts made 
to keep the costs of conflict below a maximum level". He argued 
that behaviour control is a form of conflict management which is 
"...normally directed at regulating conflict behaviour to prevent 
it from becoming unbearably destructive" and therefore should not 
be adopted as a long term conflict resolution strategy. One 
obvious limitation of the behaviour control approach as a 
regulatory mechanism is that the conflict is not terminated or 
even necessarily reduced and might lead to an indefinitely 
protracted situation with all efforts directed at managing rather 
than resolving the conflict situation.
The ICRM is a model for resolution rather than management. 
Conflict resolution is defined by Galtung[op cit], as ".... a 
process that leads the action-system to a state where the 
condition mentioned in the definition of conflict no longer 
exists". It involves the design of and building into an action- 
system of a mechanism that will attempt to resolve potential and 
actual conflict situations within the action-system by keeping 
the parties within the compatibility space of interaction (see 
chapter 2). It also identified three states of an action-system 
as Initial state. Conflict state and Solution state. These 
states are expressed in terms of the distribution of value within 
the system so that, in case of conflict, the mechanism could be 
activated to intervene and resolve the situation.
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The model would also attempt to determine winners and losers and 
ensure the parties acceptance of the prescribed solution. The 
concept is that, on the current conflictuel issue at least, there 
will be no future attempts to move from the final agreed solution 
state. The winner in a two-party conflict is broadly described as 
"...the party with most gains/least loss", while the loser is 
decribed as "...the party with most loss/least gains", all gains 
and losses relative to what they had at the initial state.
Galtung also argued that while military conflicts might "destroy 
value", economic conflicts may "generate value". He further 
argued that in economic conflict situations, it is possible for 
all the parties to be winners if , jointly, they all get more 
than was available prior to the conflict between the parties 
although the gains of one party might be more than others. It 
could thus be concluded that ICRM is a structural-based approach 
that attempts to redesign the structure of an interaction system 
in order to enable conflicts to be resolved .
The concepts of ICRM are broadly similar in outline to 
Ackoff's[1976] notion of ideals in that both aid the move towards 
futuristic achievable states that could be designed and 
incorporated into system structures. A major difference however 
is that Ackoff's ideals are, by implication, unattainable while 
ICRM is achievable. The model, although based on the behavioural 
sciences, accepts that other ideas like game-theoretic-based 
approaches could be used for the analysis and computation of the 
total value of the system in order to help determine the winner
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and the loser in a conflict.
In the arguments about the generation and destruction of values 
however, I believe that some confusion has occurred and conflict 
is being given the same meaning as competition. Value in an 
economic situation is generated during competition or at 
benevolent conflict level, but, after the competition level is 
passed or the interaction moves to a malevolent conflict state, 
it is doubtful whether value could be generated. There is some 
ambiguity over this transiton phase and the contrast between 
military and economic conflicts as used in the example , is too 
great for adequate comparison. I have striven to secure other 
references about this methodology but without success, it is 
possible that more recent developments to the approach might have 
improved it and cleared some of its ambiguities but no sources 
have been found. It has also been impossible to secure unbiassed 
opinions or comparative studies or reports on the use of the 
approach.
3.4.3 Soft Systems Metodology (SSM
The SSM was developed from an "Action Research Programme" at the 
University of Lancaster - see Checkland[1976]. Although not 
primarily developed for applications to conflict situations, I 
have found certain parts of the methodology very useful for 
examining these. One such feature of the methodology lies in its
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process for extracting and modelling in a logical and structured 
manner the individual perceptions of interacting parties in any 
problem-situation. These individual perceptions are derived from 
and through the development of root definitions for the 
individual parties.
This activity takes place during that phase of a study when an 
analyst applies his professional knowledge to the problem, in an 
abstract manner, in order to formulate conceptual models of the 
problem situation. It occurs in step 3 of the methodology's 
sequence of events as represented in Fig. 3.5. The models derived 
from these root definitions are not models of reality but models 
containing structured sets of activities expressing a particular 
view of the system identified and named in the root definition. 
It therefore enables a relevant system to be identified and named 
in order that the situation might be examined and manipulated to 
illustrate present perceptions and values.
The methodology is composed of a series of steps taken at 
various stages of a project. These stages are broadly classified 
into the Real-world phase and Systems thinking about the real- 
world phase. The phases and the various activities within them 
are diagrammatically represented in Fig.3.5; although there is 
much adaptive movement between activities and phases.
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Naughton(1981], depicted the logical structure of the methodology 
as shown in Fig. 3.6.
I noted earlier that the SSM is not primarily a tool for the
study of conflict. Its potential contribution could be
substantial however, if it is used in conjunction with other 
approaches. The methodology attempts to provide structure to 
"soft" systems study without being restrictive. The technique of 
"root definition" has been found to be very appropriate when used 
to enable explicit expressions about the "system-in-conflict" to 
be made through the use of its tabular construct termed CATWOE. 
CATWOE is the mnemonic for the table in Fig.3.7, It is used for 
the identification and naming of the parties in a system in order 
to clarify their individual perceptions (worldviews) about the 
situation under study.
SSM as a whole is an attempt to bring coherence and structure to 
the construction of models used for soft systems study. It is a 
we11-structured guideline for tackling real-world ill-structured 
problems. Its relevance to the purpose of conflict study is,
however, limited to the Root Definition and CATWOE concepts. The
limitation of the approach could be attributed to various factors 
such as the following:
(a) It was not developed primarily for conflict study.
(b) It does not depict relationships between the sub­
systems in an identified system.
(c) It is a pre-analytic data and information collection 
tool rather than an analytic tool.
(d) The methodology is ambiguous in its treatment of 
systems structures.
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Fig. 3.6 Logical structure of the SSM. (Naughton, J. 1981)
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Because of these and other factors, it is necessary to use the 
approach with other methodologies in order to exploit its full 
potentials for conflict study. Indeed, this method was adopted 
for the Ladworth Project in Birmingham when the SSM was used in 
conjunction with the Problem Formulation Methodology (PFM); (see 
the next section for more about the PFM). The Ladworth project 
was carried out for clients that included the following parties:
-the West Midlands Police,
-voluntary organisations,
-statutory agencies,
-council officials and 
-city councillors.
A copy of the project report is included in this thesis as 
Appendix B. I remain in contact with the project administrator 
and committee members who have expressed a wish that I maintain a 
continuous relationship with the Project. This work is again 
referred to in Chapters 4 & 5.
CUSTOMER
(c)
Client (of the activity) beneficiary or victim, 
w hoever Is affected  by the main activity.
ACTORS
(a)
Agents who carry out (or cause to be carried  
out) activities/transformation In system;
TRANSFORM
-A T IO N
(t)
Core of root definition, transformation process 
"carried out by the system.
WELTANSCH/
-U U N G
(w )
The outlook (often unquestioned) or framework 
that gives this particular root definition meaning.
OWNERSHIP
(o)
Ownership of the system, control or sponsorship.
INVIXgl"
SYSTEM
CO NSy^AINT:
Environmental impositions, perhaps interactions 
with wider system.
.R 9 .Æ c A T W 0 E jla W e ^  (Checkland.Pa, 1978)
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3-4.4 Problem Formulation Methodology (PFM)
Forrester[1961] , Anderton[1970] and Checkland[1979a] have all 
argued, for different reasons, that the inadequacies and 
ambiguities of the language used for problem structuring and 
formulation, are largely responsible for the lack of standards in 
communications about systems. These factors are also responsible 
for the ambiguity in role clarification, relationships and 
issues. This criticism of "fudging" is relevant to most studies 
on human activity systems, very relevant to "soft" OR studies in 
general and particularly relevant to conflict study where many 
methodologies take the causes and effects of conflict as given 
and analysis is carried out on the basis of such ambiguous 
assumptions.
It was noted in the earlier part of this report that conflict is 
studied from diverse viewpoints and from different assumptions 
and premises; it could be said that because of this diversity of 
approaches, reasons, tools, disciplines etc., it will be 
extremely difficult to have a standard set of symbols to use for 
communication. However, due to this lack of clear, unambiguous 
generally-accepted language or notation for examining conflict 
situations, most analysts have tended, (subject to professional^ 
knowledge constraints) to evolve ad-hoc diagrammatic
representations of the system and situation being studied or 
examined. This tendency has inevitably led to ill-constructed 
diagrams, lack of standards, and inconsistency in symbol usage, 
with the consequence of ambiguity in interpretations as different 
users give different meanings to similar symbols.
The PFM uses notational diagrams that attempt to reduce these 
limitations in models used for conflict study in particular and 
"soft" systems in general. It is an attempt to evolve standard
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notations that could be applied to the modelling of 
relationships, roles, actions and communications in a conf1ictual 
or potentially conflictual interaction system regardless of the 
contextual settings. It is predicated on the observation that 
causes of conflicts could be sought from these factors of a 
system rather than in one determinate cause at a specific time. 
Bowen[1970], argued that "... it is necessary to avoid defining
an event as a starting point to a crisis the process...is
theoretically infinite in times past and finite but essentially 
unstable in future time".
The notation of the PFM was originally developed by Bowen and 
Smith[1972], primarily for use on the construction of models for 
conflict in complex situations. It has since been improved and 
modified to enable it to be used as a model-cum-analytic tool for 
the problem formulation phase of conflict study. It is an 
interactive model that is designed to enable individual systems 
or sub-systems to be modelled and examined as distinct wholes 
when necessary and as components of wholes if required. 
Bowen[1979], explained the aim of the approach as "...intended to 
provide a framework for continuing discussions between analyst 
and client, and for exploring a growing mutual understanding of 
the problem-situation and issues arising from it". The summary 
of the notation and the rules for linking the symbols was given 
in Bowen [1983a] as shown in Fig.3.8 a, b & c.
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SYSTEM
Individual (also a system)
System and sub-system
■ >
- G
Pptential conflict 
Communiction 
jPurppsefuf action 
Generaf interaction/influence 
Distorted communication 
Distorted purposeful action
Fig. 3.8(a) The PFM notation. (Bowen, K.C. 1 9 8 3 a )
Fig. 3.8(b) Purposeful action 
{ R u l e  17 (Bowen op cit)
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Fig. 3.8 (c) Communications C Rule 2 7 
(Bowen op cit)
EXPLICIT RULES FOR NOTATION
C
Consultant
Client
system
Those
notation
-W Ucit 
formulation of 
problems by 
individuals
Explicit 
formulation 
of problem 
by
consultant
PI
P#
Fig. 3.9 The problem of Problem Formulation. 
(Bowen op çlt)
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Bowen[1983b], states several advantages of the notation, among 
which is that it "..imposes discipline on whoever is drawing the 
diagram by forcing attention to individual systems". The use of 
the notation by an analyst as a basis for exploration and 
communication about individual systems is one of its major 
contributions to conflict study. The problems faced by analysts 
during the problem-formulâtion phase of a study is depicted by 
Bowen[1983a], as shown in Fig.3.9. using the notation. It could 
be seen from the diagram that the relationships between the 
various sub-systems as well as the client-consultant relationship 
could be depicted in the same manner so that the whole system 
could be graphically "taken-in" and understood for study and 
analysis.
The methodology was developed primarily for conflict study in the
OR context and is therefore of double interest in this present
research. It is a factor (a)-based methodology and thus problem 
oriented although it is expressible in set-theoretic terms. The 
notation makes no allowance for overlapping systems and therefore 
each sub-system and system has. to be individually represented; 
this might make the diagrams unwieldy unless considerable 
expertise in its usage has been gained . Another limitation of 
PFM is its inadequacy to incorporate "time" into the models 
although there is hardly any methodology that fully takes
account of time as a resource and as a factor.
Although implicitly recognising these roles of "time" in conflict 
situations, the methodology's emphasis is clearly placed on 
"space" and in studies with critical time constraints, it would 
be time-consuming to construct models at several moments of time 
for every system and sub-system. In order to utilise the
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methodology to its full potential, it is suggested that it should 
be used in conjunction with other methodologies, for the phases 
which PFM does not cover or for the factors it does not emphasise. 
The PFM has been used successfully for several, not primarily 
conflict studies as reported in Bowen[1981], Dakhel and 
Bowen[1987], and in the Ladworth project mentioned in the last 
section. It is also currently being used on a study for British 
Rail and is being adopted by a conflict resolution scheme as one 
of the conceptual models to be used in future projects.
3.4.5 Viable System Model (VSM)
This methodology is based on cybernetic concepts and is primarily 
concerned with the development of viable (robust and stable) 
systems. It was developed by Beer[1962, 1971] and partly based on 
the works of Ashby [1962], who had stated that in any system, 
"...only variety can absorb variety..". The model's thrust is 
therefore, directed at either increasing the variety of the 
system to match opposing variety, or reducing through filtration, 
the impact of the opposing variety on the system. The interest 
of this research in the methodology is in the methodology's
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concepts for designing stability into systems.
Beer[1962], emphasised the importance of "robustness" in 
decisions, arguing that such decisions might have to be sub- 
optimal in order to be stable. The model regards complexity as a 
consequence of interaction between systems which Beer[1978], 
argued could only be managed through organisation. It also adopts 
the approach that there are common principles underlying all 
systems in terms of linkage, feedback and stability which could 
be defined by the synthesis of the information flow between the 
parts of the system. This commonality, and the recursive nature 
of systems makes it possible to map systems' relationships with 
little transformation.
The structures that are mapped out are constructed on neuro- 
physiological models whereby different aspects of a system are 
structured and modelled after some corresponding parts of the 
human body. Thus Beer[1966, 1971, 1979, 1981] speaks of the
heart, the brain, and the sensors of a system. Beer[1986], 
asserts that organisations are, "viable systems" engaged in a 
continuous struggle for survival against environmental 
opposition. He further argued that this struggle for survival is 
replicated at every level of a system because of the recursive 
nature of systems.
VSM is an attempt to assist a system to retain its viability, 
that is, the system's ability to adapt and survive in changing 
environmental circumstances. Beer[1966], maintained that each 
level of a system has to be viable within its defined environment 
as viable systems could only contain and be contained in other 
viable systems. viability is therefore viewed as a structural
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issue that could be built into a system from the smallest 
identifiable unit to the largest definable entity.
The methodology attempts to help systems generate enough variety 
and complexity through organisation (structure) to match the 
opposing environmental variety and complexity in order to remain 
stable and viable. Espejo[1977], portrayed the recursive notion 
of systems as depicted in Fig.3.10.
In order to model external complexities when using VSM, models of 
each element in a system are developed, although Espejo[1979] 
correctly noted that when reality is being modelled, there is
always the possibility of imperfect mapping. Beer[1981] listed 
five functions that could serve to define and describe any
system; namely Policy, Intelligence, Operational Control, Co­
ordination and Implementation. These functions are represented in 
varying degrees at every level of a system. Conflicts or
problem-situations are attributed to mismatches between reference 
models and the system. The organisational structure of a viable 
system is modelled on the basis of how the five functions deal 
with the environment.
The structure is used to analyse a system and regulate its
behaviour. The relationships and interactions at various levels 
also have to be analysed before any meaningful intervention could 
take place. Resolution of any mismatch or perceij^jl conflict is 
carried out through a remodelling and or redesigning of the
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SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
SUB-SUB-SYSTEM
Fig. 3.10 The recursive structure of systems. (From Espejo, R. 1977)
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system's structural relationships and its information flow. The 
organisation structure in a viable system is depicted by 
Beer[1981] as shown in Fig.3.11.
The VSM has a lot of potential for conflict study if properly 
structured and used in conjunction with other methodologies. Its 
contributions would be valuable at the modelling and design 
phases of a study especially where new structures are required to 
replace an existing one. The methodology could also be used to 
validate the designs and conclusions of other approaches. Indeed 
Checkland[1981], states that VSM, among others, could be used to 
validate the output of the SSM.
In spite of Beer[1962]'s advocation of "robustness", VSM appear 
to be highly structured and inflexible, which might mean that the 
"human component" of a designed system is not given the required 
attention . The VSM thus adopts a planned-for or designed-for 
approach to systems which might cause the system to be 
unacceptable to the human components and thus lead to 
instability. Since it is the human component that will make any 
human activity system stable or otherwise, this inadequate 
attention by the methodology to the component makes it in its 
present form impractical for intervention in conflicts in complex 
social systems.
VSM has been applied on several real-live situations with the 
most complex reported project being the attempted redesign of the 
Chilean economy. This project was reported in Beer[1979, 1986]
and in Espejo[1980]. It was later abandoned because of a violent 
change in the goverment through a military putsch. Inadequate 
attention to the human component of the system was unarguably one
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CONTROL
COMMANDX xCO-ORDIN 
y  \  ATION
MONITORING
Sub-system
managementSub-system
Sub-system
managementSub-system
Sub-system
managementSub-system
IMPLEMENTATION
Fig. 3.11 Organisation structure of viable system. (Beer, S. 1981)
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of the contributory factors to the change of government and the 
abandonment of the project. Espejo and Howard[1982], report on 
some work directed towards improving the methodology by enhancing 
the methodology with game-theoretic concepts (part of this work 
is the CONTROL.GEN program which is an important segment of the 
new CONAN software used for demonstration in Appendix A ) .
3.4.6 Robustness Analysis Methodology (RAM
It is necessary first to look at the background of this 
methodology in order to understand my subsequent suggestions that 
it should be included in the tools used for conflict study. It 
evolved from decision theory with the view to enabling 
"stability" to be built into decision outcomes. Decision 
outcomes were classified by Luce and Raiffa[1954], into three 
broad categories of Certainty, Risk and Uncertainty. They 
defined Certainty situations as those "....situations where no 
elements of chance intervenes between decision and outcome"; this 
condition could be seen to hold for the mechanical, deterministic 
systems earlier discussed in Chapter 2.
Risk situations are defined as "those situations where the link 
between decisions and outcomes is probabilistic". These
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situations are very much the same as those typical of socio- 
technical systems also discussed earlier: probabilities have to
be calculated and assigned for the occurence or otherwise of an 
outcome subject to certain actions being taken. Uncertainty 
situations are also defined as "...those situations in which it 
is impossible to attribute probabilities to the possible outcomes 
of any decision". These situations are also very much the same 
as those of complex social systems, earlier discussed.
The similarities of the situations covered by conflict study and 
decision theory, as well as the underlying concepts of the 
theory, give the theory some relevant role to play in conflict 
study because conflict itself, in its many phases is a continuous 
decision process that covers the broad spectrum of Luce and 
Raiffa's classification. The choice of RAM for evaluation in this 
thesis is a choice from the scores of available methodologies 
under the aegis of Decision Theory.
The choice is based on the fact that RAM, with its primary 
objective of building stability into decision outcomes through 
robust decisions, shares a broadly similar objective with my 
research theme which is to aid in the design and building of 
stability-inducing mechanisms into complex human activity systems 
using appropriate methodologies from any available source. If the 
aims of conflict management and resolution methodologies include 
keeping a defined system stable (which it inevitably does by 
implication), the methods and techniques used or at least the 
available tools for analysis, for the evolved structural and 
relational models should include stable-state-producing 
approaches like RAM.
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A decision is said by Luce and Raiffa[op cit], to be stable
"...if the system as modified by these decisions has a long-run
performance which is satisfactory (relative to the alternatives) 
should no further stages of the decision sequence be
implemented". Systems could also achieve stability through
satisficing, which was defined by March and Simon[1958], as 
"...finding any decision whose outcome achieve minimally 
satisfactory levels on all objective measures" and further 
explained as "...finding which of such satisfactory decisions 
rates highest on just one of the objective measures".
The satisficing approach is thus seeking the highest common 
denominator among some of the possible future states which, when 
applied to conflict study, might be useful for conflict
management. It would, however, be inadequate for conflict 
resolution purposes as it merely postpones hard decisions to some 
future time. In some conflict situations, it could even prove to 
be a dangerous approach to adopt because it might serve to 
increase the course and duration of the conflict. An alternative 
approach was therefore suggested by Beer[1967]. He argued that
decision-makers should not necessarily adopt the "best" or most
profitable policy in situations but rather pursue "robust" 
solutions. He suggested some trade-offs of e.g profits for 
"robust" policies that guarantees stability; especially if the 
"best" solution might become insecure in future circumstances. 
Rosenhead, Gupta, and Elton[1972], defined robustness as "...a
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measure of the useful flexibility maintained by a decision in 
achieving near-optimal solutions in conditions of uncertainty" 
Such robustness would be a very appropriate aspect of a solution 
for situations where "optimal" solutions will be inappropriate or 
unacceptable. These situations will include most conflicts in 
complex interaction systems.
The robustness of a decision is thus defined, in the words of 
Rosenhead[1980a], as "the proportion of all known "good" or 
acceptable system states which will still be attainable after 
implementation of that decision". Friend and Jessop[1977 ] , 
following similar arguments, concluded that, "...any process of 
choice will become a process of planning (strategic choice), if 
the selection of current actions is made only after a formulation 
and comparison of possible solutions over a wider field of 
decisions relating to certain anticipated as well as current 
situations". Choices of action or response should thus be based 
on the defined optimal policies to be followed which relate 
"...to intentions for actions whenever situations arise which are 
seen to belong to certain defined classes".
These comments, from different sources and perceptions, are very 
pertinent to conflict study because they reinforce the notion 
that, in conflict situations, alternative viable "solutions" 
should be generated rather than the "best" solution which might 
prove unstable. The ideas also reflect among others, the views 
of Ackoff[1974] on interactive planning, which argued that 
desirable alternative future states could and should be planned 
for in advance. Conflict situation outcomes are in most cases 
uncertain and based on incomplete information, with the 
implication and consequence that "best" or optimal solutions
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might be valid only within a narrow context. They could become 
invalid or unstable in the light of further information, new 
developments or after some time.
RAM attempts to generate as many good alternative solutions as 
possible instead of seeking the only one "best" solution. These 
multiple end-states will ensure flexibility in the plans and 
strategies, adaptability in the actions and in the implementation 
process due to the availability of choice. This approach was 
justified by Rosenhead et al[1972], who argued that "...where 
future variation in uncontrollable factors may significantly 
affect the outcome of ...a plan, it is inappropriate to aim the 
plan at the achievement of what appears on the basis of current 
information to be the "best" end-state for the system".
Rosenhead[1980] continued the trend of the earlier arguments and 
concluded that, by seeking only one optimal solution to a problem 
situation, "...one may by the initial implemented decisions, 
unreasonably restrict the possibilities remaining for the 
subsequent decisions so that little use can be made of the more 
recent information then available". He suggested that initial 
decisions should be made which permits the achievement of as many 
possible defined end-states as feasible. In complex situations, 
where there might be several robust decisions, a discriminatory 
factor is introduced into the model to test for its endurance.
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The discriminatory factor introduced into such models is called 
stability. It is defined by Rosenhead[op cit], as "...the ability 
of the system (as amended by the initial decision or decisions) 
to perform well, should the subsequent stages of the ...plan be 
delayed or cancelled". The stability concept, as defined here, 
is very much similar to the VSM concept of stability which has 
been discussed earlier. The aims of the two concepts are also 
similar and it is reasonable to conclude that the VSM and the RAM 
could be used in conjuntion with each other as they both have 
common areas for possible joint applications. With this account 
of the background of RAM's development, I now return to the 
methodology itself.
RAM uses a quantitative approach for its analyses and is set- 
theoretic in its formulation. The sequence of activities and the 
logical relationships between the sequences in the methodology 
from the inception of a decision situation to decision-taking is 
depicted by Rosenhead[1980b] as shown in Fig. 3.12.
The approach has five principal,activities, labelled A to E in 
the diagram:
[A] construct a set of measures and agree on corresponding 
acceptance levels for each of the relevant effects of 
any decision sequence (activity 7);
[B] identify a representative range of alternative futures 
(activity 6);
[C] identify the set of possible decision sequences 
(activities 1, 2 and 8);
[D] model the consequences of different decision sequence 
for each identified future (activities 3,4,5,9 & 10);
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Fig. 3.12 Flow diagram of robustness methodology. 
(From Rosenhead, J. 1980)
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[e ] select initial decisions or decision sets which (as 
measured by the robustness index - see below ) are 
components of a wide range of acceptable decision 
sequences under most or all the identified futures 
(activities 11 and 12 )
Initial work on robustness analysis (in its present form) 
was reported by Friend and Jessop[1969], and applied in the 
context of Urban Planning. The mathematics of the methodology 
is summarised in Rosenhead et al[1972] as follows:
"..consider a ...problem in which one decision must be chosen 
from a set D[ = (dj^)] of short term decisions:
...one of a set S of alternative solutions will be realised 
in the long run. Any initial decision will restrict the 
attainable plans to subset of S. Suppose that some
subset S of S is currently considered "good".... according 
to some ...satisficing criteria. A subset of 5 will
be attainable after an initial decision d^....The robustness 
of d^ is defined as r^ = n(&i)/n(&), where n(S) is the number 
of elements in set S".
Robustness and stability thus consciously become the necessary 
criteria for the choice of the initial decision from the set D, 
instead of the selection of the apparent "best" choice from the 
set S. The consequence of this is that emphasis is shifted from
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the "plan" to the "process of planning", which in conflict 
terminology could be related to shifting the emphasis from the 
"solution" to the "process of resolution".
The application of this methodology has been primarily directed 
at planning, e.g. Friend and Jessop[1969, 1975], Rosenhead and 
Gupta[1968], Rosenhead et al[1972], and Rosenhead[1978, 1980a,
1980 ]. Its potential contribution to conflict study , however, 
lies in its extensive consideration of a number of end-states 
whose outcomes are not much inferior to that of the "best" end- 
state, but whose effects are more likely to result in stable 
situations than the effect of the "best" solution. Beer's VSM, 
although presented from a cybernetic viewpoint, is arguing for 
and evolving structures designed with goals and objectives 
similar to RAM's, while Bowen[1974], called for the development 
of a paradigm with similar aspirations.
The obvious neglect of the methodology by conflict researchers 
(obvious because of the lack of explicit references to the works 
carried out with the use of the approach in open literature); 
might be due to either the methodological insularity earlier 
mentioned in Section 3.1 or the lack of awareness of the 
potential contributions of the methodology to conflict study. It 
might also be due to the fact that the approach has no obvious 
facility for examining the options open to other parties in the 
system.
Rosenhead and Wiedemannf1979], has reported on further 
developments to RAM: this involves some extensions which aim to
"incorporate explicitly... the interdependence of decision 
makers". Best, Parston and Rosenhead[1986] also reported on 
further work carried out with the methodology making note of the
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fact that it was used in conjunction with other approaches like 
Delphi analysis and cluster analysis. Such enhancement would 
further improve the potential contributions of the approach to 
conflict study. While the importance of the facilities for 
analysing various parties' options could not be over emphasised, 
and the fact that RAM does not possess this facility could not be 
overlooked, its ability to enable different end-states to be 
modelled and evaluated on stability rather than optimising 
criteria makes this methodology a potentially powerful one, 
especially if used with other methodologies that possesses those 
facilities that it lacks. Methodologies like metagames/analysis 
of options, hypergame etc fit into this category.
3.4.7 Ackoff's Philosophy
Ackoff's ideas on conflict could not be placed in any one of the 
methodological categories of section 3.3. His approach to the 
study of systems!in conflict situations or otherwise) is holistic 
and his ideas on the relationship between cause and effect stems 
from the producer-product concept(or non-determini Stic cause and 
effect) of Singer. In this section, I will not be reviewing any 
particular methodology of Ackoff "per se", but will discuss some
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of the thoughts that underlie his concepts and ideas. Ackoff
[1966], argued that conflicts could only develop in interaction
systems where and when an action by one party has an adverse
effect on the other party. He developed a model to explain
this concept of conflict development as follows:
In a given environment [N] where and I2 are interacting
systems, Let = a course of action i = l, 2...ra (cause)
Oj = an outcome j = 1, 2...n (effect)
U = utility EU = expected utility
S = purposeful state
DE = degree of exploitation
DC = degree of co-operation or conflict 
= selected actions
Ej^ j = ways action are carried out
Any conflict situation could then be represented, modelled or
specified by the following:
(a) the presence of both parties in the environment N
(b) the P^'s of 1-^ and 12
(c) the Uj's of I2 and I2
In order to model the situation, it is computed as follows:
Let (s|l2 ) represent a state in which I2 is part of l^'s 
environment
Let (sI?2 ) represent a state in which I2 is not part of I^'s 
environment
If I2 and I2 are in the same environment, 1 2 's behaviour may 
affect I^'s behaviour.
If l2 *s presence decreases I^'s expected utility, it could be
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said that I2 is in conflict with
If however, I^'s presence increases I^'s expected utility, it 
could be said that I2 is in cooperation with I^. The degree of
conflict or co-operation between and I2 (as it affects I^),
could then be expressed as:
DC 2 1 = EU^ (s|l2 ) - EU^ (s|l^)
If DC 2 1  is positive, 12 cooperates with if it is negative,
12 is in conflict with I a n d  if DC 2 1 = 0, then I^'s behaviour
has no effect on and is not part of behavioural
environment.
On the same continuous scale, the degree of cooperation between 
the two parties as it affects 1^» given as:
DC^2 - EU 2 (s|lj^) - EU 2 (s|l'^), and the difference between DC 2 1  
and DC^2 i-s the measure of exploitation. In a cooperative 
situation, where the cooperation is unequal, exploitation is 
said to be benevolent while in conflict situations, where the 
conflict is also unequal, the exploitation is regarded as 
malevolent. In certain situations, where one of the parties 
cooperates with the other(s) while the other party(ies) is in 
connflict with the first party, the situation is adjudged to be 
"normal" presumably because the conflict has not been "joined" 
by the first party.
Ackoff[op cit] considers competition as regulated conflict (on
a continuous scale) and agrees with the view of Rapoport[1961] 
whom he quoted in regard to such situations as saying that
" .......in a fight, the urge is to eliminate the opponent;
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in a game the problem is to outwit the opponent; in the debate, 
the goal is to convince the opponent". He then suggested three 
measures to change a conflict situation; namely, to remove one or 
both parties from the environment, to change the environment so 
that the effect of the behaviour of one party on the other is 
removed, and lastly to change the selected options/actions( ) ,  
the way they are carried out(Eij5 ), or the utilities placed on 
the future(Uj^5 ).
In Ackoff[1974], the producer-product concept was explained as a 
situation where certain causes might be necessary but not 
sufficient for some effects. This is said to be "...because a 
produce!r) is not sufficient for its product, other producers(co­
producers) are also necessary. Taken collectively these
constitute the producer's environment hence, the producer-product 
relationship yields envi ronment-full(open-system) not
envi ronment-free(closed-system) thinking. Emphasis is thus 
placed on the interactions within the purposeful system in a 
manner that is very much similar to the causal texture concept of 
Emery and Trist[1965], as well as the conflict ecology notion of 
Spink[1977].
Ackoff[1974, 1979a, 1979b] argued that OR should direct its
attention to the planning for and design of systems that are
stable and yet inherently flexible enough to be adaptable to 
probable future circumstances. His arguments are based on the
observation that complex social systems are probabilistic and
non-determini Stic by nature. These ideas on social systems and
the concept of planning for such systems was examined by
Ackoff[1974,1979b], under the four headings of Inactive, 
Reactive,- Preactive and Interactive modes of planning. He partly
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attributes conflicts to the modes of planning adopted for most 
systems design, and argued against the continued use of the 
Inactive, Reactive and Preactive modes.
He advocated the adoption of the Interactive mode of planning for 
the design of stability into future states in interaction 
systems. Interactive planning is based on three operating 
principles :
(a) the participative principle which seeks to involve the 
parties in the system in the planning process with the 
planners ;
(b) the continuity principle which advocates a continuous 
process of planning that will involve revisions and 
amendments as the need arises;
and (c) the holistic principle that stresses the importance of 
simultaneously planning for every part of the system (at 
the same level) in an interdependent rather than in the 
isolatory manner that is common to other approaches.
The five phases involved in interactive planning were outlined by 
Ackoff[1979b] as follows:
formulating the mess; 
means-ends planning ; 
resource planning ;
organisational and management planning ; and 
design of implementation and control.
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These five phases are interdependent rather than distinct phases, 
and there are continuous loops forward and backward to other 
phases during the duration of a project. Ackoff[1974] further 
argued that most disagreements(potential conflicts), tend to 
develop because of means rather than goals or end-states, and 
thus "...problems and solutions are... snapshots of a moving 
process", which are in a state of "constant flux" due to the 
observed fact that "...purposeful systems and their environments 
are constantly changing" He concluded that "...problems do not 
stay solved", because "..problems are conceptual constructs 
abstracted from complex situations that are systems of problems, 
messes. Solutions are also abstractions.... therefore solutions 
require....continuous maintenance and improvement".
The first point of note in Ackoff's ideas is the transformatory 
nature of the ideas themselves; this could be traced from his 
1966 work on conflict with its hard, predictive and deterministic 
approach to his 1969 publication calling for a new approach to 
the study of social systems by , OR/SA practitioners. His 1974 
book further expanded the theme started in the 1969 publication 
and his subsequent works(1979a and 1979b) have continued the 
theme of adapting to developing circumstances. The potential
contributions to conflict study lies in the conceptual 
formulations rather than any specific technique and although it 
broadly encapsulate several ideas within its framework, the 
choice of any particular approach is left to the user.
If we agree that conflict situations could be described as 
"messes" in the Ackoffian sense of the word(I believe we should), 
the ideas depict a structured approach that could be used on its
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own, or in conjunction with other selected methodologies to
study, examine and analyse a situation. Ackoff's "volte face" on 
ideas and his shift of emphasis from the "plan" to the "process 
of planning" led to a very long debate in the OR Society and 
contributed to the emergence of "soft" OR. Bowen[1983] among 
others expresses clearly his acceptance of Ackoff's philosophy 
and its influence on his thinking. Dando and Bennett[1981]'s
seminal paper on the state of OR and the subsequent debate 
generated is to a large extent influenced by his ideas and
undoubtedly also contributed to the rapid development of "soft" 
OR.
Ackoff[1974] explains the co-ordinated planning sub-phase of the 
holistic principle(earlier mentioned) as follows: "... all aspects 
of a system should be planned for simultaneously...e .g planning 
to reduce crime should involve all aspects of the criminal
justice system and more: education, housing, employment, health
services, welfare and so on.... in planning, breadth is more 
important than depth and interactions are more important than 
action". This statement accurately reflects the study on the
Ladworth Project(Appendix B) and although the analysis was
carried out with the SSM and PPM approaches, this reflection 
indicates the permeating influence of Ackoff's ideas on the field 
of studies of different types and on the potential uses to which 
the ideas can be put. It could be concluded that Ackoff's 
philosophy is problem oriented rather than discipline-oriented
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because his emphasis is on the process of resolution rather than 
on a particular means of problem-solving.
3.4.8 Game Theoretic Models
von Neumann and Morgenstern[1944 et seq] explained game theory as 
"..a theory with the general aim of extending the mathematical 
framework to enable one to analyze games of chance... and... games 
of strategy to decision situations regardless of context". Game 
theory is therefore essentially a theory for the construction and 
manipulation of games to simulate, understand and predict the 
probable behaviour of interaction systems. It is a development 
from probability theory and gambling theory but allows conflict 
situations and the parties subsequent choices of strategies to be 
quantified and modelled. In its original form, game theory is 
based on the notion that parties in a conflict 
situation!players), will make rational choices and options. e.g 
Schelling[1980] and Luce and Raiffa[1957].
Rationality is a concept that could be defined as the repetitive 
behaviour of a party or person in an expected pattern or manner 
in a defined circumstance that is consistent with commonly shared 
norms and values. Schelling[op cit], explained rationality as 
"..a collection of attributes..." and argued that irrationality 
could imply "..a disorderly and inconsistent value system, 
a decision among individuals who do not have identical value
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systems....". Rationality in conflict situations thus presumes 
that the parties in such situations will act in a consistent and 
probably predictive manner with value-maximising strategies.
This notion of rationality and its universal application to
conflict situation was challenged by Howard[1966] who argued 
that rationality may break down and give way to irrationality 
among decision makers(players). This is because, in certain 
situations, "irrational" acts might yield, eventually, better 
results than "rational" acts. Schelling[op cit], also pointed out
that "...many of the critical elements that go into a model of
rational behaviour can be identified with particular types of
rationality or irrationality". The scale of behaviour from 
rationality to irrationality is thus on continuum rather than a 
discrete scale.
Howard!1968] demonstrated the probable breakdown of rationality 
through games like Prisoner^ Dilemma. He proposed an improved 
version of the basic theory that could reflect this breakdown and 
thus remove this limitation. This version of game-theoretic 
approach is called meta-game theory. The presentation and 
application of the theory was improved by evolving a notation 
schema of zeros and ones that allows the theory to be applied to 
complex situations without the use of the complex mathematical 
formulae underpinning the theory.
One limitation of basic games theory which is also applicable to
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meta-games is the inherent assumption during the modelling phase 
that the parties in a conflict situation are playing the same 
game or perceive similar situations; i.e. that the parties share 
a common perception of the situation. Bennett[1980], outlined a 
methodology that removed this limitation and enabled the 
perceptions of individual parties to be modelled in addition to 
their perceptions of their opponent's games or options. This 
methodology is called hypergames.
Another methodology being developed to enhance game-theoretic 
based models in general, and meta-games in particular, is 
Cybergames which is being developed by Howard and Espejo[1982]. 
It combines the features of the meta-game approach of 
Howard!1971] and Radford!1977] (also termed analysis of options), 
with the VSM of Beer[1976](earlier discussed) and the additional 
ideas of Espejo[1979]. Only meta-game and hypergame will be 
reviewed in this thesis since they, in my opinion, adequately 
highlight the contributions of game-theoretic based models to 
conflict study.
3.4.9 Meta-game Theory and the Analysis of Options (MT/AO)
Howard!1971] explained metagame in relation to basic game theory 
as a "...non-quantitative but fully mathematical theory". The 
methodology uses mathematical sets and relations to analyse and 
select preferable outcomes in conflict situations. A major 
difference between MT/AO and conventional game theory is what 
he described as "the third breakdown of rationality" and which
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deals explicitly with possible "irrational" actions and options. 
This notion is recognised and modelled in meta-games but not 
explicitly recognised in conventional game theory. Howard!1975] 
argued that this advancement of meta-game has made it a more 
powerful tool than basic game theory partly due to its ability to 
"...produce certain conditional predictions..." that is obviously 
more representative of "reality" than the basic theory.
The options from which these predictions are made are expressed 
in terms of the binary notation; ! 1] is used to denote a favoured 
option, while ! 0] is used to represent an unfavoured option and 
! -] is used to denote an open option which might or might not be 
taken but whose effect on the outcome is considered to be 
minimal. The adoption of this notation is a significant break 
from conventional game theory and has made meta-game theory more 
"user-friendly" than the conventional theory due to its 
simplicity. The methodology however requires a close working 
relationship between the analyst and the client, this is because 
the building, development, modifications and interpretation of 
its models are best carried out in an interactive manner between 
the analyst and the client or representatives.
Shepanik and Howard!1977] described the MT/AO procedure as a 
"...sequential, client-interactive technique for the analysis of 
options in conflict situations in systems". Analysis is based on 
the data supplied by the client and collected from other sources.
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The logical flow of the steps and activities involved in using 
MT/AO is given by the authors as shown in Fig.3.13. In the 
approach, possible future situations are modelled!scenarios) and 
expressed in terms of the choices of the course of 
action(options), open to the parties in conflict(players). A 
group of players acting in concert is referred to as a coalition.
The methodology has been broadly applied to diverse areas of 
study like military conflicts as reported in Howard[1968, 1970],
to economic/business situations as reported in Radford and 
Fingerhut[1979] and in Howard!1975], to social situations as 
reported in Howard ! 197 3a] and to political situations as reported 
in Howard!1973b]. A copy of a situation analysis is attached as 
an appendix(Appendix A) using the computerised version of the 
methodology which has been developed as an application package.
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1.
4.
List players and options. ^
Select a particular 
scenario p/s.
Select a particular; 
player (or coalition), p/p.
Find all unilateral 
improvements for p/p  
from p/s.
If none exist 
 ^
If any exist
6. Find all sanctions If any exi^t
against p/p for p/s.
1
If none exist 
1  •
6. Find all gauranteed improvements for p/p 
from p/s.
Fig. 3 .13  Flowchart of metagame analytic procedure. 
(From Shepanik. L and Howard, N. 1977)
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The contributions of metagame theory to the analysis of conflict 
situations are significant; initially, it was confined in its 
application to users versed in mathematics, but it has since, 
been adapted especially through its associated computer software, 
to be used by anyone, with or without the aid of an analyst. One 
of its major contributions to the process of conflict study is 
its formal recognition of the differences in the understanding of 
rationality by parties in a conflict.
The evolution of a binary notation in the methodology to express 
available options for different players has simplified the 
complex process of modelling with game theoretic approaches. Its 
ability to model and analyse individual scenarios facilitates the 
predictability of the effects and possible consequences of each 
option adopted or rejected by the party using the model. The 
approach is best utilised however, as a tool for conflict 
management(if used as a stand-alone methodology), and not as a 
tool for resolution; because resolution requires all the parties 
in a conflict to evolve generally acceptable and mutually 
enforceable strategies that will, remove the basis for the defined 
conflict, and MT/AO can only be used for one party or coalition 
at any one time.
The approach also assumes that the players/parties are playing or 
perceiving the same situation . I consider this assumption to be 
wrong and unreliable because experience has shown in various 
studies and projects like the Ladworth Project(appendix A) and 
Bowen!1981] that perceptions of parties in interaction systems 
differ not only in what they observe but also in their 
interpretation of events. MT/AO is a discipline-based methodology 
that has been made general enough to be regarded as a problem-
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based approach. The solutions derived through the use of this 
methodology might prove unstable for two basic reasons.
The first reason is that it lacks the facility to model all the 
parties options even with their intention to cooperate and thus 
it could not make simultaneous predictions. Secondly, because it 
is primarily best suited for use with one party or coalition, it 
tends to seek optimal solutions that is in the best interest of 
the client rather than the best interest of the system and thus 
it is an optimal seeking approach rather than a stability-seeking 
one.
3.4.10 Hypergame Methodology
This approach is a development from metagames and has overcome 
some of the limitations of MT/AO noted in the last section 
especially on the issue of the players perceptions. Bennett and 
Huxham[1980] asserted that, unlike MT/AO, the hypergames approach 
allows the consideration and analysis of "....possible types of 
perception from the different players perspectives of the 
situation in terms of strategies and preferences". The resulting 
model is then analysed as a whole in order to trace through the 
consequences of any assumptions.
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The methodology is based on the notion that parties in a conflict 
seldom perceive the same situation!ie the players' perceptions 
of their own games and their opponents' games or situation 
usually differ from each other). Bennett[1980] gave the 
procedures involved in building hypergames model as follows:
a) specify models;
b) set up assumptions about each player's perceptions (ie 
construct games for each player) and
c) define a set of related games.
An example of how the use of the methodology could improve the 
analysis of situations is given by Bennett!op cit] with the use 
of two 2-player game matrices(one using the conventional games 
approach and the other using the hypergames approach) and 
reproduced here as Figs.3.14 (a) and (b).
It can be seen from these two games that both players p and q 
have different perceptions of each other's games and strategies.
In post-hoc studies of real-life conflict situations carried out 
by Bennett!1980b], Bennett and Dando!1979], Bennett, Dando and 
Sharp!1980] on economic, military and social system situations, 
the results suggest that these differences in perceptions might 
have played significant parts in determining the eventual 
outcomes of the conflicts. Huxham and Bennett ! 1984] and 
Bennett ! 1986 ] have reported developments to the methodology such 
as using a binary notation of the MT/AO format to simplify
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M— Sq ----------------p
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>p'>q
1
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J
1
._J_____
one outcome 
of the game
p.q are players
Sp represents p's strategy set
Sq represents q's strategy set
> p  Is p's preference for each outcome 
(one outcome 'cell' is shown)
> q  similarly denotes q's preference
Fig. 3 .1 4 (a ) Structure of a two-player game. (Matrix representation from 
Bennett, P. 1980)
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1 1 
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Spq
Player p's game:
Spp(=Sp) is p's perception of his 
own strategy set
Sqp 4S p's perception of q's 
strategy set
Each outcome 'cell' , , 
.contains an expression of p s 
preference for that outcome, >pp 
(=>p) and his perception of q's 
preference,xip
Player q's game:
Spq is q's perception of p's 
strategy set
Sqq(=Sq) is q 's  perception of his 
own strategy set
Each outcome 'cell contains an 
expression of q s perception of 
p's preference for that outcome 
>pq, and his own preference
>qq(=>q)
Fig. 3 .14(b ) Hypergame representation of a two-player game. 
(From Bennett, P. op cit)
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presentation and also enhance the methodology with the use of the 
cognitive mapping techniques of Eden, Jones and Sims[1983].
Bennett[1980a] asserts that the methodology might be most useful 
firstly in the preliminary problem structuring phase, and 
secondly, in the format modelling and analysis phase of any 
conflict study. I agree with the second claim but differ on the 
first assertion, because like most game theoretic based models, 
it has no facilities or tools to identify and structure the 
relationship between the parties. Thus it is ill-equipped to 
properly structure the problem.
The methodology is also an optimal-solution seeking approach and 
thus might yield solutions which could later become unstable, 
especially since it could only be used by one party to a conflict 
rather than for joint use by all parties as a stable-solution 
seeking tool. This emphasis on optimal solutions means that sub- 
optimal or secondary but stable goals are not explicitly catered
for. IIASA[1981] noted that "...... a first stage in modelling
should be the identification of primary and secondary goals 
together with interlinkages which would have the effect of 
unifying the various system components and subystems"
Fleissner(1981) concluded that "..It can never be claimed that 
one and only one model captures reality". This inference by 
Fleissner, that no simple methodology can be robust enough to
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encapsulate all the dimensions of an interacting system, is most 
true when applied to conflict situations which, by definition, 
implies some elements of dynamic instability. One major and 
notable contribution of the methodology to the study and analysis 
of conflict is its introduction of the notion of formally 
recognising and modelling the different perceptions of the 
parties to a conflict situation.
3.5 Commentary on Chapter 3
All the methodologies reviewed so far have something to 
contribute to various phases of conflict:
(i) identifying and naming the parties and their world views;
(ii) structuring their relationships and consequently their
problems ;
(iii) modelling and analysing;
(iv) designing a new structure or solution;
(v) testing solutions in the light of new information; and
(vi) implementing solutions in accordance with plans earlier 
made.
Clearly what is required in this area of study is not the 
development of new techniques or even methodologies but a 
paradigm that could assist in the choice of the relevant 
methodology for the appropriate phases of a conflict situation 
from prevention to resolution. This thesis attempts to evolve 
such a paradigm that cuts across the disciplinary divide. If it 
were successful only in drawing attention to the availability and 
relevance of these methodologies, it would still be of value. In 
the next chapter, I will examine how some real-life conflict
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situations have been resolved or managed. The aim is to elicit 
some common elements (if any) of these situations, either in the 
development of conflicts or in their resolution.
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CHAPTER 4
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, DISSOLUTION AND RESOLUTION 
Introduction
This chapter examines the theme of how conflict situations are 
settled and the prospects for the various settlement approaches. 
I compare the approaches and argue for the adoption of resolution 
approaches that redesign the relationships between the system in 
a way that is acceptable to the conflicting parties. I discuss 
through the use of case studies two complex systems that have 
been succcessfully redesigned and one case study of a system that 
could have benefitted from such a redesign. I also look at the 
notion of legitimacy and perception formulation relation to
systems interaction, as well as how issues are made relevant or 
irrelevant by parties in a conflict situation to the situation 
with the introduction, elevation, withdrawal or rejection of 
these issues into or from the defined conflict space.
^Yhis a continuation of the theme started in Chapter 2. In
Section 2.3, I discussed the development of conflict over time
and used the Y-diagram (Fig.2.5), to demonstrate the movement of 
interactions from "normal" to "overt conflict", on an escalatory 
basis, until an intervention interrupts and de-escalates this
movement. The Y-diagram showed this movement in interactions on 
both vertical and horizontal axis. It equally demonstrates how 
an intervention could revert the interaction back to "normal", 
although a new level of "normalcy" might now be more appropriate.
In the same Section(2.3), I used the J-curve diagram of
Davies[1962] to depict the point of potential conflict and also
1^7
utilised some parts of the Harris[1974] classification to depict 
scales of conflict.
In the last chapter(i.e Chapter 3), I reviewed some of the 
methodologies currently in use for the study of conflict and 
contended that most of them are methodologies for the management 
of conflict situations rather than methodologies for resolution. 
In this chapter, I intend to examine the issues of management, 
dissolution and resolution of conflict and look at some systems 
that have been involved in conflicts in order to draw some 
possible general conclusions from the methods used by these 
systems to deal with their respective conflicts. I will also 
examine the levels of conflict, covering issues like perceptions 
of the parties and how conflict spaces are determined.
I shall conclude this chapter by arguing for the conscious 
redesign of interaction systems, basing my arguments on the 
evidence drawn from the three case studies presented. I briefly 
look at the question of "ownership" in intra-system and inter­
system interactions and contrast conflict management with 
conflict resolution as well as how some of the methodologies in 
use could be synthesised and used for various phases in conflict 
study.
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4.1 Levels of Conflict
Conflict levels could be said to be on a hierarchical scale, but 
with each identifiable concept that could serve to define these 
levels containing, and itself contained by, other related 
concepts. These levels are determined by the defined scope and 
intensity of perceived negative comments, exchanges, actions etc 
that accompany various phases of an identified conflict 
situation.
The scope of a conflict situation is dependent mostly on time, 
previous areas and degrees of interactions and available 
resources. Conflict intensity is, on the other hand, very much 
dependent on committed or committable resources, the 
raison d'etre for the conflict, from each party's point of view, and the 
objectives of the parties. The levels of conflict fluctuate in 
accordance with the combination of scope and intensity: thus, it
is possible to have conflict situations of high intensity but 
narrow scope or situations of. broad scope but low intensity. 
Conflict situations that combine high intensity with a broad 
scope might develop into a Hobbesian situation "where everybody 
uses all possible means of destruction against everybody else", 
unless a timely intervention is made to de-escalate the situation 
by reducing the scope and intensity.
Because the complex nature of interactions and structure of human 
activity systems makes the total elimination of "undesirable" 
conflict in complex systems an "ideal" rather than a "real" 
state, most research activities and studies are directed at 
keeping conflicts at manageable levels or at least preventing the
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development of malevolent conflict(and, where it has developed, 
to minimise its effects).
The scope and intensity of conflict situations are determined by 
the interplay of the various factors that define the structural 
relationships and interactions between the systems. These
factors include the Perceptions(ie the interpretation of the 
weltanschauungen) of the parties(eg. of each other's legitimacy, 
actions, etc); the relevancy or irrelevancy of issues to the
conflict (as seen by each party); and the relative Stability of 
relationship prior to the development of the current conflict
situation. System's perceptions are formed and articulated by 
the decision-making sub-set of the system. By implication, this 
sub-set also determines the levels and degree of complexity of 
the system's relationship with other systems. These levels of 
interaction and complexity eventually determine the scope and 
intensity of future conflict situations.
Fig.4.1(a) and 4.1(b) depict two opposite trends in systems'
interactions and show various levels of relationships. Fig.4.1(a) 
shows an escalatory trend from a close relationship into a
malevolent conflict situation. Two examples of this type of
relationship are the Iran-USA relationship from the period of the
Shah till the present[Aug.1987], viz. since a change of
leadership occurred in Iran; and the USA-Libya relationship after 
a change of leadership in Libya from King Senussi to the present
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leaders of Libya. These interactions went from close 
relationships under the previous leaders to ones of overt 
hostility under the present leaders. Two examples that could be 
used to illustrate Fig.4.1(b) are the USA-Japan relationship and 
the Federal Republic of Germany-USA relationship. The USA-led 
alliance defeated these two countries in the second world war 
[WWII] but, since then, the relationship has developed in a 
pattern reasonably similar to Fig.4.1(b).(ie from overt hostility 
to close relationship).
Systems relationships from the "close" level to the level of 
"covert hostility" might be interpreted as "normal" depending on 
the previous levels of interactions. In the next three sections, 
I will be examining those factors earlier mentioned that 
contribute significantly to the levels of conflict; namely 
perceptions, stability and the relevancy/irrelevancy of issues.
4.2 Perceptions of Legitimacy
Legitimacy could be broadly described as what a majority or a 
generally accepted framework confers on a decision making system 
or on a decision itself. Legitimacy could evolve over time,
derived from experience or force or in most instances
delegated(devolved) from a higher authority. Rosenbaum[1975], 
argued that it could also be derived from "tradition, religion 
and judicial decisions" among other sources.
Perceptions are mostly based on the subjective interpretation of
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facts, issues and observations set against some prior information 
set(data base). They form the basis of systems interactions and 
could be said to be the pivot around which conflict revolves. 
Because all conflicts are in part(and probably a large part) 
traceable to different weltanschauungen and perceptions, any 
intervention in conflict situations ought to seek to minimise 
misperceptions between the parties. Most actions and reactions 
are formulated on these perceptions and, in turn, determine and 
help to formulate the opposing party's responses and reactions on 
a continuous basis that will escalate or de-escalate an ongoing 
situation.
Systems interactions are based on role definition and role 
playing; these roles are either dictated by circumstances, forced 
by one party on the other(s) or generally agreed upon by the 
parties. In order for the system to remain stable within its 
defined interaction space and prevent the development of 
malevolent conflicts, each system or sub-system must be perceived 
to be playing its defined and accepted role. Any deviations or 
perceived deviations from these roles or disagreement over the 
roles by one or more of the sub-systems diminishes acceptance of 
the roles and consequently the legitimacy, of both the original 
role, which has been compromised, and the perceived new role, 
which has not been accepted or legitimized. This shift in the 
perceptions of systems on the legitimacy of roles is one of the
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key determining factors of the level of conflict.
In an intra-system situation, a decision sub-system may be 
classed as illegitimate in various ways. It may be perceived by 
the systems's owners(in the CATWOE sense, section.3.4) as 
illegitimate. Its legitimacy may have been withdrawn by the 
legitimizing or conferring authority as would be the case for 
example, in a democracy by the people, in a communist country by 
the party, and in a military dictatorship by the armed forces. 
On the other hand, illegitimacy may stem from a challenge to 
authority by a powerful minority who might challenge and possibly 
remove the authority through defeats at elections, purge of party 
officials, revolutions and coup d'e' tats
Most systems structure and formulate their offence/defence 
mechanisms to match their perceptions and counter the effects of 
opposing hostile activities. Legitimizing authorities confer 
legitimacy on decision sub-systems that will best serve their 
interest in the light of threats and objectives. Because there 
is no identifiable logical , structure to the process of 
legitimacy, my conclusion is that legitimacy is determined by 
subjective processes that change over time and circumstances 
depending on the objectives and means of the conferring 
authority.
In 1948, the People's Republic of China with more than 
750,000,000 people and constituting about 95% of the Chinese 
population was deemed illegitimate and refused membership of the 
United Nations because of the USA veto in the Security Council, 
while the Nationalist Republic of China(Taiwan) with less than 5% 
of the population, was legitimized and regarded as speaking for
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the Chinese people. This situation was reversed in 1971. In the 
case of Cyprus, where the situation is still fluid, the Greek 
part of Cyprus is currently deemed legitimate by the United 
Nations Organisatio(UNO), while the "de facto" Turkish part of 
Cyprus is regarded as illegitimate.
Legitimacy of individuals as leaders is similarly dependent on 
changing situations and political expediency. The political 
careers of Sir Winston Churchill and General de Gaulle prior to 
the second world war, during the war and immediately after the 
war tend to reflect this condition of legitimacy suggesting that 
leaders in war are not necessarily acccepted in peacetime.
4.3 Concept of Stability
Political scientists and writers are mostly agreed on the notion 
that most systems in conflict are unstable. Indeed Jaros[1973], 
Rosenbaum[1975] and Pi rages[1976] argued in varying degrees about 
stability and the absence of conflict in political systems. 
Sociologists like Phillips[1976] and Coser[1956] as well as 
Systems Engineers like For rester[1971] also examined the effect 
of conflicts on systems' stability; while Cyberneticians like 
Ashby[1962] and Beer[1979] evolved means of designing systems 
that are capable of maintaining their stability in conflict 
situations.
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Systems are basically composed of dynamically interacting sub- 
systems(a situation which makes the laws of thermodynamics 
very relevant and applicable to its study). The principles 
underlying thermodynamics makes the stability of a functional (or 
any interacting) system a relative issue, because the dynamism 
and complexity of its interfaces makes fluctuating relationships 
more realistic and "normal". Levels of conflict in such 
interacting systems therefore also depend on how the systems 
perceive the stability of their relationships. Distinction 
should be made however between structural relationships and 
general relationships as well as the attendant stability and 
possible fluctuations in these relationships.
Structural relationships are based on the intrinsic/inherent 
relationships of shared values and culture that has evolved due 
to geographical proximity or historical collaboration. Such 
relationships could also be deliberately designed and used to 
integrate systems, thus fostering interdependency on the systems 
to the extent that most sub-systems of the integrated system are 
affected. General relationships however are based on a more 
compartmentalised approach, without the in-depth impact on the 
systems that the structural relationship has.
Structural relationships are relatively permanent and can 
withstand and survive potentially damaging malevolent conflict 
situations although the relationship might emerge in a modified 
form. It is rather difficult to change structural relationships. 
General relationships are more flexible and malleable; they form 
the basis of most routine interactions and could be said to be 
the operational or executive aspect of interaction. These
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relationships are ultimately based on individual structural 
relationship and their flexibility is based on the latitude given 
for interpretation by the decision sub-system.
Fluctuations(or flux) usually occur on a constant basis in 
general relationships and thus introduce some elements of 
instability into the interactions, but, in systems with strong 
positive structural relationships, these situations are not 
necessarily perceived by the sub-systems to be conflictual(at 
least not in the extrinsic or real conflict sense as used in 
Chapter 2). Ashby[1962] noted this inherent instability in
complex systems but concluded that "..in conflict situations the 
system behaves to keep itself within the recognised area of 
^,stability. .new conditions are tackled by defining new states for 
the system and if these new states result in instability, the 
unstable state is vetoed or matched, thus bringing the system 
back to equilibrium". Beer[1979], also argued that systems are 
always in a continuous state of change, and constantly striving 
to "..maintain..stability despite intra and inter system flux.."
The empirical validity of these statements on the ability of 
systems to maintain their state of equilibrium is limited in my 
opinion to general relationships rather than structural, and also 
largely applicable to technical and socio-technical systems 
rather than to complex human activity systems where equilibrium 
in interactions are constantly changing because of changing
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perceptions or interpretations of actions. Toates[1980], after 
looking at a similar situation, concluded that an attempt to 
return systems of this type to equilibrium might lead to a 
situation with positive feedback "...where displacement is not 
self-correcting but self-enlarging". Espejo[1982] also concluded 
that a complex system, because of its nature of being in a semi­
permanent state of movement, is almost always "... in a process of 
adapting, learning and evolving within the constraints imposed by 
its envi ronment ".
Stability is thus a relative rather than an absolute concept, a 
state that could be achieved at various levels of interaction but 
which is very much dependent on the perceptions of the parties. 
These perceptions about the relative stability of the 
relationships also contribute to the definition and delineation 
of the levels and scope of a conflict.
Howard[1972] argued that while it is possible for one party in an 
interaction system to destabilise' the system by starting a 
conflict, resolution of conflict and the accompanying stability 
requires the co-operation of all the parties involved in the 
situation. Each party in an interaction system develops its own 
set of standards against which relationships are measured and, as 
long as the system operates within those criteria, the sub­
systems perceive it to be stable although external observers 
might perceive the situation to be unstable.
The differences in perception and the subjectivity of its nature 
could be illustrated with the following examples drawn from the 
UK system.
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(i) Despite the fact that Northen Ireland and Scotland 
are constituent parts of the UK, a "stable" period 
or day in Belfast will not necessarily have the 
same meaning in Edinburgh because of the different 
prevailing situations in both cities.
(ii) Within the England sub-system of the UK system, 
perceptions are also bound to differ; an average 
"stable" period in the records of, say, the West 
Midland Police in Coventry wil be given another 
interpretation in Guildford despite both forces 
being in England.
It could be stated that stability is not only relative and
subjective but also dependent on existing circumstances. System 
perceptions are formed and adopted for the system by the decision 
sub-system and on the basis of these perceptions, the type and
level of actions or reactions are formulated relative to the
decision sub-system's interpretation fo the interaction system's 
stability. One major objective of conflict resolution approaches 
is the reduction of subjectivity in the interpretation of 
available facts and obs^ya^onsi.
Ritzer[1975] contended that most successful relationships are
largely based on the "objective" interpretation of facts and
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observations because all relationships exist as dynamic systems 
with tensions but the successful ones have developed enough 
structural stability or resilience to resolve potentially 
damaging conflict situations. It should be noted however that 
stability, whether structural or general, is determined by the 
issues on which the relationships are based and by those which 
the conflict is about. The next section examines how systems 
determine the choice of issues to include or exclude in the 
prosecution of conflicts.
4.4 The Notion of Issue Relevancy in Conflict Situations
In the last section, I quoted Howard[1972] as saying that 
although one party in an interacting system could start a 
conflict, all the parties involved has to co-operate to resolve 
the situation. This view is consistent with the premise that 
conflicts develop from policies, actions or perceived actions and 
general interest in defined "relevant" areas of interaction 
between the parties. While it, is possible for the parties to 
hold totally opposed views on "irrelevant" issues without the 
risk of conflict, similar opposition of views on "relevant" 
issues are likely to lead to conflict if one of the parties wants 
this to happen. Once the conflict has been joined, the ability to 
stop it has passed to all the parties that have become involved.
The classification of issues into relevant and irrelevant are 
mostly subjective, time and situation dependent. Relevant areas 
of interaction could be defined as "those areas of interaction 
where an action system's primary interests are
defined!acknowledged or not by other parties) as important or
140
crucial to its relationship with the other parties". Policies 
and actions of the other parties in these areas are therefore 
more likely to be critically scrutinised and differences might 
consequently be perceived and interpreted as antagonistic and 
intolerable. Irrelevant areas of interaction could also be 
defined as "those areas of interactions where differences in 
interests are acknowledged but tolerated by the interacting 
systems".
Because of the arbitrariness involved in the classification of 
issues, there might be some contradictory classifications or many 
qualifiers whereby sub-classes of certain relevant classes are 
made irrelevant or vice versa by the decision sub-systems for 
strategic or tactical reasons such as peace gestures, signals to 
the other party and actions intended to bring pressure. Any 
issue could thus be made relevant to a conflict situaton, by 
being introduced or elevated during the course of the conflict 
into the conflict space by one or more or the parties at any time 
as a necessary or one more necessary issue to be resolved before 
the conflict situation could be defined as terminated. An issue 
that has beeen made relevant by one party however requires the 
mutual consent or acknowledgement of all the parties for it to be 
downgraded or removed and reclassified as irrelevant.
One implication of these definitions and explanations is that the 
delineation of areas into relevant and irrelevant classes are
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subject to unilateral changes, in particular to make issues 
relevant, by any party to the conflict at any time for whatever 
reasons. In addition to those reasons earlier mentioned in the 
last paragraph, other reasons for unilateral classifications 
inignt include the following : to escalate or de-escalate the
situation, or to get more bargaining or negotiating space. 
Another implication is that "normal" interactions are possible in 
areas regarded and classified as irrelevant, and differences of 
view in these areas could theoretically be ignored, at least 
until an irrelevant issue is elevated or reclassified by one of 
the parties.
The classification of issues is a function of the decision 
subsystems of the different parties. There is thus a degree of 
certainty of expectation of differences between the parties on 
the classification of issues or, at least, on the emphasis given 
to different issues. A change of a decision sub-system or a 
change in the perceptions of any decision sub-system might result 
in a change of the classification of issues. The following two 
examples are used here to illustrate the validity of the 
arguments in this section and although insignificant by 
themselves, the underlying principles are universally present in 
other complex conflict situations. The first example briefly 
examines an aspect of the superpowers' relationship and how an 
issue was made relevant by one party's decision sub-system only 
to be reclassified and downgraded by another decision gub-system 
of the same party after a change of government. The second 
example looks at the contrasting classifications given to 
religion in two democratic political systems, the USA and 
Northern Ireland.
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[1] The Issue of Grain Supply in Superpower Relationships
The USA is a leading supplier of grain to the USSR, and despite 
covert and overt actions directly or indirectly against each 
other, grain supply among other economic issues, had been firmly 
classified as an irrelevant issue in the defined conflict space 
between the two superpowers. Although economic sanctions had 
always been a credible potential weapon, the effects on the USA
farmers had always prevented its use. The situation changed
however in 1979 with the USSR invasion of its neighbour, 
Afghanistan. The USA decision subsystem!ie. the President) 
retaliated by placing an embargo on the supply of grain to the 
USSR, thus reclassifying grain supply as a relevant issue in the 
defined conflict space of their interaction system.
The USSR secured alternative sources of grain! eg from the EEC, 
Brazil, Argentina etc) and refused to classify the issue as
relevant, resulting in the subsequent loss of sales by USA
farmers and leading to thousands of job losses (source: Time &
Newsweek Magazines 1980) and hundreds of bankruptcies. Later, in 
1980, there was a change in the USA decision sub-system and one 
of the first actions of the new President was to reclassify grain 
supply as an irrelevant issue. The USA farmers were reported to 
have lost an estimated $100 million in income. The ease and 
subjectivity of issues classification is depicted by the 
contrasting attitudes of the different decision sub-system in the
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USA system over the period concerned.
[2] Classification of Religion in USA and Northern Ireland(NI)
This example contrasts the approaches to religion in two 
"Christian" political systems. Although NI does not qualify as a 
"system" in the USA sense, for the purpose of this argument and 
because systems and subsystems are basically similar, the 
differences being of size and complexity rather than of essence 
or structure, this comparison is valid and consistent. The point 
I intend to draw out concerns the classification of religion in 
relation to politics within the two political systems.
The late J F Kennedy, President of the USA from 1959 to 1963, was 
a Roman Catholic who defeated Nixon, a Protestant in a largely 
protestant country. Kennedy's success was in part due to the 
classification!by the majority of national voters) of his 
religious sect as politically irrelevant(local elections might be 
different) with issues like ability, charm, youthfulness being 
regarded as relevant. In Northern Ireland however, these factors 
are irrelevant in comparison to religion. The very relevant 
issue of religion makes it virtually impossible at the present 
for contestants from opposing sects to win any elections in areas 
outside their religious boundaries. This example illustrates not 
only how an issue might be classified differently by similar but 
different systems, but also the difficulty of finding a logical 
means of determining the rationale behind the classification of 
issues. Perceptions, experiences and history tend to play an 
important role in some of the classifications.
Mitchell[1986] pointed out that "empirically...decision-makers
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classify issues as more or less relevant(perhaps in some very 
rough order of importance) which alter over time rather than 
dichotomously into relevant/irrelevant". I contend that, if all 
areas of interactions between systems are regarded as being in 
the interaction space, a defined conflict space is of necessity 
contained within the interaction space, and what to make relevant 
is a prerogative of any of the parties, but what to make 
irrelevant is the joint decision of all parties. These'"^decisions 
are based not necessarily on what is "best" or "good" for the 
system but what is "good" or "best" for each party from each 
decision,—  system's point of views. I thus disagree with 
Mitchell's contention of a hierachically structured 
classification of issues.
Issues are almost always linked together at various levels and 
therefore this exposition does not assume discrete relationships 
between issues, rather, I regard these relationships as 
continuous. The classification and reclassification of issues 
determine the size of the conflict space in relation to the 
interaction space because the more issues are elevated or 
classified as relevant, the larger the conflict space grows and, 
correspondingly, the smaller the "normal" interaction space 
becomes. Eventually, there may be no "normal" and direct 
interactions : interactions will occur indirectly only, through
other parties. The concept of conflict space is further examined 
in the next section.
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4.5 Conflict Space
While it could be stated that there is possibly an infinite number 
of individual interactions between interacting systems, it could 
also be stated that the areas or spaces within which these 
interactions occur are finite and readily defined/delineated. Our 
main concern is directed at these finite spaces rather than 
individual interactions because conflict situations are defined, 
developed and prosecuted within these spaces. I concluded in the 
last section (4.4) that there is an inverse relationship between 
conflict space and "normal" interaction space because conflict 
space is drawn out of normal interaction space and as one grows, 
the other reduces until one of the spaces is reasonably 
eliminated in one extreme leading to a Hobbesian situation and in 
the other extreme leading to the total elimination of conflicts 
or potential conflicts.
Bowen[1985] concluded that "conflict states can only be fully 
stated in a many variable continuous space". In complex human 
activity systems, interactions take place in several 
spheres/areas which when viewed holistically form a definable 
interaction space. This systemic whole could however be broken 
into identifiable parts each containing structural patterns 
similar to the whole system(due to the recursive nature of 
systems). In any interaction system, the more interactions that 
occur between the various sub-systems, or the more there are 
coincidences of interest, the greater the possibilities of 
disagreements in these areas but not necessarily of conflict.
Conflict space thus delineates the areas/spheres of interaction
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between systems that have been identified or defined by any of 
the parties as being relevant to a conflict. An increase in 
conflict space, although reducing "normal" interaction space 
does not automatically lead to an increase in the level or 
intensity of the conflict situation although its scope would be 
increased. This increase in scope might be due more to a 
strategic move(for whatever reason) than to an escalatory move.
One means of increasing conflict space is through the linkages of 
issues while another means is through reclassification. 
Howard[1973] identified two types of linkage: "causal linkages"
and "linkage by definition". He explained causal linkage as 
"one-way only linkages" that are linked only by direct cause and 
effect, while linkages by definition affects and are affected by 
other variables. Conflict space is therefore determined by the 
number of various factors that are linked together and made 
relevant by one or more of the parties in the system.
The escalation or de-escalation of conflict is thus determined 
by the contents of the conflict space over time. Because time is 
a continuum with discernible phases, the period or phase when 
issues are moved from one interaction space to another is an 
important phase in a conflict siuation as it could mark potential 
stability phases if the right intervention is made. These 
potential stability plateaux could be utilised for the 
prevention of escalation of the situation or to assist in the
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processs of de-escalation. The major difficulty in the 
determination of these points in time is primarily due to the 
inability of the intervening party or even the opposing parties 
to know the period when the other party might shift the goal 
posts.
Fig.4.2 shows the inverse relationship between normal and 
conflict interactions and the phases involved over time during 
which one space expands at the expense of the other. It should 
be noted that because interacting systems are relatively 
independent of each other(ie. in the control sense) the ability 
to reduce the contents of the conflict space is vested in all the 
parties and thus there are no owners of the system involved in 
the conflict situation. This lack of ownership is in contrast 
to some other types of systems and conflict situations which will 
be examined in the next section.
4.6 The Concept of Situation Ownership
The issue of ownership is one of the main differences between 
inter-system and intra-sytem conflict situations. Ownership is 
used here to denote a system that has responsibility(benefits or 
suffers) for the actions or inactions of generally or
specifically defined sub-systems due to its defined
responsibilities for these sub-systems. In most intra-system 
relationships, there are formally designed hierarchical
structures which define relative positions and relationships
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Fig. 4.2 Systems Interaction Space.
149
within a system as well as its relationships with other systems. 
In such systems, clusters of subordinates revolve around and 
report at various levels to superiors who also form clusters at 
their own respective levels and report to higher authorities in a 
cascading chain of command.
Each subordinate's goals are defined sub-goals of the superior's 
goals and contained within the superior's goals thus making the 
superior's goals superordinate to the goals of his alloted 
subordinates. In cases of conflict between such subordinates 
over goals, objectives or means, the superior could intervene by 
virtue of his position to reconcile the differences and resolve 
any conflict thus making the goals compatible with others' sub­
goals and with his own superordinate goals. This right(or 
legitimacy) to intervene, coupled with the subordination of the 
subsystems goals to the superior's goals effectively confers on 
the superior the right of ownership of the system at that level 
of recursion in the system's hierarchical structure.
Inter-system relationships and any conflict situation arising in 
it involve relatively autonomous systems with some equality in 
status(this relative equality is in relation to goals and 
objectives rather than size or resources) with no mutually 
binding superior system to whom their differences of objectives, 
means and goals could be subordinated. Interactions between 
these systems do not follow any formally designed "modus vivendi"
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on relationships and there might be no necessarily compulsive 
reasons for individual systems to subordinate their goals to any 
overriding superordinate goal although an agreed "modus 
operandi" might be in operation.
The Bowen[1981] notation is used in Figs.4.3(a) and (b) to depict 
the concept of ownership and in this sense refers to the sub- 
system(might be a person) that sponsors or controls the "named" 
sub-system(ie. someone in charge).
This concept of "ownership" is in line with that of
Checkland[1981 ] in his soft systems methodology that was dicussed 
in 3.4.3. In fig.4.3(a), X is the "owner" of conflicts in system 
A between sub-systems B and C because the goals of the sub­
systems determine synergistically the goal of X and he is 
ultimately responsible for the performance of system A and any
success or failure will be attributed to him. X therefore has an 
in-built incentive to prevent the development of malevolent 
conflict and in the case of one developing, to minimise the 
effect on system A. X can also enforce a solution on Y and Z 
which is considered to be in system A's interest rather than in 
the interests of subsystems B and C because the goals of the sub­
systems are subordinate to the overall goals of system A.
In Fig.4.3(b) systems B and C interact within a defined system(A) 
but with no superior system to intervene in any conflict between 
them. The subsystems are autonomous and relatively equal thus
making the achievement of their respective goals and objectives
the dominating influence in their interactions rather than the 
achievement of system A's goal (ie the containing sytem).
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SUB-SYSTEM C
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Fig. 4.3(a) Conflict in a system. (System has an 
'owner'. From Bowen, K.C. 1981)
0  SYSTEM B
SYSTEM 0
Interaction 
system A
Fig. 4.3(b) Systems in conflict. (Environment of 
interaction system has no 'owner'. From Bowen op cit)
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The role of system ownership(which also incorporates conflict 
situation ownership) is relatively the same in most systems while 
the lack of it gives rise to virtually similar consequences. In 
industrial/management systems, conflict situations between 
subordinates are usually resolved at higher levels of the 
organisation structure because of the control function that is 
vested in the higher levels over the subordinates thus in effect 
making the higher levels the 'owners' of the lower levels and 
their attendant successes or failures. In similar organisations 
however, if a conflict situation develops between the management 
and the union of workers, a new interaction system becomes 
involved in which there are no superiors or subordinates; rather 
there are equal sub-systems with no identifiable "owner" or 
superior to enforce the superordinate view except in special 
circumstances or through some outside system.
4.7 Conflict Outcomes
Conflicts are prosecuted and maintained by the quantity, quality 
and timely deployment of available resources of the parties and 
their supporters which are allocated for the direct and indirect 
prosecution of the situation. These resources include 
information, hardware, software, time, level of support from 
other key parties and internal solidarity. The availability and 
effective utilisation of these and other resources on the basis 
of their strength and deployment determine how conflict
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situations could be transformed. Conflict situations could be 
decided in one or a mixture of several ways, ie. it could be 
managed(suppressed, settled or compromised), dissolved or 
resolved.
Some of these "end states" are transient by nature, while others 
are inherently unstable and thus could breakdown eventually when 
there are changes in the circumstances of the parties. In this 
section, I will examine three of these possible end-states and 
how they could be achieved, arguing against the adoption of some 
of these approaches.
4.7.1 Conflict Management
Galtung[ 1965 ] defined conflict management as "the efforts made 
to keep the costs of conflict below maximum level" while 
Pi rages[1976] regards conflict management as " an active process 
undertaken ...to maintain... stability..", through the strategy of 
"responsiveness", and the pos.sible "...substitution of more 
remote issues for those that are ...more dangerous and pressing". 
Human activity systems exist in permanently continous states of 
dynamic instability and therefore conflict management could be 
described as the process of keeping this instability within a 
defined tolerable and acceptable limit.
Conflict management should ideally be a temporary phase until an 
acceptable solution is found and adopted. There are however 
several approaches for managing conflict and the approach used 
or the mix of approaches adopted will have a bearing on any 
eventual resolution of the conflict situation.
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One approach to conflict management is suppression where the 
stronger party in a conflict situation deploys its resources in 
such a way as to prevent the weaker party(parties) from overtly 
challenging its authority or legitimacy. de Reuck[1984] however 
contended that, because conflict is ultimately about alternative 
futures "..there can be no question, therefore of the suppression 
of conflict since alternative futures are forever before us". 
This contention is however of relative validity because, while it 
is correct that alternative futures are forever before us, it 
should be remembered that the parties may have differences over 
the desired future states or over the means of achieving agreed 
future states; that is why there is a conflict situation in the 
first place. Suppression could therefore exist in the present 
and this affects future states(South Africa and Afghanistan are 
examples of such situations).
Another approach to conflict management is settlement which could 
either be negotiated or imposed. Negotiated settlements involve 
the parties in conflict, with or without external interventions 
imposing conditions on themselves for the temporary cessation of 
the conflict. Imposed settlement involves the imposition of 
externally sanctioned conditions on all the parties or the 
imposition by the "winner" of the conflict of its own conditions 
on the "loser". Compromise is also an approach for managing 
conflict situations and involves bargaining between the parties
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for trade-offs of the various issues that has been made relevant 
during the course of the conflict. This strategy implies that 
most or all the parties get something of their demands and give 
up something of the opposition demands although none is likely to 
get everything it wants.
As formally recognised means to defined ends rather than ends in 
themselves, conflict management approaches are effective for 
limited periods of time but in the cases where suppression or 
imposed settlement approaches has been adopted, de Reuck[op cit] 
pointed out that "..if the coercive basis of the settlement 
weakens or is withdrawn, the conflict will well up again since 
the will to continue has only been constrained by duress". The 
validity of this statement extends in a modified form to 
compromise and negotiated solutions if an acceptable resolution 
is not readily available.
The limitations of conflict management approaches stem from the 
observation that these approaches do not remove the 
causes(extrinsic or intrinsic), of a defined conflict situation 
but rather, they attempt to maintain some sort of stability or 
equilibrium in systems relationship pending the conscious 
development or evolution of acceptable solutions. Due to the 
multi-dimensional nature of conflict situations(eg. dimensions of 
time, space, resources etc) however, some events might outgrow 
the scope of the conflict management approaches leading to 
renewed and increased conflict until a solution is implemented. 
Mitchell[1986] cited the Versailles settlement as an example of 
the transient nature of settlements and how easily they could be 
broken.
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Coser[1956] argued that conflict is not necessarily negative but 
has its positive effects which includes the notion that "...the 
experience gained in the use of resources in one conflict might 
be valuable in the management of future conflict situations". 
Galtung[op cit] also concluded that "a conflict, properly 
maintained and managed at an adequate cost level may be 
functional in a particular culture " although he accepted that a 
mismanaged conflict could reinforce and eventually escalate a 
situation.
Empowerment and conflict substitution are two other approaches 
for conflict management: empowerment involves the provision of
resources by an external source to the weaker party in a conflict 
thus enabling the weaker party to have enough resources to put it 
on a reasonably "equal" footing with the stronger party if the 
external source could not enforce its own solution on the 
situation, e.g. the USA arms supply to Afghanistan rebels and the 
USA arms supply to the Contras in Nicaragua are examples of 
empowerment. Conflict substitution involves the replacement or 
substitution of pressing conflicts with external conflicts in 
order to promote internal solidarity and mobilisation against 
perceived external "threat" instead of concentrating on internal 
"problems", e.g. de Reuck[1985] cited the Argentinian invasion 
of the Falklands Islands as an example of the conflict 
substitution strategy.
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It is reasonable therefore to conclude that there are various 
means of managing conflict situation but that most of the 
approaches do not eliminate conflict but are concerned with (a) 
the resources deployed for its prosecution and (b) the scope and 
intensity of the situation, with the aim of regulating these 
variables. They are also concerned with the conduct of the 
conflict itself, in order to ensure that the situation does not 
become unbearably destructive. Examples of the application of 
conflict management approaches will include the following;
(a) Regulated warfare (broadly guided by the Geneva 
convention)
(b) United Nations troops in trouble spots (eg. Lebanon),
(c) SALT treaties,
(d) Complaints boxes in organisations, and
(e) Acknowledged "areas of influence" of the superpowers.
Conflict management is a temporary phase or at least should be 
regarded as one because, after some time the conflict , if it 
does not reappear in much the same form as before might develop 
in one of two ways : it could either be resolved or, due to the
lack of(or insufficiency in) some of the resources by one or more 
of the parties, the situation might become dissolved. This 
dissolution is also a temporary phase but its transiency is 
patently different from the transiency of conflict management.
4.7.2 Conflict Dissolution
Dissolution is a temporary termination phase in conflict 
situations which is marked by a cessation of sustained overt
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hostilities by the weaker party coalition in the situation. This 
phase might last for a long period of time. In general, it can be 
attributed to the depletion of resources of the weaker party and 
the eventual loss of its capacity and capability to continue the 
prosecution of the conflict. The stronger party can then enforce 
its preferred values. Because of this enforcement of values on 
the loser, it becomes inevitable that the loser will, at an 
appropriate time in the future, restart the conflict when it has 
acquired sufficient resources to challenge the initial "winner", 
because the winner has not been voluntarily recognised, accepted 
or legitimised. Enforcement of the winner's values does not 
therefore lead to a permanent termination of the conflict 
situation.
de Reuck[1984] contended that when conflict situations are 
abandoned by the parties from exhaustion, the outcome is mostly 
"decided by external forces" and cited the case of Cyprus as an 
example. First, the Greek Cypriots invited Greece to intervene 
on the island and the Turkish Cypriots later invited Turkey to 
intervene; both communities now have minimal influence in the 
affairs of their own island. Conflict dissolution could lead to a 
temporary de-escalation of overt conflict and force it into a 
covert existence: but, unless the causes of the conflict are
removed, there is a distinct possibility that the conflict might 
re-emerge in a more malevolent form in the future, because the 
dissolution has merely put the conflict in abeyance.
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The dissolution phase could however be turned to a resolution 
phase if the "winner" decides to seek resolution to the conflict 
rather than impose its own solution on the situation. The phase 
corresponds to one of the Y-points in Fig.5 of Chapter 2 where 
stability could be achieved if the winner could resist the 
temptations of enforcing its values on the loser. Examples of 
dissolved conflict situations in which such opportunity 
existed(or still exists) are the conflict over the Falkland 
Islands between the UK and Argentina, and the industrial conflict 
between the NUM, representing the majority of miners in the UK, 
and the British Coal( formerly NCB), representing the management 
of the industry and, to a large extent, the Government. A more 
detailed case study of the latter conflict is included in a later 
section.
4.7.3 Conflict Resolution
Resolution is the phase at the end of which the conflict 
situation as defined by the parties is acknowledged by them as 
terminated due to the removal or acceptance of issues that had
been relevant to the situation. The resolution process is thus
the^series of actions, inactions, events etc. that, by design,
lead towards this termination. The phase is unique in that
elements of finality are included, present value is distributed 
and future value distribution is agreed and accepted by the 
parties.
de Reuck(op cit] asserted that resolution "..implies a solution
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freely acceptable to all concerned, one that does not sacrifice 
any of their important values, and one that none of the parties 
will wish to repudiate even if later they are in a position to do 
so". He went on to quote John Groom as saying that resolution 
implies transforming the very grounds of dispute and reaching 
an outcome that is self-supporting in the sense that it is
positively advantageous to all the parties involved".
Conflict resolution is therefore a process through which
interactions in a defined interacting system have been
consciously shifted from the defined conflict space back into the 
"normal" interaction space. This state of affairs could be
achieved through different approaches, among which are :
(i) agreement on goal-states and means;
(ii) reconciliation of objectives and means ;
*
(iii) transformation of conflict issues into problems that 
require jointly derived solutions ; and 
(iv) re-evaluations/re-appraisal of relationships.
Luce and Raiffa[1957] explained that solutions could be defined 
in a system if the following conditions hold:
(a) "there exists an equilibrium pair among the jointly 
admissible strategy pairs; and
(b) all jointly admissible equilibrium pairs are both
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interchangeable and equivalent".
Schelling[1980] defined an equilibrium pair as "a pair of 
strategies for... players such that each is the player's best 
strategy that can be coupled with the others", while he defined a 
jointly admissible strategy as "a pair that is not jointly 
dominated by another pair, ie. it yields a pair of pay-offs that 
are not both inferior to the pay-offs in some other cell".
Groom and Webb[1985] argued for the adoption of facilitation as a 
means of resolving conflict situations; their arguments are based 
on the premises that only the parties in conflict can evolve 
lasting solutions to their situations and that a sub-system is 
required to act as a facilitator who will be "...a channel or 
conduit encouraging this to occur". The aim of the facilitator 
will then be an attempt to aid the parties in the evolution of 
jointly admissible strategies.
Conflict resolution could evolve from either the conflict 
management phase or from a dissolution phase; but, moreso than 
the other phases, it requires the co-operation of all the parties 
in the conflict as it is the termination point of the situation 
and the redefinition of a new "normal" interaction phase and 
space. This new phase and space involves the general acceptance 
of a redesigned interaction system whereby issues and 
relationships are re-classified. It might even be possible that, 
superficially, the status-quo will be retained : yet resolution
can come about only if new interpretations are given to old facts 
and the relationships redesigned to reflect the "new order". The 
concept of Systems redesign and how it could be achieved, with 
short case studies on systems that have been redesigned, is
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further explored in the next section.
4.8 Systems Redesign (Case Studies on Conflict Resolution
Pi rages[1976], concluded that "much more is known about 
conditions that lead to the deterioration of... order(conflict 
situations) than about conditions and actions that maintain 
order". In other words, not much study or research has been 
devoted to the study of how stable systems attained their
relative stability and the lessons that could be commonly drawn
from such systems. This section examines some relatively stable 
systems. It draws some general conclusions from these systems on 
the basis of which an outline of a structure that could improve 
stability in complex system is subsequently formulated in
Chapter 5.
Most complex systems evolve to their current level of complexity 
out of simpler systems and in most cases, due to the pressure of 
the environment, the systems would have been reactive or
preactive in their interactions with other systems in the 
environment. This implies that these systems either respond to 
external stimuli as it occurs or predict likely events before 
they happen and then develop matching mechanisms to minimise any
163
undesired effects. It is implicit in this that situations rather 
than systems set the pace and direction of events( "situations" 
refers to the ongoing process of interaction and 
interrelationship).
Ackoff[1974] argued that the only way to give the initiative and 
drive back to the systems is through the adoption of an 
interactive approach to planning by the systems and a continous 
redesign of the interacting system on a permanent ideal goal- 
state seeking basis. Beer[1978] called for the redesign of most 
complex systems in order to ensure their survival and continued 
viability, while Weinberg and Weinberg[1979] argued for systems 
redesign in order to improve stability. Galtung[1965] suggested 
a structure for a conflict resolution mechanism that could be 
incorporated in redesigned systems while Bowen[1970] also called 
for a review of the approach to systems design.
In the light of these and other arguments, and my personal 
observation of systems, it is apparent that systems need to be 
periodically reviewed, and when, necessary redesigned if external 
complexity is perceived to have reached a level that is equal to 
the designed capability of the system to cope with it. In most 
of my own observations, the most relatively stable systems(ie. 
those systems with the least destructive perturbations) have been 
found to be those systems that have been consciously and 
continuously redesigned and thus always possessing enough in­
built robustness to cope with environmental complexity.
Von der Mehden[1964] attributed much of the conflict in 
developing countries to the structures inherited from colonial 
masters which had not been changed because of an inability to
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develop(or evolve) new structural relationships between tribes, 
races, nations and countries. Bowen[op cit] argued that the 
approaches adopted for the study(and consequently the design) of 
solutions to conflict in social systems should be re-appraised. 
Systems redesign does not eliminate conflicts from interaction 
systems but in the cases that I have examined, systems redesign 
has succeeded in the conscious design and implementation of 
structural relationships that has replaced previous relationships 
and has produced comparatively viable, durable and stable systems
The two case studies on systems redesign that follow are based on 
Switzerland and the European Economic Community[EEC]. A further 
case study(see section 4.9) on conflict dissolution is based on 
the recent dispute between the National Union of Mineworkers[NUM] 
and the National Coal Board[NCB](now British Coal).
4.8.1 Switzerland Case Study
Sigg[1983] described the Swiss state system as "the most stable 
in the world". This description was based on a comparative 
analysis of the Swiss system with some other democractic state 
systems. This is despite the fact that the Swiss state is 
affected by certain factors which jointly or individually has 
caused instability in several state systems, and even led in 
some cases to the eventual disintegration of those states.
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These factors, which have contributed to the destabilisation of 
several state systems, include the following which I discuss in 
full later in this section:
(a ) Multilingualism/Multi cultural ism
(b) Religious Differences
(c) Industrial Relations and
(d) Power Sharing.
The Swiss system has been consciously designed and continuously 
redesigned over time to prevent and resolve potentially damaging 
conflicts developing from these factors. In certain cases, 
mechanisms have been developed to manage conflict situations 
until acceptable solutions(stable solutions) were evolved, thus 
minimising the negative effects of these factors. This section 
examines how this has been done. The approach, intrinsically, is 
conceptually similar to the problem solving approach. I also 
mention some other state systems and the effects of similar 
factors on them.
(a ) Multilingualism/Multi cultural ism
Switzerland is bordered by Italy, France, Germany(FRG), Austria 
and Liechtenstein and thus very much influenced in its 
development by events in these neighbouring countries culturally 
and linguistically. There are four national languages in the 
country reflecting the population mix of the country. Three of 
the languages are classified as official languages and there are 
also several local dialects. 65% of the population are German-
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speaking, 18% are French speaking, 10% are Italian speaking(these 
are the three official languages). 1% are Rhaeto-Romansch 
speaking (the fourth national language) and 6% speak other 
languages.
In many bilingual/multilingual and multicultural systems, eg 
India, Canada, Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Pakistan, serious conflict 
situations have developed over the role and status of languages 
and the "attempted subordination" of some cultures to others 
within the system. This factor has been partially responsible 
for civil wars in Nigeria, Sri-lanka and Pakistan. It has led to 
civil strife and calls for secession in India and Canada.
The Swiss system also has equivalent internal disagreements over 
this issue, but a conscious effort was made to redesign the 
system in order to prevent these conflicts from becoming 
malevolent. One means of how this was achieved was the 
acceptance of parity between the languages and "giving" equal 
recognition to the fourth, Rhaeto-Romansch, although it is spoken 
by only 1% of the population. This action removed one ;
'^raison d'etre" for potential conflict over the issue that could have 
lead to instability in the country.
Because the different linguistic and cultural sub-systems of the 
Swiss system are closely linked with neighbouring states, the 
country has in the past faced some internal conflicts mostly on
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divided loyalty, yet it has survived two World Wars without
getting "involved". A sign of the system's continuous
redesigning approach to conflict resolution is the creation of 
the Jura canton in 1978. The French-speaking canton was created 
from the German-speaking Berne canton after a national plebiscite 
favoured its creation and following a long and sustained(sometime 
violent) campaign by the French-speaking people of the canton, 
against their continued existence as a minority within the 
predominantly German-speaking Berne canton. There is currently a 
similar campaign going on for the removal of South Jura from
Berne to be merged with the main Jura canton.
(b ) Religious Differences
Although a Christian country, Switzerland is broadly divided on 
the same denominational lines that separates many Western 
European countries, ie. Catholic and Protestant. This religious 
divide is compounded in the Swiss system by geographical and
linguistic factors whereby the rural areas tend to be mostly
French, Italian and Catholic , while the cities tend to be
dominated by Protestants and Germans. There are 23 cantons in the 
country with the Protestants dominant in 15 cantons and the 
Catholics dominant in 8 cantons.
There were several religous wars between the cantons until the 
17th century. In 1712, after another religious war, a commission 
was set up with the stated objective of settling religious 
conflicts. The action taken led to major reductions in the
conflicts between the communities, but did not resolve the core 
relevant issues which were power-sharing and religious 
accommodation. For example, in the 1847 Parliament, the Liberals
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and Radicals, mostly Protestants and representing 80% of the 
population, had only 12 votes, plus 2 half-votes in the 22 vote 
Parliament while the Catholics representing 20% of the population 
held the balance of 9 votes(which represents a disproportionate 
share of power and influence in terms of their population).
The Catholic cantons also formed alliances between themselves and 
neighbouring Catholic states, primarily the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, to preserve the "status quo". This alliance was called 
Sonderbund and threatened to break the state system until the 
break was forestalled however by the declaration of war in 1847 
on the Sonderbund by the Liberals. As winners, the Liberal and 
Radical coalition introduced a new constitution in 1848 in which 
the state system was redesigned structurally. The basic features 
of this 1848 constitution are still valid and in use today 
although it was again revised in 1874 when the use of referenda 
was introduced for the Federal system.
Fahrni[1984] commented that after the military defeat of the 
Catholic/Conservatives in 1848, the winners(ie. the Protestant 
Liberal/Radical/Democrats), introduced a referendum at the 
national level which eventually "led to guaranteed concessions to 
the Conservatives and to the Catholics' integration into the 
Swiss Federal state". The major concessions of interest here 
included those of cantonal sovereignty and self-determination on 
several key issues and the introduction of a bicameral parliament
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thus evolving a situation in which the second council, the 
Council of State was composed of equal representatives from all 
cantons irrespective of size or population. This had the effect 
of giving the smaller cantons a leverage in decision making.
The introduction of the new constitution led to new coalitions of 
the politicians, cutting across religious divides, thereby 
relegating the role of religion in party politics. Although 
religious differences are still a reality in the system, the 
conscious redesign of the system's structural relationships, 
effected by the constitution and manifested in the power-sharing 
formula to be examined later, has ensured that this issue has 
ceased to be a major source of conflict in the Swiss system. It 
should be acknowleged that religious differences "per se" are not 
necessarily the singular causes of conflicts. They are, however 
in many instances, significant contributory factors as for 
example, in the Lebanon and in Northern Ireland.
(c ) Industrial Relations
The Swiss industrial sub-system could be described as an 
integrated sub-system. Integration is used in the sense that 
employers and employees have deliberately reconciled their values 
and jointly designed a new structural and general relationship 
whereby conflicts are regarded as mutual problems for joint 
solution seeking and the parties are regarded as partners. This 
state of affairs was evolved after the last major industrial 
dispute(which was nearly nationwide) in 1918. The "winners"(i.e 
the coalition between the Federal government and the employers), 
defeated the unions but recognised and accepted most of their 
grievances .
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In the "Economic Articles" of the Swiss Federal Constitution, the 
government is now obliged by law to plan and carry out their 
economic policies with the organisations of employees and 
employers. Sigg[op cit] asserted that "associations and trade 
unions are even more firmly integrated into political life than 
are the political parties", because these associations' rights 
and duties, as well as obligations, are clearly spelt out in the 
constitution, while those of the political parties are only 
discussed in broad terms. A process of systems redesign of Swiss 
industrial sub-system started which culminated in the 1937 
signing of a peace treaty between the largest trade-union 
organisation and the largest employer organisation. This 
stipulated among other things, "no strike" and "no lockout" 
clauses and an agreement that all future disputes should be 
referred to and settled by an arbitration body whose decision 
would be final if the two parties failed to reach a solution by 
themselves.
(d ) Power Sharing
The political factor in a state system is the pivot around which 
other factors revolve. This is primarily due to the fact that 
this factor in a legitimate system is the custodian of the power
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of the state. It is responsible for the allocation, or sharing, 
of power or authority and the corresponding responsibilities. 
The perceived allocation and utilisation of power in complex 
systems are thus potential causes of conflict. They could lead to 
instability and the eventual disintegration of the system if some 
significant minority of the state system perceives the power 
sharing as unfair and thus illegitimate(see Section 4.2).
Because of the complexity of the structural composition of the 
Swiss system, the issue of power sharing is also complex. There 
are about 14 political parties, as at Dec. 1986, and these tend 
to be organised around issues at cantonal rather than at National 
level. To prevent potentially damaging conflicts from developing 
over power-sharing, the political system was designed to 
distribute power among the people by taking into consideration, 
the complexities and peculiarities of the overall system.
This has created a unique situation. The country is probably the
only one in the world without a Head of State or "de jure"
individual leader. It is a deliberately designed system with 
leadership vested in a council rather than in an individual
leader and the Council is made up of seven members drawn from the 
four largest political parties.
The parliament operates through a bicameral structure, on a part- 
time basis, with both houses sitting at the same time in
different chambers. Legislation has to be passed by both houses 
before it becomes law. Most elections are based on proportional 
representation thus ensuring that the smaller parties get into 
Parliament with some reasonable support from the electorate: the
majority election system does however operate in some cantons.
172 ‘
The two chambers of parliament are the Council of States, which 
represents the cantons and half-cantons, and the National 
Council, which directly represents the people. These two 
chambers meet once a year to elect the government, its President 
and Vice-President. Executive power, however, lies with the 
Federal Council which is elected by Parliament on a 4-yearly 
basis with the President of the Confederation as Chairman of the 
Council. The Federal Counsellors, including the Chairman, are 
all heads of government departments(ministries) and are all equal 
in status.
The conscious move towards this political system of voluntary 
power-sharing began in 1953 when the party in power, the Social 
Democratic Party, began a 6-year voluntary withdrawal from 
power/government which culminated in the introduction in 1959 of 
a new form of representation that was designed to ensure the 
maximum participation and collaboration of the majority of the 
people and the support of the major political parties. This 
redesigned form of representation(popularly known as the magic 
formula) was implemented in 1959. Fahrni[op cit], commenting on 
this redesigned system, concluded that the new system has ensured 
that since 1959 "..80% of voters have been consistently
represented in the government". The Federal counsellors, 
irrespective of their political parties, must also ireflect. the 
country's geographical, linguistic, cultural and religious
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diversity, eg. two counsellors could not come from the same 
canton, there must be at least 2 counsellors from the minorities, 
etc.
The redesigned system ensures, through this act of balancing, 
that counsellors represent the country rather than their 
individual political and other affiliations. It has reduced 
potentially damaging conflicts about power-sharing because issues 
or problems are viewed holistically as the country's problems.
( e ) Commentary on Switzerland Case Study
The example of the Switzerland state system supports the argument 
for continuous systems redesign. It is not claimed that the 
Swiss system has no conflicts within itself or that it is a 
permanently stable state. It is presented as a dynamically 
stable system that has continously redesigned itself to 
accomodate issues that could have caused instability. That 
conflicts have not been totally eliminated in the system is 
evident from events in Switzerland, e.g student demonstrations, 
agitations and violence accompanying the creation of Jura 
canton.
The concept of redesign has, however reduced potentially damaging 
conflicts in the systems because at various conflicts 
conclusions, the winners negotiated "away" some of their gains 
in order to achieve stability. At various Y-points of conflicts 
in the state system, the religious "winners" of 1848, the 
industrial "winners" of 1917, and the political "winners" of 
1953, negotiated with the "losers" each time for jointly 
acceptable situations. They jointly evolved acceptable and
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stable solutions for the perceived joint problems and so far none 
of the parties has tried to renege on these agreements or to 
repudiate them.
These resolutions of conflict have not only checked a temporary 
instability but fostered a more permanent stability with the 
positive consequence that the internal solidarity of the system 
has been enhanced and its legitimacy generally and willingly 
accepted.
4.8.2 European Economic Community(EEC) case study
Within the first half of this century, Europe has been engulfed 
in two costly and destructive wars. The origins of these wars lay 
in earlier conflicts that had not been acceptably resolved. At 
the end of the second world war however, negotiations began for 
redesigning the relationships between some of the European 
countries to prevent the development of future malevolent 
conflicts of such magnitude. The negotiations between these 
countries led in 1951, to the creation of the European Coal and 
Steel Community(ECSC) whose aim, according to Budd[1985], was 
primarily "....to lock together the Coal and Steel resources of 
Western Europe in such a way that these nation states could never 
again go to war against each other".
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The six countries which evolved this approach and structure were 
France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries of Belgium, 
Luxemburg and the Netherlands. It is reasonable to conclude that 
the treaty which was primarily aimed at France and Germany, led 
to the creation of the Common Market(EEC) in 1957 with the 
signing of the Treaty of Rome. The aim was to link the other 
parts of their economies together in the way that the ECSC had 
done for coal and steel. The European Atomic Energy Community 
was also created in the same year. All the treaties creating 
these structures were signed by the six members, but in 1973 
three new members were admitted while in 1981 another one member 
joined and finally in 1986 the membership became twelve.
The aims of the Community were explained in the preamble to the 
ECSC treaty as "to substitute for age-old rivalries the merging 
of essential interests; to create, by establishing an economic 
community, the basis for a broader and deeper community among 
peoples long divided by bloody conflicts; and to lay the 
foundations for institutions which will give direction to a 
destiny henceforward shared". . To achieve these aims, and 
administer the organs earlier mentioned, four structures were 
designed namely the Commission, the Parliament, the Council of 
Ministers and the Court of Justice.
Budd[op cit] further argued that the two World Wars were caused 
"..not only by real economic pressures but by..the the failure of 
traditional diplomacy", among other reasons. I submit that 
regardless of internal disagreements within the community, the 
"newly" redesigned European system has brought relative stability 
to the continent and further assert that the relative dependency 
of the community members on each other politically, economically
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and, in most cases, militarily, has significantly reduced the 
probability of malevolent conflicts between them.
The redesigned system, the community, has thus brought together 
the "winners" and "losers" of the wars and redefined the issues of 
conflict as common problems for joint solutions. The role of the 
community could therefore be reasonably described as that of an 
integration system. The integrating functions are carried out 
through the earlier mentioned structures of Court of Justice, 
Commission, Parliament and the Council of Ministers. Solutions 
are sought on aspects of community life from these sources. 
Again all is not perfect, but it is nevertheless a great 
improvement on the past.
4.9 Case Study on Conflict Dissolution
The mining industry in the UK was involved in a year long strike 
between 6th March,1984 and 5th March,1985. The conflict 
contained all the variables discussed in Chapter 2 and ended 
without a clear resolution. In common with most conflicts in 
complex systems, it is impracticable to identify and model all 
the causes of the situation, but any objective and close study of 
the conflict will reveal the interplay between the different 
factors that effectively determined the scope, duration and
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outcome of the conflict. The analysis of some of these factors 
have yielded some patterns from which empirical deductions could 
be made. These could be tested on or applied to other conflict 
situations with the aim of deriving better understanding of the 
prosecution of conflict. The ultimate aim is to evolve some 
practical mechanism that could and would assist systems in 
preventing such malevolent conflicts from developing or in the 
event of any such development, to minimise its effect and 
facilitate the resolution process.
4.9.1 Background to the Miners' Conflict
(a ) General relationships
Rosenbaum[1977], asserted that "the management of mines in the 
UK(as different from that of the USA) is a political affair". I 
accept the validity of this statement in the sense that the 
political sub-system of the state system is the prime mover in 
its role as the controller and regulator of other subsystems, 
such as the economic, industrial,. military and social subsystems 
of the country system.
This regulatory role of the state is, in the sense of Ashby[1963] 
and Beer[1967], based on the concept of regulation and control 
which involves the direct and indirect regulation or manipulation 
of the other subsystems which might be achieved through 
intervention, legislation or as a consequence of actions, or 
inactions in other subsystems. The dependency of other 
subsystems on the political sub-system is however a two-way 
process as the other subsystems confer legitimacy on the 
political subsystem and this determine its composition and
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direction. These relationships thus constitute a loop, with the 
interactions and interrelationships dynamically dictating each 
sub-systems pace and the course of events as pointed out in 4.8.
In Fig.2.9, I used a modified version of the influencing diagram 
of Easton[1965] to depict this process in a general form while in 
Fig.2.10, I presented in a specific form how the miners' conflict 
developed over time in relation to the three subsystems 
identified in that chapter as particularly relevant to the 
conflict, viz, the economic, social and political subsystems.
Fig.2.10 could be extended to incorporate subsequent developments 
and issues that have been made relevant, as well as other new 
events in the escalatory trend that culminated in the eventual 
dissolution of the conflict. However, for the purpose of this 
case study, such an enlargement is deemed unnecessary(because the 
required level of detail is outside the scope of this research 
programme). The three subsystems used for the analysis were 
initially determined on the basis of the view—points of the main 
parties to the conflict.
(b ) Key parties to the miners' conflict 
The key conflicting parties were :
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(i) National Coal Board(NCB) and
(ii) National Union of Mineworkers(NUM) members who were
against the NCB(later referred to in this study as
NUM-LOY, while those who oppose NUM policy and
continued working are called NUM-DIS)
Other main parties were :
a) The Government;
b) Trades Union Congress(TUC);
c) Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service(ACAS);
d) British Association of Colliery Managers(BACM);
e) Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunication and Plumbers 
Union(EETPU);
f) National Association of Colliery Overmen, Deputies and 
Shotfirers(NACODS);
g) Labour Party;
h) Police;
i) Judiciary; and 
j ) Press/Media
The actions and inactions of these parties, coupled with the 
factors listed in 2.3 and used below, eventually determined the 
course, duration and eventual outcome of this conflict to a 
significant degree.
4.9.2 Perceptions
There had been several earlier conflict situations between some 
of the parties, in particular between the NOB and the NUM as well 
as the NUM and the Government, with the last major conflict
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contributing to the downfall of the Conservative Government of 
1974. Although in the course of interactions since then, there 
has been potential conflict situations between the NCB and the 
NUM, the conflict management approaches adopted by the management 
had evolved an interacting relationship that could be depicted as 
shown in fig 4.4.
Fig.4.4 depicts the interactions between the NCB and the NUM 
prior to the conflict; it also depicts the NUM system as 
perceived by the NCB before and immediately at the start of the 
conflict. In this model, the NUM is regarded as the sole 
representative of the mineworkers and thus solely interacts with 
the NCB on the members interests. At the onset of the conflict, 
this perception changed because of an intra-system conflict in 
the NUM system, when some subsystems of the NUM system refused to 
support the conflict against the NCB, thus by implication 
becoming in conflict with the other subsystems.
The NCB's perception of the NUM changed as a result of this intra 
system conflict, thus leading to a new interaction diagram which, 
according to the NCB, should be(as I have interpreted it ) as 
shown later in Fig.4.5(a). NUM however, preferred the use of 
Fig.4.4 to continue serving as the basis for interactions: it
also perceived the NCB as surrogates of the Governemnt and 
argued that the conflict was between the Union and the Government 
rather than between the NUM and NCB. This perception of the NUM-
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LOY is shown later in Fig.4.6(b).
(a ) NCB's Perceptions
The NCB's perceptions and subsequent actions during the conflict 
were based on the following premises:
that the NUM is weakened by intra-party conflict,
that the conflict is on economic rather than social
issues, and
that the NUM has split "de facto" into two factions with 
one faction in conflict with it while the other is not. 
These observations led the NCB to articulate the following points 
of view:
i) The NCB should negotiate with the two factions of the 
NUM rather than with the national leaders(decision 
subsystem) of the union alone who now represent only 
one faction.
ii) The NCB(rather than the Government) is the main party 
in conflict with the mineworkers.
iii) The conflict is an economic conflict between employees 
and employer; hence no social or political issues 
should be introduced(this view was later modified).
iv) Other main parties are "neutral" in the course of the 
conflict.
V ) The Government is outside the main negotiation 
subsystem, although part of the subsidiary negotiating 
sub-system.
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These views and some of the other perceptions of the NCB on the 
negotiations with the NUM are shown in Fig.4.5 (a).
Government
NCB
NUM
LOY
NUM
DIS
Government
NCB
Fig. 4 .5 (a ) NCB's perception of negotiation system  
(Using PFM notation, ref Bowen op cit). '
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(b ) NUM'S Perceptions
The NUM decision sub-system's perceptions were formed on the 
basis that the mines are all state-owned and, "ipso facto", the 
mineworkers are ultimately employees of the state: therefore the
conflict is between the miners and the Government which is acting 
through its agencies like the NCB and, eventually, through the 
Police and the Judiciary. The Union is also of the opinion that 
despite the intra-party conflict within the NUM, the negotiations 
system should be as depicted in Fig.4.5(b) rather than as shown 
in Fig.4.5(a). The NUM's perceptions could be summarised as 
follows :
(i) The conflict was between the Union and the Government,
(ii) The conflict was economic in its manifestation, social
in its effects and political in its origin.
(iii) Negotiations should be carried out with the NUM alone 
despite the intra-party conflict in the union,
(iv) Most Government agencies are, in one form or the other, 
involved.
These and other views of the NUM about the negotiation system is 
depicted in fig.4.5(b)
It could be seen from these figures that there were differences 
between the parties on the role of the government and on the role
of the NUM-DIS. Some of these differences about the role of
some of the parties and even the type of conflict(economic or 
social or political) led to a re-appraisal of the NCB'S 
strategies and stance on the conflict and of its view of the role
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Primary or main negotiations I Secondary or subsidiary negotiations
NUM
Government
NCB
NCB
Government
:l ; ;
NUM
LOY
NUM
DIS
NEGOTIATION SPACE
Fig. 4.5(b) NUM's perception of negotiation system. (Using PFM notation ref. 
Bowen op cit)
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of the wider system that incorporates the other key parties. 
This new perception of the NCB is represented in Fig.4.6(a)
The views of the NCB as reflected in fig.4.6(a) reinforces the 
Board's earlier stance and while acknowledging that it is in 
purposeful communication with the government, it maintains that, 
by and large, the government, like the other key parties, is 
neutral. The NUM perception of the roles of the key parties is
however very much different from this and is depicted in fig.4.
6(b).
A comparison of figs.4.6(a) and (b) will show some of the
differences in the perceptions of the main parties(i.e the NCB 
and the NUM) with the major difference being on the role of the
government. The government's stated views were in essence
similar to the NCB but include the following additional views on 
the conflict.
a) The police, as the principal government organ for the
prevention of crime and for law enforcement, were
"neutral" during the conflict and doing their duty 
rather than supporting the NCB.
b) The government had a duty to all the parties in the
conflict but, because the conflict was an economic one 
between employee and employer, the government is above 
such conflicts and has no role to play.
NCB's perceptions!and also the government's] appear to be
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initially predicated and formed on the basis of Fig.2.7 in 
Chapter 2, which narrowed the relevant issues to economic ones. 
The NUM's arguments were formulated and articulated on the basis 
of Fig.2.8 of the same chapter, which presents the conflict as an 
econo-social-cum-political situation. The "rightness" or 
otherwise of the arguments have no identifiable bearing on the 
eventual outcome of the conflict. The NCB's stance on the model 
to be used was modified during the course of the conflict when 
NCB offered, belatedly, to help relocate redundant mineworkers 
and assist in financing alternative industries in run-down areas 
as well as helping to carry out retraining schemes for redundant 
workers.
4.9.3 Factors Affecting Conflict Prosecution
Cook and Selford[1982] identified two broad categories under 
which real-life multi-dimensional situations could be studied and 
analysed; these classifications are as follows:
a) quantitative or quantifiable and
b) qualitative or non-quantifiable.
(a ) Quantitative Factors
i) expected future savings if the conflict is 
prevented from escalation ;
ii) economic impact on main parties if the conflict 
situation continues ; and
iii) scale and effect of the conflict.
190
(b ) Qualitative Factors
i) client solidarity;
ii) political and top management support;
iii) wider system support and its impact on the conflict;
iv) impact of the conflict on the wider system; and 
V ) impact of the conflict on the parties.
Other more general factors are the likelihood of:
a) success by main parties to the conflict; and
b) implementation of the results(including the ability 
to enforce agreements).
These factors are broadly similar in outline to the factors 
enumerated in Chapter 2 Section 3 as influencing the development, 
intensity, scope, duration, and levels of conflict. They are 
included in the following analysis of the miners' conflict with 
the aim of drawing some general conclusions from the situation.
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Analysis of Factors
(i) Client(Coalition) Solidarity
This factor is extremely important for the "successful"
prosecution of conflicts and its presence in the NCB coalition
(coupled with its absence in the NUM coalition) could be said to 
have contributed to the eventual outcome of the conflict.
Dissensions within the NCB were muted: those who disagreed with
the Board's views were not allowed to form any significant group 
before being forced to retire or being reposted to less damaging 
positions, e.g, Ned Smith, the Industrial Relations Director of 
the Board and Geoffrey Kirk, the Press Officer.
The remaining members of the Board were united in purpose thus 
retaining their solidarity for the prosecution of the Conflict. 
The NCB coalition(of the Board, Government and sections of the 
press) was also intact and cohesive in the presentation of their 
views.
The NUM was involved in an intra-party conflict in which a 
significant section of its members were actively working against 
the Union's interest in order to undermine the effectiveness of 
the Union against the NCB coalition. The NUM coalition(of the 
union,and its supporters e.g TUC, Labour Party) were equally 
involved in various intra-party conflicts and could not present a 
credible coalition in support of the NUM's cause. It could be 
seen from these short description of events that the negotiating 
position of the NCB was significantly strengthened by the factor
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of coalition solidarity. The NCB correctly gauged the situation 
and exploited it. The NUM's negotiating strength was remarkably 
weak; however, it still perceived itself as fully representing 
the interest of all the mine-workers.
The effect of the lack of solidarity of the NUM coalition could 
be estimated in part by the level of coal output from the NUM- 
DIS, bearing in mind that any output from this sub-system 
strengthened the NCB and weakened the NUM. It should also be 
noted that intra-party solidarity was already lacking in the NUM 
system before the overt conflict situation. This was manifested 
in the action by the NUM-DIS sub-system of witholding the usual 
financial contributions to the NUM headquarters. The fact that 
some NUM-DIS leaders like Roy Lynk and Ray Chadburn were defeated 
by Arthur Scargill in the election for Presidency of the Union 
may have contributed to this state of affairs. In short, the 
position of the NCB remained reasonably solid before and during 
the conflict. The NUM system's position prior to and during the 
conflict changed as shown by figs.4.7(a) and (b).
(ii) Levels of Support from other Main Parties
The key parties to the conflict, earlier identified, formed 
formal and informal coalitions with the two main parties and gave 
support in various forms and to varying degrees to the parties. 
This support ranged from refusal to criticise and condemn certain
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actions, to open declaration of support and commitment of 
financial and other resources.
(a ) The NCB's level of support
The NCB had maintained that it formed no coalition against the 
NUM and that the key parties were "neutral" in the conflict. 
This stance was contradicted by publications, articles and books 
like "The Miners' Strike" by Geoffrey Goodman[1985] as well as by 
reports from The Aston University Broadcasting Research Unit, The 
National Council for Civil Liberties and the Strathclyde 
University Media Research Unit. All these suggested that, of the 
ten key parties earlier listed, five were positively supportive 
of the NCB either by their actions or by their inactions. The 
five are the Government, BACM, NACODS, EETPU and the overwhelming 
majority of the media. Further, the Government was revealed as 
having agreed to "bankroll" the NCB in the prosecution of the 
conflict by guaranteeing to underwrite all NCB expenses and 
losses.
The government also agreed to a high pay claim by the Rail- 
workers to reduce the likelihood of their claiming a legitimate 
reason for supporting the NUM. Another relevant fact was that 
David Hart, an adviser to the Prime Minister, was one of the key 
organisers and fund raisers for the "Working Miners' Committe" 
whose sole aim was to support the working miners and undermine 
the NUM.
In effect, the NCB had the "power" of the state behind it with 
all that this implied. e.g. legislation on the number of
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demonstrators, refusal of funeral grants by the DHSS to striking 
miners, increase in the deduction from Social Security payments 
to strikers from £15.00 to £16.00. State powers also included the 
police: on one occasion[20/8/84], one thousand officers were
deployed to escort one miner to work at the Gascoigne Wood drift
mine.
The goverment also bought and stockpiled in Europe more than 20 
million tonnes of coal to help NCB supply their customers. 
Finally parties, such as those units of the media which were
supportive of the government, transferred this loyalty to the 
NCB. In the light of the foregoing, it would be difficult to 
conclude that the NCB had no coalition with the level of support 
remaining consistently high throughout the duration of the 
conflict.
(b ) The NUM's level of support
The NUM's perception of the role of the key parties has been 
diagramatically presented in fig.4.6(b). It shows that the 
police, the NCB, the media and the government, as well as the
judiciary, are regarded as forming a coalition. The NUM had 
hoped that the TUC, BACM, NACODS and the Labour party would be in 
coalition with it.
In the various reports referred to earlier, only two of the ten
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parties were adjudged to have been supportive of the NUM, namely 
the TUC and the Labour Party. Due to intra-party conflicts within 
these systems themselves however, support was inadequate. The 
Labour Party had internal ideological conflicts while the TUC had 
leadership problems and lacked enthusiasm for the conflict. Only 
ACAS was unanimoualy agreed upon by all the reports and parties
involved to have been neutral in the conflict.
The role of the two remaining parties, i.e the Police and the 
Judiciary, have been the subject of prolonged controversy and 
debate. There is no generally accepted conclusion but one
outcome is clear: their "neutrality" has been called into
question as never before. I will briefly examine these sub­
systems in relation to the conflict in order to draw out some 
general points on conflict prosecution and role conflict.
( c ) The Role of the. Police and Judiciary
The police and the judiciary are constitutionally required to be 
neutral in conflict situations, but in reality, the nature of 
their duties makes neutrality an ideal. In this particular 
conflict, the police's duty was to enforce the "Law of the Land" 
as passed by the government!which in the NUM's perception was an 
active party to the conflict]. The police are expected to obey 
lawful orders or face disciplinary action; they are required by 
law to enforce legislation regardless of their personal 
preferences and, through their senior officers, are responsible 
to "any" duly elected government of the day.
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Because the NUM perceived the government to be a party to the 
conflict, and also because of the constitutional relationships 
between the police and the goverment, the "neutrality" of the 
police was inevitably "stretched". Further, reconciliation of 
the concept of neutrality with reality on duty is very difficult.
Again, the judiciary is constitutionally required to interpret 
the laws passed by Parliament. It would be wrong to conclude 
that the judiciary is subject to the whims of any government of 
the day. It should, however be noted that between 1979 and 
1984(when the strike began), no less than eight legislative 
changes were made by Parliament(in effect, by the government) in 
industrial relations laws, and all these new laws had to be
interepted by the judiciary. The role of the judiciary during 
the conflict was naturally seen as antagonistic by the miners. 
Their strength of feeling against both the police and the
judiciary was emphasised by their opposition to laws passed by
earlier Labour Governments. "The Law" was the Government of the
day, the Government was the "enemy" and through these
perceptions, democratic principles were endangered.
(iii) Impact of Conflict on Wider System
(a ) Customers
The effect of the conflict on the customers, i.e the consumers of
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energy, could be said to be irritating rather than damaging. 
This minimal effect was due to the stockpiling of coal in Europe 
by Goverment/NCB. The production of coal by the DIS sub-system, 
and adequate supply of alternative sources of energy(eg nuclear 
power from home and from France, oil from the North sea) was used 
to supply customers and most of the customers thus tended to 
maintain an attitude of support for the NCB and by implication, 
of disagreement with the NUM.
(b) Community
Reports suggested that the conflict created deep splits within 
the usually close mining communities. Relations between the 
police and mining communities reached a very low and hostile 
level: in some cases, it is still low, two and a half years after 
the overt conflict phase ended. Some families that became 
divided over the conflict are still divided.
Many miners were openly contemptuous of the judiciary. Even some 
members of the bar have openly protested and criticised both the 
police and the judiciary over the handling of several cases 
against the miners. Most of the miners charged with public order 
offences have been discharged by the courts but there still 
exists some residual bitterness against the authorities. Many 
businesses collapsed and some communities even broke up due to 
the lack of patronage and amicable relationship within the 
communities.
(c ) The Economy 
The actual cost of the conflict to the country has not been
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officially released although the government gave an initial
figure o f £ 4.1 billion, later revised upward to £ 5 billion, as an 
interim figure. Some city analysts[e.g Simon and Coates on 
1/1/85] declared this figures to be unreliable and much too 
conservative. They calculated the minimum cost of prosecuting 
the conflict to be £ 85 million per day and rising. Other city
sources calculated the cost to be between eight and twelve 
billion pounds sterling overall.
The diversion of funds from other sectors of the economy to
finance the conflict decreased government backing for some 
industries, increased job losses and produced lower standards of 
living.
(iv) Public Opinion: Support from the Wider System
The opinion and support of the wider system varied at different 
phases of the conflict; initially and up till the very late phase 
of the conflict, much of public opinion was directed against the 
NUM. The press gave the union what has since been generally 
agreed as negative coverage, and concentrated on the violence 
perpetrated by NUM members without any corresponding coverage on 
violence directed against NUM members.
Since the issues at stake were not intelligently presented to the 
public, public opinion was "formed" by the media through
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inaccurate reports, half-truths and slanted coverage of events, 
from angles favourable to the NCB according to some of the 
reports earlier cited. Towards the end of the conflict however, 
five different public opinion polls showed a decisive shift of 
support from the NCB to the miners. The popularity of the Prime 
Minister dropped in three consecutive opinion polls as a direct 
consequence of the conflict.
V ) Resources, Determination and Capacity of Parties for Conflict
The resources that a party/coalition could commit to a conflict 
is the sum of its resources excluding those required for other 
uses, plus those made available by its supporters.
The determination of the two main parties and their capacity for 
conflict were undoubted. However, the combination of the various 
factors earlier discussed tilted the odds heavily in favour of 
the NCB. The NCB coalition's immense resources were consistently
deployed throughout the conflict while the NUM coalition's
potential resources were not; one example of the latter involved 
the Dockworkers' Union which initially supported the NUM and 
refused to handle imported coal, but later withdrew this support 
because of a court injunction. Overall, the split in the NUM,
and only lip-service support from the TUC and its constituent
unions steadily eroded the NUM's potential resources for 
maintaining the conflict.
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4.10 Commentary on Chapter 4
In this chapter, I have argued the case for systems redesign. I 
have also reviewed various approaches for dealing with conflict 
and concluded that management and dissolution phases are 
temporary phases during which resolution could be sought and the 
system redesigned for future stability.
I have examined three case studies of different systems namely 
Switzerland, EEC and the NCB/NUM. One common element between 
these systems is that at one time or another in their past, they 
had been involved in malevolent conflicts. In two of the 
systems, the structural relationships and interactions were 
consciously redesigned to prevent or forestall, where possible, 
the development of future malevolent conflicts and to minimise 
its effect if one should develop. In the other system however, 
the system was not redesigned and a "winner takes all" approach 
was adopted thus leaving room for renewed malevolent conflicts 
when the "loser" has acquired enough resources to restart the 
conflict.
In the first two systems, the "winners" adopted an approach that 
has translated conflict situations into problems for joint 
solutions in the de Reuck[1985] sense, and thus have devised 
mechanisms that would prevent malevolent conflicts. This process 
of resolving conflicts is an appropriate approach for all complex
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systems; it offers reasonably "stable" and acceptable solutions 
to the parties which, if robust enough, will "hold" even if 
conditions change.
In the Swiss example, the "winners" of the civil war "gave in" to 
most of the demands of the "losers" except for secession and 
since then, the system has not been involved in another conflict 
over the same issue. Potential conflicts on autonomy have been 
resolved by the system without any party resorting to the threat 
of secession, eg Jura Canton was created in 1979 after a national 
referendum supported its creation. The EEC is also a successful 
system in spite of considerable potential conflict issues. It 
has prevented the development of malevolent conflicts in West and 
Central Europe, although this has probably been assisted by other 
organisations like NATO and WEU. Systems can therefore succeed 
in the prevention, or minimisation, of the effect of malevolent 
conflicts if they are consciously designed to achieve this.
The miners' conflict however, unlike the other two case studies, 
was not imaginatively resolved and the NCB coalition(winners) 
has, in my opinion, missed at least one significant Y-point or 
plateaux where a new and more stable relationship could have been 
jointly designed and implemented as in the Swiss example. A 
structure or mechanism that could be used to incorporate the 
processes, underlying such a successful redesigned system, into 
other interacting complex systems is outlined in the next 
chapter.
203
CHAPTER 5 
INTEGRATION SYSTEM AND Y-DIAGRAMS 
Introduction
This chapter presents the arguments for the concepts of
Integration systems and Y-diagrams. It explains the thinking 
behind these concepts, their structures and the principles of 
their design and creation. The chapter also examines the
criticism that has been levelled against the Integration System 
concept and presents arguments in response to these criticism.
The arguments in this chapter call for a new approach to the 
handling of conflict in complex systems. It advocates the
adoption of an Integration System approach where stability could 
be consciously designed into a system and sub-optimal but stable 
solutions could be incorporated into system interaction at the 
design phase.
Definition of key terms
Interaction system: this defines an inter-relationship between
autonomous interacting systems, covering all aspects of
interaction as a definable entity or system.
Interacting systems: the individual or autonomous systems with
defined boundaries of identity that become units of some defined
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interaction system.
Integration system : a system that is evolved by an interaction
system to improve its internal relationship and interactions, 
and, particularly, to aid in the prevention or minimisation of 
damaging conflict. It operates on a continuous basis and could 
be formally defined as a problem-solving framework for seeking 
stability in complex conflictual situations.
Negotiation system: a system used by interacting systems to deal
with conflict situations, as they arise, on an ad-hoc basis.
Wider system: interacting systems in the environment of a defined 
interaction system, whose actions or inactions have important 
influence on events and outcome in the interaction system.
Sub-systems: definable parts of an interacting system with
specific functions.
Coalition: a group of interacting systems acting in concert, i.e
with defined or broadly agreed(or understood) common 
goals/objectives, against some other coalition or individual 
system.
Note: The recursive nature of systems implies that the
difference between some of these definitions are questions of 
relationship and scale rather than those of structure.
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5.1 Conceptual Background
It was asserted earlier(Chapter 3 Section 4) that most research 
on conflict in complex systems carried out in the field of 
Operational Research have been directed at seeking means for 
conflict management and sometimes for conflict resolution. It 
was also noted that complex systems are inherently conflictual 
by virtue of their dynamism, multiple relationships and 
multivarious interactions. I contended however, that in most 
systems, conflict could reasonably be prevented from becoming 
malevolent or its negative effects minimised.
This contention is based on the fact that systems relationships 
and interactions can almost always be redesigned; even "normal" 
relationships can be deliberately and periodically reviewed and 
redesigned to retain "normalcy". Kast and Rosenweig[1970] quoted 
Katz and Kahn[1966] as saying, that "social structures are 
essentially contrived systems. They....are imperfect
systems  are anchored in the attitudes, perceptions, beliefs,
motivations, habits, and expectations of human beings". They 
themselves argued further that, unlike mechanical or biological 
systems, social systems "....have structure, but the structure 
of events rather than of physical components ...(and).. can be 
established for an infinite variety of objectives".
It is therefore logical to conclude that these systems are 
guidedly evolved or consciously designed structures for 
relationships and interactions. Using this evolution paradigm.
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interactions could be said to have developed to the "status quo" 
from past structural relationships and linkages shaped by force, 
history, passive collaboration and interrelationships between the 
parties without any clear acceptance of roles by the parties. 
The consciouly designed approach implies that interactions are 
developed on artificially constructed parameters which could be
"shaped" by the force of an external system, the force of an
internal party or mutually designed by the internal parties.
I discussed in Chapter 2 Section 3 the differences between intra­
system and inter-system relationships; it is pertinent to note 
that potentially (damaging . conflicts are more likely to develop 
in inter-system relationships through a lack of "ownership", of 
the larger interaction system. Externally imposed or internally 
imposed ownership might not be acceptable to all parties in the 
interaction system and this lack of legitimacy will eventually 
lead to instability. Stability in these systems is based on 
legitimacy and acceptance which are better derived from mutually 
agreed or designed relationships.
Due to the recursive and hierarchical nature of systems most of 
the features in inter-system relationships are similar to those 
in intra-system relationships, with only differences of 
ownership, magnitude and levels of recursion between them. 
These features are also replicated at various levels of systems 
interaction and relationship. It is these features that must be
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studied, with the aim of eliciting from the available data, the 
means and methods of preventing or minimising the effects of 
potentially damaging conflict situations.
This aim and the views underlying it are consistent with the
views of Ackoff[1974] who observed that society(social systems) 
"....responds more rapidly to disruptions(overt conflicts) than 
it does to the crises(situations and ecology) that produce them". 
These views are also consistent with those of Bowen[1968] who was 
critical of the fact that "....many studies of defence start from 
the hypothesis that it is necessary to win....The re has been
little effort ....  to describe how such wars come about, what
stages nations pass through in coming to war, and what could bave
been done at the earliest or at some intermediate stage to
prevent the later stages occurring". He concluded that "it is
important to know whether we can indeed identify the early stages 
and be prepared to act accordingly".
What Ackoff and Bowen are calling for is an end to the reactive 
approach to conflicts in systems-and the adoption of preventive 
approaches in systems relationships. Their criticisms could be 
removed by systems redesign where the structural and general 
relationship between the parties in an interaction system are 
deliberately redesigned to include integration mechanisms that 
will strive to preserve viab ility and stability regardless of 
environmental pressures.
The argument for systems redesign raises the question of the 
designer; this is an issue that needs to be resolved because the 
eventual stability and viability of an interaction system, is, to 
a significant extent, dependent on the acceptance of the
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structural relationship by the parties and the ability of the 
system to adapt to changing circumstances. The perceptions of 
the parties about the structures are inevitably formed on the 
basis of the designer's legitimacy. Systems structures and 
relationships develop from three design sources of varying 
degrees of legitimacy:
(a) externally imposed,
(b) internally imposed and
(c) internally evolved.
5.2 Structures
(a ) Externally imposed structure
This is the imposition of an externally designed structure on a 
conflictual system by a wider system with the ability to enforce 
the structure. The design might be in the form of a "formula for 
peace" or a restructuring of the systems relationship, but a 
characteristic of this approach is that it inevitably always has 
to be supported by a package of sanctions against non-complying 
parties.
If the external intervention has been agreed to by all the 
parties in a conflict, then this approach could lead to stability 
but if not, the reluctant parties might redirect part of their
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negative actions against the external parties. The legitimacy 
of the wider system is an important factor that will be
considered by the parties before any decision to accept this type 
of structure is made(although they may not have any such option).
The structure is most effective under two circumstances, namely 
when the design is fully acceptable to all the parties or when
the external system has the resources to enforce the design 
unilaterally and indefinitely.
Examples of this mode of systems relationship design are courts' 
judgements, compulsory and binding arbitration, etc. It should 
be noted that the structure does not always lead to stability, 
but is useful only as a temporary phase during which the parties 
are encouraged to evolve their own structure. The use of the 
structure will determine whether it is a purposeful or a
purposive design.
A design is purposive if the interests of the wider system is
given a higher priority, over the interests of the conflicting 
interaction system, in the considerations for the imposition of 
the externally designed structure. It is purposeful if the 
interest of the interaction system is give a higher priority over 
the interests of the wider system or of any sub-system of this.
It should be noted however, that most externally imposed 
structures tend to be purposive rather than purposeful. It could 
be argued that the continued partition of Germany is an example 
of an externally imposed structure of the purposive nature 
serving the interests of the external or wider system rather than 
the interests of the Germans themselves even though the external
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parties are divided among themselves.
(b ) Internally imposed structure.
This is a situation where the "winner" of a conflict situation, 
or the "stronger" party in an interaction system, imposes on the 
system its ideas and design of how the relationships should be 
and compels the "loser" or the "weaker" party to adopt and 
operate the structure. The maintenance of this structure is 
however dependent on the continued supremacy of the "winner" or 
stronger party, since the structure is implicitly unacceptable to 
the "loser" or weaker party.
The design is inherently purposive as it represents the "winner"s 
interests and not the interests of the interaction system. It is 
also inherently unstable as it does not resolve the conflict but 
forces it to a covert existence. It could, however, be used to 
serve as an interim phase during which the "winner" and the 
"loser" might jointly evolve an acceptable structure.
Current developments in the British Coal(formerly NCB) and NUM 
interaction system(Section.4.9) are further proof that this 
approach should serve only as a temporary rather than permanent 
phase. On the 21st of September 1987, the NUM began a new 
overtime ban after a large majority of its members voted against 
the NCB-designed and imposed new disciplinary code.
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( c ) Internally evolved strucJ:jjre
This implies a joint evolution of designs and structures by the 
"winners" and "losers", the "strong" and the "weak", to resolve a 
defined conflict, and jointly seek means of preventing similar 
conflict situations, through the transformation of conflict
issues into problems for joint solutions. The structure is 
consistent with the framework suggested by Galtung[op cit] who 
called for the establishment of "institutionalised conflict 
resolution mechanism"(discussed in 3.4.2 ).
The approach is also in line with the views of Likert[1961] who 
advocates the adoption in organisations of structures with 
" . ..overlapping-group form of organisation where integration of 
approach implies a submergence of parts in the whole and is
V
inherently purposive and purposeful. Most internally evolved
structures represent in principle the interaction system's
purpose, but at the same time may have well-defined purposes of 
their own.
This structure appears to be the most acceptable design to 
parties and also considered to be the most legitimate. It should 
be noted that the stimulus for the structure might be external, 
but if the designers are the interacting parties themselves, the 
chances of the system being stable are greater than if it had 
been externally designed and imposed. Examples of internally 
evolved structures are the EEC, and the Swiss system.
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A proposed structure for achieving internally evolved stability 
is discussed in the following sections. The structure is called 
an integration system. Two aspects are discussed namely 
methodological integration and a structure for an integration 
system. Designers and users might evolve other structures, but 
the one outlined here depicts the basic components and guidelines 
required to design such an integration system.
5.3 Integration System(I.S.) Paradigm
Bowen[1970] argued that "The only positive and very difficult 
way(to examine conflicts) is to endeavour to understand why this 
behaviour(conflict behaviour) occurs and to seek ways of removing 
the conditions which encourage it". Ackoff[1974] also called for 
an "interactive approach to planning and design" arguing that 
plans and design should aim "... to prevent, not merely to
exploit, opportunities ......  try to induce co-operative changes
in ... systems ... that are ... fundamental". He concluded that 
"... no aspect of a system is precluded from change.... a system's 
structure, functions, organisation and personnel as well as its 
allocation and use of resources"
An Integration System is a structure that attempts to achieve the 
objectives expressed through these opinions. It is an internally 
evolved structure with a prerequisite that all the parties in an
213
interaction system participate in its design and implementation. 
Although I.S. is primarily a structural design process, its 
underlying principles of seeking robust solutions from various 
sources and its deliberate generation of several options and 
alternative lines of action are also applicable to the choice of 
methodologies to be used for many project studies.
The I.S. paradigm is partly influenced by the "gestalt" idea of 
systems. Gestalt is defined by Gould and Kolb[ 1964 ] as ".... an 
organised entity or whole in which the parts, though 
distinguishable, are interdependent, they have certain 
characteristics belonging to none of the parts. The gestalt thus 
constitutes a unit segregated from its surroundings."
In the methodological section, I will outline how multiple 
methodologies could be used in the various phases of a conflict 
project, with the purpose of obtaining improved quality of 
information at the various phases rather than a total reliance on 
the use of single methodologies for every phase of a project from 
beginning to end. The structural section discusses role 
definition, relationships and communication links in an 
integration system.
The roles of an I.S. will vary from system to system depending on 
the phase of interaction when it is introduced into the system. 
In "normal" relationships, it will assist the parties in 
improving communications by the reduction of distortion and 
"noise", it will also assist in the reduction and possible 
elimination of incompatible goal-states between the systems 
through discussions, meetings, exchanges, etc.
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It is not implied that an I.S. could remove all the differences 
between systems or that genuine differences could be communicated 
away through an I.S. However, if the structure is introduced 
into a system at an appropriate decision point(Y-point), even if 
there is an identifiable "winner" or "stronger" party(who might 
be acceptable or unacceptable to the "loser" or weaker party), 
the structure will serve as an arbiter and help in redesigning a 
new structural and general relationship that would be more 
broadly acceptable to 1 all theL parties and thus promote 
stabili _ty.
The role of an I.S. will include:
(a) Ownership;
(b) Regulation; and
(c) Communication
(a ) Ownership
An I.S. will perform the role of the "owner" of an interaction 
system in any inter-system conflict. The concept of ownership in 
inter and intra-system relationships has been discussed in 
Section 4.6., and it is obvious from the discussions that inter­
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system disagreements or conflicts are more likely to develop and 
escalate than intra-system situations due to the lack of 
ownership of inter-system situations. An I.S. fulfils this role 
and enables the interests of the system to take priority over 
the interests of the parties in the system.
This role will facilitate the reconciliation of incompatible 
goal-states of the parties and minimise the development of 
damaging conflict situations.
(b ) Regulation
The regulatory role of an I.S. could be examined from two 
perspectives, first as a maintenance structure and secondly as an 
adaptive mechanism. In the first role, the I.S is a form of 
"soft" homeostat that strives to prevent conflict and preserve 
the equilibrium or stability of the system. In the second role 
however, the I.S. attempts to resolve a defined conflict and 
restore stability to the system-in order to restore a disrupted 
system back to a steady state or dynamic equilibrium.
The first objective is partly achieved by the mere existence of 
the I.S. itself, while the second goal is achieved through the 
functions of the I.S.(i.e. its role). Weinberg and 
Weinberg[ 1979 ] explained the structure-régulâtion law in relation 
to stability as follows "...stability is made possible by the 
process of regulation; regulation is made possible by the 
existence of stability". Regulation and stability could occur at 
most Y-points rather than at peaks or beginnings of conflict 
situations.
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An I.S. could regulate systems at Y-point, mostly because the 
points, though not of fixed or discrete nature, are discernible 
points on a continuum, characterised in system interactions by 
actions or inactions, gestures, expressions, indications and 
other modes of communication that might be understandable to the 
other parties that a tactical or strategic decision point has 
been reached which might escalate or de-escalate the conflict.
(c ) Communication
The I.S. will perform the role of a facilitator between the 
interacting parties through the provision of communication 
avenues that will keep the parties adequately informed about each 
other. This is not to suggest that all differences could be 
resolved through communications, but it does mean that there will 
be less distortion of facts between the parties.
5.4 An Approach to Methodological Integration
In Section 3.4, nine methodologies were reviewed and, in Section 
3.5, it was argued that an integrated approach to the choice of
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methodologies might be more appropriate to the study and analysis 
of conflict. This suggestion is based on the observation that 
most methodologies are more applicable to certain phases of study 
and analysis than in all the phases to which they are 
individually applied in current studies. Phases like problem 
identification and structuring, analysis, testing, design and 
implementation may be better studied by using different 
methodologies
I concluded Section 3.5 by arguing that what is required in the 
field of conflict study is not necesssarily a new methodology or 
new techniques, but a paradigm that will assist analysts in the 
choice of relevant and available methodologies for appropriate 
phases of a situation under study. These would range from
preventive methodologies to resolution methodologies.
It is noted that attempts are being made to integrate some soft 
OR methodologies and enhance their effectiveness, but I am not 
aware of any other effort to integrate these methodologies in the 
way outlined here. Notable among these other attempts at
integration are the works of Bennett and Huxham[1984] on 
enhancing the hypergame methodology with the cognitive mapping 
approach, Bryant[1983] on similar notions, Bennett[1984a] on 
linking various approaches to decision-making and the works of 
Fraser and Hipel[1984] on game-theoretic based approaches.
5.4.1 Methodological Choice
The aim of the approach to methodological integration discussed 
here is to enable an analyst build up a "repertoire" of 
methodologies in a well-classified order so that only the most
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appropriate methodology for a phase is used. The choice of 
particular methodologies for use are not only dependent on their 
availability but also on the following factors
(a) professional/educational background of analyst;
(b) role of analyst;
(c) client; and
(d) objectives of study and analysis/ raison d'etre -)•
( a ) Professional/Educational Background of Analyst
The professional and educational background of an analyst is an 
important factor in the choice of approaches to be adopted and 
tools to be used in conducting a study or an analysis. This is 
because the analyst's professional world-view has been formed 
through this environment. The tools he chooses to use for 
problem-solving have been determined in this context and he would 
tend to use familiar approaches for even new problems. This 
would already, in many cases, have had the effect of limiting his 
range of choice, perhaps seriously; for example, in the field of 
OR, the dichotomy between the two schools of thought into "hard" 
and "soft" approaches has meant that analysts suscribing to one
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approach might have little or no knowledge of other equally valid 
methodologies available in the other "school of thought".
(b ) Role of Analyst
The role of an analyst is another important factor in the choice
of methodology and this role, in the present context, could be 
one(or, rarely, more than one) of four identifiable roles:
(i) analyst as a "neutral" observer;
(ii) analyst as an adviser to one party in a conflict;
(iii) analyst as an adviser to the system in conflict; and
(iv) analyst as an adviser to the wider system.
Although there may be some overlap between roles, in particular,
(iii) and (iv), roles are generally implicitly incompatible with 
each other. The methodologies preferred by the analyst will have 
to be commensurate with the role he is called to perform.
(i) Analyst as a "Neutral" Observer
An analyst in this category could chose and utilise any mix of 
methodologies that best suits the reasons for the study and
analysis. These reasons might be of research, scholarly
interest, general interest, and fun, etc. The role allows the
analyst to develop scenarios on experimental basis with the main 
constraints being the analyst's professional limitations and
availability of resources.
The result of the analyst's study could be widely disseminated to 
all the parties in the conflict situation through reports, 
publications and lectures, etc. The aim of the analyst would be
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to gain a better understanding of such situations, evolve 
generally applicable statements to explain such situations and 
their possible evolutions. Preventive, managing and resolving 
methodologies would all be used in such studies. The testing of 
any implementation of ideas, however, can only be carried out in 
other roles.
(ii) Analyst as an Adviser to One Party in a Conflict
This role dictates that an analyst seeks and utilise 
methodologies that will yield optimal solutions for the client. 
These solutions might not, however, be stable in the long run. 
Most analyses carried out in this role are aimed at obtaining 
"winning" strategies or options. An alternative aim of analysts 
in this role could be the minimisation of losses to the party or 
coalition to which the analyst acts as adviser.
Most game-theoretic based approaches are best utilised in this 
role but emphasis would be laid on managing methodologies and 
optimal-seeking rather than stable-seeking solutions. An ethical 
point raised by this role is whether an analyst should inform, or 
draw the client's attention to the possible long-term instability 
inherent in some "solutions" derived from this strategy. The 
final decision should, however, be left to the analyst.
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(iii) Analyst as an adviser to the system in conflict
An analyst in this role will require resolving, preventive, and 
managing methodologies for the study, but with the main aim 
directed at prevention and resolution in order to achieve 
stability in the system. The choice of methodology in this role 
is therefore dictated by the search for stable rather than 
optimal solutions. Ideally, some attention should be given to the 
wider system, but this is not the primary task from the clients' 
point of view.
(iv) Analyst as an Adviser to Wider System
The task by an analyst in this role is similar to that of the 
analyst in the last role. However, now, the methodologies chosen 
must enable the analyst to consider the impacts and implications 
of the situation's continuation, resolution or management on the 
wider system.
(c) Client
The client is another important factor in the choice of 
methodologies for use in conflict study and analysis, because he 
is the main beneficiary of the study and analysis and may be 
paying a lot for it. The client could be co-operative or unco­
operative with the analyst, and the brief of an analyst would 
differ in accordance with the client's aims and objectives. 
There is always the possiblity of conflict even within a conflict
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study.
If the client is a party or coalition in a system,its preferred 
option might be an optimal solution, the best possible outcome
for itself, rather than the best outcome for the interaction
system. On the other hand, if the interaction system is the
client, the preferred option would be on stability which could
imply sub-optimal solutions.
The importance of the client is further stressed because most 
analyses are carried out from their viewpoints, with their 
inherent prejudice, perceptions, assumptions and preconceptions, 
which if incorporated into the data for analysis would yield 
distorted information. It is inevitable that these personal 
views are used for analysis, because it is nearly impossible for 
opposing parties in a conflict situation to have all the 
required information about each other, and these views serve to 
fill the gaps in order to develop a fairly representative model. 
The analyst has a duty, perhaps, to ensure that his client is 
aware of this, by demonstrating the sensitivity of solutions to 
any data uncertainty.
(d) Objectives of Studv and AnalvsjLS
The " raison d'etre’^ . for the study and analysis is another key
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factor in the choice of methodologies by an analyst. If the 
study and analysis are for research and increase in knowledge 
about conflict, the choice and use of methodologies is virtually 
unlimited. If the study is aimed at determining the costs and 
benefits of the prosecution of a conflict[expressed in financial, 
social or political terms], the choice of methodologies may be 
biased towards the use of quantitative ones. If the objective is 
to redesign the system however, for a more viable and stable 
structure, the choice of methodologies would of necessity include 
qualitative approaches.
5.4.2 Conflict Study/Project Phases
Evaluated on the basis of these four criteria, this research has 
largely been carried out in the role of a "neutral" observer with 
the intention of advising the system or the wider system. It has 
also included a short period of "testing" in an actual conflict 
situâtion(Appendix B). The ultimate aim is to seek a better 
understanding of conflicts through an integrated use of different 
methodologies for the various phases of a defined conflict 
situation.
Fig 5.1 depicts the logical relationship between some of the 
methodologies, and the various phases of conflict study at which 
they may be most appropriate. The phases in a conflict project 
study are represented in the diagram as follows:
(a) Current situation determination/project initiation phase
(b) Problem identification and structuring phase
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(c) situation analysis phase
(d) Integration systems design phase
(e) Scenario testing phase
(f) Integration system implementation and change-over phase
(g) Post-implementation study, review and operational phase
There is considerable overlap between some of these phases but 
they individually possess characteristics and features that 
distinguishes them.
( a ) Current Situation Determination/Project Initiation Phase
This phase introduces the analyst to the interaction system and 
is concerned with the determination of the current level or scale 
of interaction between the system. This could be achieved by 
initially using a scale like the Harris[1974] conflict 
classification scale as shown in Fig.1.6.
The scale could then be transferred to and examined on a 
structure like the Y-diagram for monitoring the trend of events 
and prediction of next Y-points; ie determining in outline, 
possible escalatory points and possible stable plateaux where 
meaningful intervention could take place.
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(b) Problem Identification and Structuring Phase
This is the phase where a representative model of the interaction 
system is developed by the analyst for study and analysis. 
Methodologies like CATWOE could be used to capture the various 
"weltanschauungen" of the different interacting parties in the 
system in order to clarify the differences in their perceptions.
Methodologies like PFM or Cognitive Mapping of Eden, Jones and 
Sims[1983] could then be used to structure the relationships 
between these sub-systems to detect any structural or general 
incompatibility. Relativistic models are more appropriate for 
use in this phase than isomorphic or homomorphic models.
( c ) Situation Analysis Phase
Detailed analysis of the current and possible future situations 
are carried out in this phase, with the objectives of determining 
the immediate and the remote causes of the current situation, in 
order to identify the extraneous factors that are likely to 
influence the development of the situation as well as identifying 
the likely effects of and reactions to certain lines of action.
Several methodologies could be used in this phase among which are 
the game-theoretic-based approaches(previously discussed in 
Section 3.4.8), Strategic Choice of Friend and Hickling( 1987 ] , 
which has developed from earlier studies such as Friend and 
Jessop[1969 ] , and Decision Conferencing of Phi 11 ip[1987]. The 
output from this phase will be the development of different 
scenarios to represent possible alternative futures for the
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system.
(d) Integration System Design Phase
This is the phase where the conceptualised scenarios are 
developed and their relationships(general and structural) 
designed. This structuring of the relationships and interactions 
is the design process. In the words of Kenneth Boulding
" intentions are fairly easy to perceive, but frequently do
not come about and are not fulfilled. Design is hard to 
perceive, it is design and not intention that creates the 
future" .
The definition of the systems relationship, its levels of 
interaction and communication links between the systems are also 
carried out in this phase with the consequence that several 
models might be designed. These inputs eventually determine the 
structural stability of the designed systems which ideally should 
be purposive and purposeful.
Kast and Rosenweig[1970] defined the concept of equifinality as
the notion that " final results may be achieved with
different initial conditions and different ways". This implies 
that variations of input might still yield the same stability in 
systems. It is my view that this definition may be more 
applicable to mechanical systems than to social systems. This is
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because the black box approach appears to be unrealistic when 
applied to social systems.
The structure and stability of social systems are determined by, 
and dependent on, their inputs which in turn are determined by 
their structure in a continous loop. Weinberg and Weinberg[op 
cit] concluded that the resolution of the conflict between the 
structural and input approaches to systems study and design, is 
the understanding that "....structure is defined in terms of
input,  conversely, input can be defined in terms of
structure".
(e ) Scenario Testing Phase
The various models designed in the last phase are tested in this 
phase against two system modelling criteria of completeness and 
stability. The completeness testing is to ensure that all 
relevant actors, perceptions and issues up to the present, have 
been included in the models during the analysis and design 
phases. If the testing phase proves that the model is complete,
the model is subjected to the second test, but if negative due to
changes in any of the factors over time, the study is looped back 
to the problem identification and structuring phase.
After the completeness criterion is satisfied, the test of 
stability is carried out on the models to ensure their 
robustness. A final choice of the model to be implemented is 
made in this phase and methodologies like robustness analysis 
(earlier discussed in Section 3.4.6), and system dynamics of
Forrester[ 1964, 1972 ] could be used. There is also a loop back to
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the situation analysis phase if the stability test on the models 
prove negative.
( f ) Integration System Implementation and Changeover Phase
If the chosen model is accepted by the client, this is the phase
where the model will be implemented and integrated into the
existing structure. Methodologies like PSP and Ackoff's ideas 
could be utilised in this phase. The key process in this phase is 
the formal change of procedures in handling relationships, as 
this is the phase where the I.S. becomes a permanent part of the
interaction system and takes over the roles assigned to it.
( g ) Post-implementation Study, Review, and Operational Phase
Due to the dynamic nature of conflict in complex systems, 
continuous re-appraisal of the various phases is necessary on the 
basis of new actions, information and initiatives. A continuous 
review of the implemented integration system is very important in 
order to keep it reflecting the interaction system's views.
The selection and suggestion of the use for these methodologies 
is entirely an explanatory exercise that should be regarded as a 
guide to how such methodologies could be used in conjugation with 
each other rather than as a prescriptive paradigm on which 
methodologies should be used with each other.
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An analyst would be free to chose the methodologies considered to 
be most appropriate to the phases in the study, as most of the 
approaches overlap. All the phases occur in most system design 
projects although studies can be terminated at any of the phases 
if further study is considered to be unnecessary, for example, at 
the situation analysis phase it might be discovered that the 
status-quo is the most appropriate structure.
5 . 5 The Principles of I.S. Design
The concept of an I. S., although  ^ t a prescriptive paradigm 
or methodology, allows the use of various approaches from diverse 
fields of study in singular or combined mode, both in the design 
of an I.S and in its activity. It is a purpose-built form of 
what is defined by Phillips[1984] as a Decision Support System, 
i.e "...any system that helps -the manager to form preferences, 
make judgements and take decisions". The I.S., ideally, is also 
a form of expert system, although the expertise is still held by 
the individuals that it contains. Bowen[1985] defined an expert 
system as "...a model of the expertise of a person or of a group 
of persons, whose knowledge can be sensibly integrated over a 
particular range of expertise".
It is necessary that the parties in an interaction system be 
actively involved in the design and all other aspects of the 
system. This would ensure that the structure is designed "with" 
the parties and not "for" them. It is also necessary that all
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the essential elements(issues) that constitute the interaction 
space of a system, rather than those of the conflict space, be 
examined and analysed during the design of an I.S.
The I.S concept recognises that an interaction space is not 
neatly divided into small boxes of actions and inactions but 
contains many overlapping sub-systems, in which disagreements in 
one aspect of interaction could contribute to the development of 
conflict in another(eg religious, economic, social and political 
sub-systems may be linked in this way) .
This ideas were taken into consideration during the study carried 
out on the Ladworth Project(Appendix B). The study was not 
primarily on any conflict situation but was carried out to assist 
the members of the Management Committee in the evolution and
adoption of common parameters for the Project. It also helped 
to bring to the "open", the reservations of several members and 
thus assist in the ensuing clarification of motives and
opinions, reassurances on objectives and commitment and a renewed 
commital of resources to the Project by these members.
On the project, the use of multiple methodologies was followed. 
In the final report, some aspects of Checkland's SSM were used to 
elicit the perceptions of the parties while a simplified form of 
Bowen's PFM was also utilised to structure the relationships
between the parties in the project as well as to structure the
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project itself. The data collected through these two 
methodologies were used to formulate questions for, and generate 
discussions with the parties through interviews, notes, meetings, 
etc and the answers from these sources were used to evolve a new 
structure for the system. It was necessarily a limited exercise, 
but it did show, at least, that an analyst could intervene in a 
system of this type, follow the principles laid down in these 
arguments and assist in the resolution of potential conflict 
situations to the satisfaction of the parties involved. The 
parties expressed their appreciation of the structured arguments 
and proposals.
5.5.1 Structure of an Integration System (I.S)
(a ) Objectives
The objective of this section is to determine common parameters 
in interaction systems for situation evaluation. An integration 
system should be composed of. legitimate representatives of 
interacting parties in a system with the aim of evolving 
strategies and tactics for the reduction and possible elimination 
of incompatible goal-states in the system.
An I.S structure is not a compromise-seeking system, because 
compromise solutions are not inherently stable as both parties 
are expected to give up some demands in order to gain some 
concessions from each other. It is not a consensus seeking 
approach either(except in certain situations explained later); 
solutions could also become unstable because of the adoption of 
a lowest common denominator strategy, i.e. the solutions that
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will disturb the parties least at the present.
The I.S is an internally evolved metasystem that helps to ensure 
that the objectives of the system are valued by the sub-systems 
to be greater than the objectives of the individual sub-systems. 
This is primarily achieved through the formulation of goals by 
the I.S. for the system that are super-ordinate to those of the 
sub-systems and which are most appropriate for the viability and 
stability of the system.
The approach is superior to the compromise or consensus 
approaches for two reasons. The first is that a compromise 
solution is a form of honourable conflict dissolution that occurs 
mostly in stalemate situations. The conflict might erupt in the 
future as there are no clear or acceptable winners; a party that 
could muster enough resources to the level where it perceives 
itself to be able to "win" or achieve a more favourable outcome 
could most likely restart the conflict at an opportune moment.
A consensus solution is an appeasing approach which might become 
unacceptable to some of the parties in the future, thus leading 
to another conflict. It is basically a conflict management 
method that might not be in the best interest of the system on 
the long run. It is an operational, sometimes tactical, but not 
a strategic method for conflict resolution. An exception to this 
criticism would be when the approach is consciously adopted to
234
enable an integration system to be designed and a conflict 
situation to be resolved.
An Integration System is a permanent(rather than an "ad hoc") 
structure that will include in its repertoire the means of 
selecting which of these or any other approaches are to be used 
for any situation and thus embraces the scope of the other 
approaches.
(b) features
The following are essential to the design of an Integration 
System:
1 An integration system should be jointly internally
evolved, staffed and operated by all parties in an 
interaction system. This condition has to be satisfied 
in order to enhance the legitimacy, acceptance and 
subsequent effectiveness of the I.S.
2 There should be some equality in the representation of
the parties in the I.S. This is necessary because of 
the "equality" in status between the parties; "equality" 
is used here in relative terms of defined autonomy, 
goals, and objectives rather than equality in size or of 
resources between the parties.
3 An I.S has to be funded by the interaction system, on an
agreed basis, rather than by one party in the system . 
The I.S must have control over the funds it is given: it 
might also receive funds from "neutral" bodies, given
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the agreement of the interaction system,
4 An I.S should be a permanent rather than an ad hoc body
in interaction systems. This would ensure continuity 
and promote understanding and trust between the parties.
5 An I.S should be complemented with a team of
professionals from a multidisciplinary background. 
This would provide objective analysis of qualitative 
and quantitative data and information to the I.S., as 
and when required. Probably conflicting data, via 
individuals in their respective sub-systemic roles, 
may be processed in this analysis.
6 Mini-integration systems could be designed for various
levels by the main I.S. This is necessary because 
systems relationships vary at different levels of 
interaction; e.g, in an industrial system, the employees 
are subordinated to the management, but as a group, i.e 
union, the workers' body is on an "equal footing" with 
the management body. Local disputes may be best resolved 
at local levels between the parties.
7 An I.S would be responsible for the generation of
alternative options to conflict. This will be achieved 
through research and analysis, that might involve a
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cost-benefit type of analysis of short term gains and 
losses in various circumstances; e.g conflict 
development, conflict prevention, system redesign and so 
on. It would also involve the longer-term evaluation of 
the costs, effects, and impacts of potential conflicts 
on the system and its wider environment. It would not 
itself have the function of decision although it would 
strongly influence courses of action by the parties, 
jointly or unilaterally.
The suggested objective and the structure to adopt to achieve it, 
is thus, that of an ideas factory and laboratory, or a "think- 
tank", where issues affecting an interaction system are raised, 
discussed and clarified. It can, but need not, agree upon 
policies, and suggest programmes for implementation. As a 
communication channel, it would aim to improve and strengthen 
system relationships through seminars, periodic reports, ad hoc 
situation reports and research findings.
This would inevitably reduce, the risk of distortion and 
misperceptions, keep the parties adequately informed about each 
other's " raison d 'être*^  ^ ^ for certain actions and consequently lead 
to increased stability. In an industrial context, unions would be 
kept regularly informed of company performance and its 
implications for the company's profit and workers income; the 
management too will be kept informed of union opinions for 
consideration in company policy formulation. Overall, it would 
provide a continuously available forum for organised study rather 
than a series of meetings often stimulated only by perceptions of 
crisis by one or both parties.
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(c ) I.S Expertise and Methodologies
Ideally, an I.S should be staffed by experts from diverse
backgrounds, unlike the PSP(Section 3.4.1) which implies that
only social scientists should be involved. The methodologies
that could be central to an I.S's functions would include those
methodologies discussed in Chapter.3 and others such as those 
referred to in Figure 5.1 and the accompanying text, which any of 
the analysts might find useful.
It should be noted that most of these methodologies have 
similarities in their aims, objectives or functions due to their 
development sources and reasons for development. Approaches like 
MT/AO and hypergames are very similar because they share a common 
root(game theory); however, MT/AO has now been developed into an 
analytic "expert" system in the form of a computerised software 
package called CONAN. Another computer software called Decision­
maker has also been developed based on the same game-theoretic 
principle. Some indication of the use of CONAN for exploratory 
analysis is given in Appendix A.
Methodologies like the VSM and RAM coincide in their final 
objectives;i.e. the design of stable rather than optimal 
systems), others like the PFM, PSP and Ackoff's philosophy share 
common aims in their attempts to detect "real" causes of
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situations rather than the "symptoms". Moreover, they are all 
problem-oriented approaches which evolved from practical 
applications and are directed at conflict resolution rather than 
management.
Bowen[1985], after listing Metagame, Hypergames, System Based 
Interviewing[Moynihan,1987a], Expert Gaming[Moynihan,1987b], SSM, 
Cognitive Mapping, Strategic Choice and Decision Conferencing 
among the methodologies that could be used to design Decision 
Support Systems or Expert Systems, noted that "...the 
methodologies.... mentioned... all seem to have some role to play, 
potentially at least in the search for expertise and its 
expression in explicit, usable form". There could be no better 
or more fitting comment on the role of these and other 
methodologies earlier mentioned than this statement by Bowen in 
regard to their appropriateness as tools in an I.S.
5.5.2 Differences Between an I.S and a Negotiation System.
An I.S is not designed for the purpose of negotiations and should
not perform that role as it is normally construed. It is a
structure that aims at preventing conflicts and its objectives 
are both wider than, and different to, those of a Negotiation
System(NS). However, a new conception of a NS could be an
integral extension of an I.S. The NS is, in general, an ad-hoc 
coming together of the conflicting parties when a conflict is 
apparent and some sort of "solution" is sought.
The I.S role also includes keeping competition from developing 
into conflict and preventing benevolent conflict situations from
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evolving to malevolent ones in the sense of Smith and
Bowen[1972]'s use of the words.
Another major difference between an I.S. and a N.S. is the 
relationship between the parties; in an NS the parties' roles are 
adversarial (ie "we" versus "them") because they represent 
different sub-systems, and are negotiators on behalf of their
respective sub-systems. In the case of an I.S, the parties
represent the interaction system and the roles are thus
inherently co-operational(ie "ours") by design.
5.5.3 Criticisms of I.S.
The main criticisms which have been or might be levelled against 
the integration system approach are as follows;
i) It is utopian and unattainable because the likely
"winner" in a potential conflict would not willingly 
shift to a less conflictional stance.
ii) It takes away "the right of management to manage as they 
deem fit" in an industrial situation.
iii) It would become another bureaucratic appendage to the
system.
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iv) It could become too powerful and remote from its
constituents and thus might become unrepresentative, 
consequently becoming delegitimized through its 
acceptance of unpopular measures.
v) It might be abused by any of the parties .
v i ) The approach does not recommend to decision makers what
to do.
While there might be some validity in these criticisms, I argue 
on the following pages that the benefits to be derived from this 
approach by an interaction system are far greater, in terms of
viability and stability, than any of its perceived limitations.
I also show, with the support of short case studies, that some of 
the criticism are unfounded and ill-informed while others could 
be reasonably overcome through the measures that would be 
designed into the I.S. There is powerful and convincing
evidence to suggest that structures, similar to I.S, have been
successfully implemented and are currently operating smoothly in 
relation to various aspects of system interaction.
5.5.4 Response to Criticisms
(i) Ideal and Utopian
The I.S approach does not aim for the total elimination of all
unwelcome conflicts or possible conflict situations. Rather, it
is a pragmatic approach that aims to reduce potentially damaging
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conflicts, starting with objectives that are non-utopian but
achievable.
The Swiss system, the EEC system and to some extent, the
industrial systems discussed in the next section are visible
examples that such an approach is practical. Conflicts have not 
been totally eliminated in these systems, but it is pertinent to 
note that damaging or disruptive conflicts have not been
experienced in those areas of interaction where structures 
similar to the I.S have been implemented. Of course, even with 
an I.S, perceptions could change, the I.S could fail, and a 
malevolent conflict could still develop. An important point in 
the operational effectiveness of the I.S structure is the 
volition and willingness of the parties to achieve or move 
towards a state of stability.
(ii) Right to Manage
This criticism is voiced about the application of the I.S 
approach to industrial/commercial situations. It is argued that 
such a system would deny the management sub-system its "right to 
manage as it deems fit". Management is based on legitimacy and 
acceptance or on delegated authority: it could also be based on
coercion, etc. However, a management sub-system that relies 
solely on "right" will find stability very difficult to achieve 
for the system. This is why worker incentives and co-operation
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schemes are constantly promoted.
The following industrial-economic case studies illustrate the 
invalidity of this criticism and reinforces my arguments that the
I.S approach enhances rather than removes the "right to manage".
Case 1: Norway
The Norweigan Industrial Systems relationship is broadly governed 
by an agreement called the Basic Agreement. This was initially 
signed between the employers' and employees' associations in 
1935. The Companies Act of 1973 strengthened this relationship 
by compelling mining and manufacturing companies to have 
employees' representatives as part of the decision-making sub­
systems. This condition was extended in 1974 to include building 
and construction companies.
An industrial democracy research project was commissioned in 1962 
by the Norwegian Employers Confederation(NAF) and Norwegian 
Federation of Trade Unions(LO) with the objectives of improving 
industrial peace and stability. A Co-operation Council was 
evolved in 1969 to perform roles similar to those of an I.S in 
the industrial sub-system of the country.
The Co-operation Council is made up of repi^^entatives from the LO 
and the NAF. It has its own secretariat(jointly funded and 
maintained by the parties) with a manager and professional 
consultant who carries out research on its behalf and at its 
behest. These staff are employed on a full time basis and paid 
by the Council.
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Research is continuously carried out by the staff on various 
aspects of industrial structure and relationship; courses are 
regularly conducted on company and industrial matters to 
familiarise employees with issues that contribute to the 
formation of industrial or company policies, with major input 
from the employees.
The I.S structure is replicated at most levels of interactions in 
the industrial-economic subsystem of the country(i.e. in 
companies, departments, etc). For example, in companies or 
departments with more than 400 employees, a Works Council would 
perform the functions of an I.S; in one case, the Works Council 
is comprised of 14 representatives, with equal numbers drawn from 
the management and the workers.
The organs for integration in the Norweigan industrial-economic 
subsystem thus include the works councils, department councils, 
conferences. Concern Councils with protection and environment 
committees, and, at the pinnacle, the Co-operation Council of 
LO/NAF. The basic agreement is revised as a rule every four 
years.
Case 2: Sweden
The structure that performs the I.S functions for the Swedish
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economic-industrial subsystem is called the Labour Market 
Administration(LMA) and has responsibility for the direction of 
the industrial policy of the country. This body is 
administratively responsible to the Swedish Cabinet and the 
Ministry of Labour.
The LMA is made up of the representatives of the employers' 
associations and the workers' unions. This structure of 
representation is replicated at most levels of systems 
interaction. LMA performs its functions through several agencies 
but the most important agency for industrial matters is the 
Labour Market Board (Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen— AMS), whose 
directorate is composed of 15 members of which 6 represent the 
employees, 3, the employers and 6 others who appear to be 
independent "specialists".
Representatives of the employers and employees are jointly 
represented on many permanent committees involved in research and 
counselling as well as on the Boards of Directors at all levels 
of the LMA. Decisions that affect the industries, economy, or 
the social life of the workers are jointly discussed, analysed 
and formulated to ensure wider acceptance at each level of 
implementation.
Case 3: Japan
The Japanese concept of "nemawashi" is broadly similar in 
principle to these approaches as it involves intensive prior 
consultation between the management and workers over policy 
issues before they are formally initiated. Difficult points or 
potential conflict issues are resolved and positions accepted by
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the parties prior to policy formulation.
These procedures ensure that there will be little or no 
difference in the stances of the parties, yet these "concessions" 
by the management to the workers have not removed their "right to 
manage" because neither profits nor productivity has been shown 
to fall or negatively affected due to these "concessions".
In all the countries discussed above, the I.S format or 
structure appears to have contributed significantly to the 
reduction of econo-industrial conflicts. Due to the significant 
reduction of obstacles to mutual co-operation(i .e obstacles like 
distrust, suspicions based on inadequate information, and 
hostility), industrial stability is ensured, and the managers' 
"right to manage" has been voluntarily accepted and their 
position further enhanced and legitimised.
(iii) Bureaucracy
This criticism is partially valid in that the I.S requires 
additional independent professional and secretarial back-up 
separate from the normal organisation structure. However, the 
benefits of evolving and maintaining this structure should far 
outweigh the cost. The benefits are derivable from conflict 
prevention and improved understanding between the parties.
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The I.S does not have to be over bureaucratic, as the secretarial 
back-up could be minimal. For example, the secretarial back-up to 
the Norwegian I.S earlier described are mostly carried out by 
part-time employees. Bureaucracy does have some virtues however; 
as any study of the EEC would show, the cost of maintaining the 
bureaucracy, despite continuing arguments and differences, is 
bound to be quantitatively and qualitatively far cheaper than 
that of prosecuting the sorts of major conflict that have 
previously bedevilled Europe.
(iv) Remoteness and abuse of power
This is a criticism that could be levelled against any 
regulatory and control mechanism, e.g a government cabinet, union 
leadership, or management team. The situation could be overcome 
through periodic reviews of représentation' through elections or 
votes of confidence in representatives and, of course, through 
report-back procedures.
In addition to ex-officio members of the I.S (e.g in an econo­
industrial situation, the union leaders and the management team), 
new members should be regularly introduced and rotated. 
Communication between the I.S mechanism and the constituent parts 
of the interaction system should be kept very open so that 
decisions reached on behalf of the parties are acceptable to all 
the parties.
Delegitimization of representatives could occur if the 
representatives are perceived not to be adequately representing 
the views and opinions of the legitimizing authority. However, 
provided the representatives keep adequately in touch with their
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constituents and report back regularly on the issues discussed by 
the I.S, the consequences of the validity of this criticism 
would be avoided. The "independent" professional group in the
I.S have an important communication role in this context.
(V ) Abuse by one party
Another criticism is that one of the parties might abuse the I.S 
by exploiting the other parties or attempt to dominate the 
structure for its own benefit. This observation might be valid 
in some circumstances as it is with every system or organisation.
In a well planned and jointly evolved I.S, with the defined 
objective of achieving or striving towards stability, its own 
procedures would work against this happening.
The joint evolution of an I.S is predicated on a mutual desire 
for stability rather than optimality in favour of one party or 
coalition. It involves the willingness to abandon coalition 
formation in favour of the whole and finally the acceptance of 
the mutually evolved design.
Because of the dynamic nature of interactions, it could not be 
ruled out that a party might want to "bend" the rules if the 
conditions appear to be favourable. A regular review of the 
structure, its achievements, raison d'etre^ - , consequences if it is 
abandoned and future objectives would serve to remind the parties
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of the necessity of not abusing the system.
5.6 The Concept of Y-points and Y-diagrams
One permanent feature of a dynamic interaction system is change 
over a period of time. Most studies on such systems are, in one 
form or another, directed at coping with these changes or 
handling such changes in order to minimise their negative
impacts. Changes are, however, preceded by the decisions which 
determine the courses of these changes and decisions too could be 
preceded by changes in a continuous looping relationship. 
Decision Theory, or more accurately theories of decision, is 
concerned with the better understanding of the process of these 
decisions.
Also in conflictual interaction systems, there would always be a 
point in time when, due to one or several factors, one or more of 
the parties in conflict would reach a point of decision-making on 
whether to de-escalate the situation or to escalate it.
Regardless of the reasons for reaching this point, the point is 
referred to in this study as a Y-point. The diagram used in 
monitoring the phases of interaction between the parties in a 
system and the various decision points reached before the current 
situation is called a Y-diagram (Fig. 2.5).
A Y-point is thus basically a decision point at which parties in 
an interaction system decide on the actions or inactions in the 
next defined phase of their relationship(as defined by the party 
making the decision). Such points are also mentioned earlier 
(Chapter 2) as potential stability plateaux where meaningful
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intervention by interested parties could take place.
Dando and Bee[1977], pointed out how important this phase of 
decision taking is with the aid of game scenarios between players 
who are relative gain maximizers(RG) and non-relative game 
maximizers(non-RG's). In a series of games, the non-RG's 
attempted to modify the RG's behaviour in order to evolve more 
co-operative games and, when these efforts failed, the non-RG's 
"....then arrive(d) at a crucial decision point in the game". 
Such crucial decision points are the Y-points: because the non-RG 
could decide to change his strategy and play a non-co.operative 
game or continue to play with the previous strategy. They 
concluded that "...it should be possible to alter substantially 
the frequency of the hostile response by providing information 
about the possible intentions of the RG player".
The function of providing this sort of information is what the
I.S is partly designed to achieve. The Y-diagram is one of the 
facilities that should be available to an analyst during the 
course of studying an on-going situation, or an interaction 
system before the development, or during the course of a conflict 
situation, in order to determine the trend of events. A Y-point 
could serve as an intervention point where conflict management 
actions are implemented while a resolution process is initiated. 
In the miners' conflict, for example, the collapse of the strike 
should have been seen as providing a period for the redesign of
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the NCB NUM interaction system because that period was clearly a 
Y-point.
One problem in conflict situations, however, is that a party or 
coalition might be so convinced of its eventual "victory", or the 
obviousness of its "victory", that it might be unwilling to grant 
concessions to the obvious or potential "loser". One of the 
functions of the Y-diagram in such situations is to assist in the 
identification of the plateaux where meaningful intervention 
could be made and an I.S designed(or redesigned, if it has, in 
fact, failed earlier) to strive for stability in the system.
5.6.1 Some features of Y-diagrams
A Y-diagram is a schematic representation of the development of 
an interaction system's relationship over time. It could be 
constructed by any analyst or other interested party, concerned 
with the conflict situation. Its main use is to serve as an aid 
to the analysis of the system's interaction. It depicts 
pictorially(Fig 2.5) the gradual development of relationships 
from "normal" to the first potential disagreement point, which 
could be resolved and thus revert the relationship back to 
"normal", or which could through the addition of other issues 
develop into a conflict situation; with further Y-points 
developing at various levels of conflict.
( i ) Y-diagram Construction
The diagrams are basically block diagrams with only two 
additional symbols for decision points and connector or looping
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process. The blocks(squares) are used to represent the key
phases of interactions in a symbolic manner. The phases could
later be individually studied and analysed when a detailed
understanding of phase is required. The symbols used in its 
construction are as shown in Fig.5.2
(ii) Uses of Y-diagram
Y-diagrams could be used at any phase of system interactions for 
either :
(a) post-hoc studies; or
(b) current situation (live) study
(a ) Post-hoc Studies
In this type of study, the diagram could be used to examine the 
development of the systems' relationships, thus determining when 
Y-points were reached, and what happened at those periods. This 
would enable one to respond to enquiries like:
Were any opportunities seized or missed?
What were the consequences of the options adopted by the 
parties? and so on.
The answers to these and other questions posed during the 
analysis would yield valuable insight into the problem of
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Phases
   Decision points
. Connector/Looping symbol
Fig. 6.2 Symbols fon Y-diagram.
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situation analysis.
Although there is the benefit of hindsight for the analyst, the 
exercise should assist the user of the diagram in deriving a 
better understanding of "similar" conflict situations(noting that 
similarity may be a very subjective concept.)
(b) Current (live) Situation Study
Y-diagrams could be used to examine "live" situations("normal" or 
conflictual). This involves the modelling of an ongoing 
relationship up to the current phase of interaction. It is 
essential that even "normal" relationships are periodically 
reevaluated and constantly monitored, if only to keep them 
"normal".
The diagram could serve as a monitoring tool whose function 
would be to assist analysts or users in the prediction of 
potential critical decision points ahead in the system. This 
could alert the decision making sub-system to potential issues 
over which there could be some later disagreement or, potential 
conflict points, and also to changes in the pattern or essence of 
the system's relationships. Qualitatively better-informed advice 
could thus be given to the decision sub-systems before the Y- 
points are reached.
(iii) Data and Information Requirements for Y-diagrams
In order to construct Y-diagrams, the analyst must obtain data 
and information from the potential or eventual user of the 
results obtained in the analysis and any other relevant sources
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about the following:
-the other parties in the interaction system 
-the known options available to every party in the system 
-the known factors influencing every party in the system 
-the sanctions that could prevent parties from adopting 
certain options
-the credible threats possible and available to the parties.
These details would be collected and collated to evolve an idea 
about the governing ground-rules for the parties. This 
information would then be used to chart the development of the 
relationships and would assist the analyst in determining when a 
party/coalition could decide to transform a "routine"
disagreement into a conflict.
5.6.2 Determinants and Indicators of Y-points
Because of the inevitabilty of change in dynamic systems' 
interactions, Y-points could develop in any interaction system 
regardless of the state of relationship!ie "normal" or
conflictual). The Y-points would vary from one situation to 
another even in similar systems but the factors determining their 
emergence could include (but not necessarily limited to) the
following :
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^ ) "raison d'etre^- and causes of conflict;
b) perception of "de facto" "status quo" and projected 
course of events;
c) internal pressure; and
d) external pressure.
(a) "Raison d'etre and Causes of Conflict
The actual, or perceived reasons and causes of conflict form one 
of the factors that contribute to the emergence of Y-points. If 
the conflict situation was deliberately provoked by one party(or 
coalition), Y-points in such circumstances would be very 
different from situations where none of the parties want 
conflict. If the raised issues are considered to be relevant by 
all the parties, one or more of the following conditions have to 
be satisfied before a Y-point could evolve:
(i) depletion of the resources of one party(coalition) or
all the parties and .the inability to replace them at
the same frequency,
(ii) inability of one party (coalition) to have a decisive 
advantage over the others (stalemate) and
(iii) withdrawal of support by the wider system.
Some of the issues could also be made irrelevant by some of the 
parties if they are not considered to be the main causes or
reasons for the conflict situation. If the causes or reasons for
the situation are generally agreed and acknowledged, a Y-point
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might be possible if only to allow some action to be taken. For 
example in the Iran-lraq conflict, the reasons and causes have 
not been agreed upon and therefore Y-points for meaningful 
intervention have not evolved.
(b ) Perception of "de facto" "status quo" and Projected Course 
of Events
The actual state of affairs and likely future states might 
persuade some parties to try and evolve a Y-point. If one or
more of the parties appraise the present and project the
appraisals into the future, the consequences of continuing on the 
same line of action might be considered unacceptable. This might
lead to a Y-point where a new future is jointly agreed or
designed.
If however, the projected course of events is perceived by some 
of the parties to be eventually favourable, the Y-point might 
only be used as an intermediate, stock-taking phase, subject to 
certain stipulated conditions. Such conflicts could become long- 
drawn with no clear winner or loser with continuous situations 
with short or long breaks in the overt phases of the activities. 
This could continue until some other factors contribute to bring 
about, facilitate, or force, another Y-point. Two examples of 
such scenarios are the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Superpowers'
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relationship.
(c ) Internal Pressure
This is another important factor that could bring a Y-point
about. Internal pressure involves pressure from some sub-systems 
in an interacting system against its own decision-subsystems' 
decisions, actions, etc. The pressures might have various 
reasons but the effect is the same: dissension from the system's
stance. This contravenes one of the key principles governing
the successful prosecution of any conflict - the principle of 
internal solidarity. This principle implies that a party or 
coalition in conflict must present a unified front against the 
other party or coalition. It also implies that the issues of the 
conflict must be supported by the legitimizing authority and 
supporters(ref. Section 4.9.3)
Internal pressure is extremely important in the emergence of Y-
points because decision sub-systems depend on the other various 
sub-systems in their interacting systems for their legitimacy and 
for the system itself to remain as a viable entity. If internal 
pressure calls for a Y-point, the decision sub-system would in
most cases heed the call, as otherwise the support for the sub­
system could be withdrawn. An example of the importance of this
factor was the role of the Peace movement in the USA at the
latter part of the USA-Vietnam war.
(d ) External Pressure
Y-points could also be achieved as a result of external
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pressure. This could occur if the interacting systems are 
"persuaded" or convinced that it is in their best interest to 
find a solution to the conflict. This "conviction" or
"persuasion" is carried out by the supporters of the parties in
the wider system. External pressure could also come from the
supporters of the opposing parties. The key to the success of 
any external pressure is the abililty to enforce sanctions that 
usually accompany such proposals or persuasion.
From whichever way a Y-point is evolved in a conflict situation, 
its manifestation offers the parties an opportunity to decide on 
new relationships between themselves, but at a price. The
immediate price is that one party has to make a move or shift its 
position somewhat unless there is an external party to bring them 
together. The need for reliable predictive models for this phase 
of interactions could not be over emphasised. However, the
dynamic nature of interaction systems, the ease and rapidity 
with which issues could be classified or reclassified, as well as 
the obvious fact of incomplete information make this a daunting 
task. The Y-diagram is a modest move towards such predictive 
models.
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5.7 Commentary on Chapter 5
In a conflictual system, the initiative for an I.S. should 
ideally emerge from the "obvious winner" because of the 
acceptance factor mentioned in Chapter 3. Although this 
initiative would initially be regarded as suspicious by the 
"loser", its adoption and promotion tend to have more chance of 
success than if it had been imposed by the "winner" or from 
external sources or even initiated by the "loser". In "normal" 
interaction systems, the initiative could emanate from any of the 
interacting parties and even from an "external" source that is 
acceptable to all the parties in the system(external in the sense 
that it is not an active party in the defined interaction 
system). This chapter has examined the concepts of Integration 
System and Y-points in Y-diagrams and how these concepts could be 
meaningfully utilised by analysts or other parties in a "normal" 
or conflict situation. It is clear that the game-theoretic 
methodologies discussed in 3.4. could play an important role in 
developing and analysing Y-diagram models.
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
6.1 General Commentary
The Integration System concept is based on the existence or 
development of good faith between the interacting or conflicting 
parties. It is also based on the assumption that most of the
parties in an interaction system would prefer stability in the
system to unnecessary and malevolent conflict situations. In
situations where conflict has been deliberately provoked by one
party or coalition, for whatever reasons, it is obvious that an
I.S would not be of much service except when all the parties 
involved agree to jointly participate in the I.S. Systems with 
structures similar to that of the "I.S" have been functioning 
without the parties attempting to abuse the system.
An I.S does not have the power of decision and its approach is 
not prescriptive by nature. The structure and the Y-diagram,
used together, present a framework that brings to the attention 
of the decision makers and others, a structured means of 
determining the current situation, modelling it and deciding on 
how the next phase of interactions would be influenced.
It is not based on any particular technique for conflict
resolution but on a paradigm that would assist parties in 
conflict situations or "normal" interactions to design and
implement a resolution-seeking mechanism into the interaction 
system. Interaction systems differ in structure, relationships, 
and ground rules of interactions. The rules and norms that
govern the development and prosecution of conflict would also
vary from situation to situation and context to context in
accordance with the form of interaction "normally" engaged in .
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These variations are also reflected in how the conflicts could be 
settled, but the principles governing the resolution of conflict 
are reasonably finite and repeatable in modified forms in most 
situations. Like any other situation in human activity systems, 
it is difficult to prescribe methodologies for resolving problems 
that have not yet occurred. In Chapter 5 however, I have 
discussed some of the facilities and methodologies that are 
considered appropriate for the various phases of a conflict 
study.
The contents of this thesis can be summarised under three broad 
headings of conflict study, conflict development and conflict 
settlement. Under conflict study, I have examined how conflict 
situations could be studied using different methodologies and 
conclude that single methodologies are mostly inadequate to
"capture", model and analyse the inherent variety of most
conflict situations or even other interaction systems.
This conclusion is consistent with the observations of
Schelling[1980] who lamented the narrowness of single
methodological approaches to conflict study and commented that he 
had "...hoped to help establish an interdisciplinary field ... 
cutting across economics, sociology and political science, even
law and philosophy and perhaps anthropology " This, he hoped,
could be useful, "...not only to theorists but also to people 
concerned with practical problems".
The variety of complex systems could thus be adequately
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represented only through the use of multiple methodologies for 
different phases of the study. As Curle[1975] explained, in
conflict studies, "......the stress is on the mutual reaction of
people, and groups in conflict situations, and how this may be 
modified. It is definitely not confined to international 
conflict but deals equally with industrial, social, racial and 
other sorts of conflict."
I have adopted the multiple methodology approach to conflict 
study in the Ladworth Project (Appendix B) and shall in further 
meetings with the members of the committees continue to use this 
approach. In conflict development, I have looked at the types of 
ecology in which conflicts are likely to develop. I have 
examined relationships between "normal" interaction space and 
conflict space, and how an increase in one space leads to a 
corresponding decrease in the other as issues are classified as 
relevant or irrelevant to an ongoing situation.
The role of perceptions in conflict development was reviewed, as 
were the factors that interplay to determine the scope, intensity 
and duration of a conflict situation. I also examined the 
difference made in systems interaction when system ownership has 
an overarching authority over the conflicting parties.
The issue of conflict outcomes was extensively discussed on the 
basis of management, dissolution and resolution. I examined these 
outcomes in relation to systems stability and argued for the 
adoption of the one outcome that could lead to stability.
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stability in systems and how it could be achieved is a dominant 
theme running through the thesis and I suggested a structure that 
I am convinced could lead to improved stability in systems. I 
have used several case studies to support my arguments that 
stability in complex systems is dependent on the structural 
integration of the sub-systems.
In seeking to determine the underlying principles on which such 
an integration system could be based in design and 
implementation, based on the case studies, observations and this 
research, I suggested some essential conditions that are 
necessary for the design of an integration system.
During the research programme, I evolved two analytical tools to 
complement the methodologies in use, the first tool is the Y- 
diagram, which could be used at any phase of interaction, to 
determine the current situation and plan for the next decision 
point. The second tool is the Integration System structure 
which could be used to help in the redesign of the interaction 
system* s relationship and structure.
Some of my views have been modified and enriched on certain 
aspects of conflict through correspondence with de Reuck and 
Mitchell. Discussions with Checkland and Howard also clarified 
some of my opinions. The correspondence and interactions 
between me and the Ladworth Project committee members during my 
studies for them, and after these were completed, have enabled me 
to monitor to some extent, how an integration system could be 
implemented in practice.
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6.2 Conclus]nns
On the basis of the arguments and submissions in this thesis, 
reinforced and supported by the ideas from other sources 
acknowledged in the report, my conclusions from this study are 
thus as follows:
(1) One of the major "obvious" lessons that could be drawn 
from the arguments of this thesis is the effect of 
different situation-handling approaches on system 
relationships. This lesson was demonstrated through the 
use of case studies, especially those on conflict 
resolution and the one on conflict dissolution.
(2) Future system relationships are determined by the 
management of Y-points(decision-points).
(3) The relative stability of an interaction system is 
dependent on the structural and general relational 
structure of the system.
(4) Conflict study cannot be adequately carried out using a 
single discipline approach.  ^ A multi-disciplinary 
approach is essential.
(5) Conflict does not erupt spontaneously. It requires a 
certain ecology to foster and nurture it.
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(6) Conflicts, being properties of dynamic systems cannot be 
totally prevented or eliminated, but the development of 
malevolent types can be minimised through design.
(7) Stability has to be consciously designed into a system's 
structure and not taken for granted.
(8) Only internally evolved structures can ensure stability 
because externally or internally imposed ones are 
inherently unstable due to the fact that the "loser" 
might not accept its conditons and could, at an opportune 
time, undermine it. Here, I consider the EEC and the 
Swiss systems to be relatively stable, but not the 
miners' system.
(9) The concept of an Integration System is an approach that 
could aid in incorporating stability into interaction 
systems.
(10) Perceptions are key factors in determining structural 
relationships and stability.
(11) Despite the possibilities of positive outcomes from 
benevolent conflict situations, creative resolution of 
conflicts are extremely rare( e.g a process for forcing 
prices down, and yet increasing both parties share of 
the market due to affordable prices, versus a price 
war).
(12) Conflicts are more easily started than resolved(e.g one 
party can begin a conflict, but its resolution requires
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the co-operation of all the parties that have become 
involved in the situation).
(13) The "original" conflicting parties have no more say in 
a conflict situation than do their key, and therefore 
essential, supporters in the wider system.
(14) Support of the key parties in the wider system, and 
not the "rightness" or otherwise of the parties is a 
major determining factor in the duration, scope and 
probable outcome of conflicts.
(15) Dissolved conflict situations make the interaction 
system inherently unstable as the miners' case is now 
proving. The "losers", i.e. NUM-LOY, have
now(Sept.1987) imposed an overtime ban on their members 
in a move that is very similar to the initial overt 
phase of the last conflict situation which was 
dissolved.
(16) "Winning" intra-system conflicts poses more problems 
than "winning" inter-system conflicts. This is 
because in an intra-system situation, the loyalties, 
support, resources and effort of a system is divided 
against itself and, at the end of the conflict, the 
system is still divided until an I.S. is implemented in
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one form or another. For example, the victory of the 
British Government over Argentina and its stance on EEC 
issues has brought it more favourable reactions than 
its coalition's victory over the NUM.
(17) Prescriptive methodologies are impracticable for 
conflict research.
Future Research
In the light of the commentaries, arguments and these 
conclusions, further research is required to help determine how 
an I.S could be incorporated into industrial organisations, into 
public political life or into international relations without the 
parties losing their identities.
Further multidisciplinary research is also required to formulate 
or evolve more detailed paradigms relevant to classes of 
situations in which conflict may occur. These paradigms, in 
extension of what is suggested in this thesis would aim to 
perform the following functions:
a) to help predict;
b) determine ;
c) examine ; and
d) interprète
likely indicators that would enable analysts or any interested or 
intervening parties to recognise when meaningful interventions 
could take place.
Fu rther research is also required on the different types of
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structure that would be best suited to different interaction 
systems. This further research must be action or project-based 
as it cannot be adequately carried out primarily as a University- 
based study unless under the aegis of a permanent conflict study 
unit working in the field. The author of this thesis intends, if 
possible, to carry out advisory and consultancy studies for 
organisations in conflict or wishing to avoid one. The work 
reported here will act as a methodological base for him or others 
to get appropriate research started.
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EXPLANATORY NOTES ON THE LADWORTH PROJECT 
Introduction
The thinking behind the concept of I.S could not fully tested 
in a malevolently conflictual situation but it was felt 
necessary to test and sharpen the ideas through the observation 
and involvement in as real a situation as possible. I had some 
interaction with the Newham Conflict and Change Project (a 
project set up in the London Borough of Newham to help in the 
resolution of conflicts in the area.), but there was no 
suitable project for me to test these ideas on and thus I had 
to look elsewhere.
i
The Ladworth project was chosen because of |its nature which 
could be described in the words of Ackoff (1974) as "messy". It 
has most of the factors present in complex conflict situations 
earlier discussed in the body of the thesis and, more 
importantly for my research, the parties were willing to 
jointly evolve a 'stable solution* in line with our 
suggestions.
Involvement with the project could be said to have occurred at 
one of the phases in the project that has been described as a 
Y-point in this thesis. This is because of several factors 
affecting the project. These factors include (but are not
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limited to) the following:
(i) Uncertainty about future funding.
(ii) Threat of failure due to inadequate local 
participation.
(iii) Internal pressure to do 'something'.
(iv) Structure of the project.
(v) Unclarified relationship between Ladworth and similar 
projects in the area.
(vi) Stalemate between factions due to some polarisation of 
views.
PROCEDURES AND METHODOLOGIES USED IN INTERVENTION
The 'Ladworth' system was treated from the onset as a "soft 
system" in the Checkland use of the word, and, in line with my 
arguments in this thesis, it was decided to use any appropriate 
methodology for the project. Consequently, the SSM approach was 
used to identify the owners, their perceptions, the expected 
transformations and their expected benefits.
The Ecology of the Ladworth project was then constructed and 
studied in line with the producer- and co-producer concept of 
Ackoff to determine how the individual perceptions were formed, 
and whether the perceptions were purposive or purposeful in 
relation to the project. The adequacy of the data and 
information base used by the parties in the formation of their 
perceptions and articulation of their views was examined for
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accuracy (measured against actual incidents and documents), 
relevance and content. The result of this examination was used 
to construct a PFM model.
The PFM's concept of System ownership was utilised to generate 
questions on the following aspects of the Project: 
i) Structure suitability and relevance, 
ii) Similarity/Divergence in Aims and Objectives between 
Ladworth and individual Organisations, 
iii) Involvement and Participation or otherwise of the 
organisations with Ladworth 
iv) Opinions of the parties 
v) Basis for perception formulation.
Project Scope j
Work for Ladworth covered the areas of Study, Analysis and 
Design. The study aspect was carried out with conventional 
modes of data collection and study. i.e Interviewing, 
Observation and Archival or Records study. These three methods 
will now be briefly examined to show how they were used to 
obtain relevant data and information about the project.
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Interviewing
Thirty-five organisations were interviewed during the study 
period over a period of 4 months. These organisations included 
Statutory Agencies (eg. Police, Housing, Education, Recreation, 
District Intermediate Treatment Centres), Voluntary Agencies 
(eg. MACRO, Housing Associations, Tenant Associations, Youth 
Clubs, Cooperatives etc.) and Councillors.
Interviews were conducted at various levels of these 
organisations, eg. in the Police, from the P.C on the beat to 
Divisional Chief Superintendent level in the two Divisions 
covered by the project. 3 serving councillors and some of the 
ex-councillors representing the project areas, as well as 
several council workers, were also interviewed.
I
i
The interviews were carried out to elicit information from the 
people and organisations concerned about their perceptions of 
the project, its benefits, limitations, achievements, failures, 
why they are active (or inactive) in the project, and how the 
project might be improved structurally or functionally.
Observation
I attended 20 meetings of the Steering Committee and other 
related organisations and projects in Birmingham. These 
meetings included for example (a) Attendance with the Police,
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at an impromptu (for me) Schools anti-crime meeting in 
Handsworth, (a) dousing Association meetings in Ladywood, (c) 
Neighbourhood watch meetings, (d) Police-Tenant Association 
eetings, (e) Resource Allocation meetings, (f) Planning 
etings, (g ) Project management sub-committee meetings etc.
m
me
Records Examination
This involved the examination of various records and documents 
connected with the formation and management of the project, 
records on planning, policy, and reports from different 
organisations and evaluations of the project. Access was given 
to any documents I required from any of the parties: 
information gathered from this source, which is not usually 
available to the members of the project, proved crucial in 
determining how and where the project deviated from its primary 
purposes and the probable means of regaining its lost momentum. 
On the basis of the analysis carried out, it was discovered 
(and later confirmed by most of the parties concerned) that the 
structural and functional relationships between the parties 
were inherently competitive, especially between the Statutory 
Agencies and to a lesser extent, between the Voluntary 
Organisations.
It was realised that these 'rivalries' has been carried over to 
the relationship and management of Ladworth. It was also 
realised that these influences contributed directly and
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indirectly to tne impact of Ladworth on the community. These 
preconceived ideas formed the perceptions of the parties and 
represent the ecology of the project.
It became apparent that the perceptions have to be modified by 
the parties themselves if the project is to be successful. I 
felt that this was possible if the objective of Ladworth could 
be made to be more important than the sub-objectives of the 
individual parties. My initial report was circulated to more 
than 50 member organisations and individuals for their 
reactions, comments and ideas.
The responses from these sources were analysed and combined 
with all other information to produce the final report. This 
final report was also circulated to most of the project members 
before the Annual General Meeting (AGM) of the project for 
1987, for debate at the AGM. The meeting was well attended with 
about 100 people representing various organisations. I was 
questioned by more than 20 people on various aspects of the 
report, and I argued for the adoption of the I.S structure for 
Ladworth. One of the most remarkable feature of the research 
has been the transformation of the parties from opponents of 
the study, to critics and cynics, but later to supporters and 
active participants when the ideas of the I.S were understood.
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ihe active support of these initial sceptics came about after 
the realisation that the research could be of assistance to the 
project and also to their own organisations.
EPILOGUE
The Ladworth report has now been submitted by the Management 
Committee to the Birmingham City Council for consideration and 
adoption in the Council's policy formulation on Inner City 
organisations. Reports suggest that this seems to have taken 
place.
The ideas of an I.S was very well received by many of the 
parties involved in the project, ie, from the Councillors, the 
representatives of the Statutory Agencies and other 
Organisations. This view is supported by letters and telephone 
calls of appreciation I have since received from some of the 
organisations involved with the project.
It is my belief that I have taken part in a successful attempt 
to transform rivalries, competition, covert conflictual issues, 
and unclarified assumptions to overtly stated problems for 
'open' discussions and the acceptance of these as problems for 
joint solution.
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CONCLUSION
Our aim in the Ladworth study was not to resolve any particular 
conflict but could be summarised in the words of Angyal, as 
quoted by Beresford and Dando (1978), "In systems thinking, the 
task is not to find direct relations between members but to 
find the superordinate system in which they are connected or to 
define the positional value of members relative to the 
superordinate system".
The relevance of the project to my research is best expressed 
in the words of M'Pherson (1974) as being "an empirical study 
in the Systems Science sense of using the systems paradigm to 
study the structure, behaviour, organisation, and other forms 
of relationship and interactions of the system in conflict in 
order to obtain evidence for the further development of 
knowledge concerning the systemic characteristics of conflict". 
In this sense, it has supported the concept of Integration 
System,and helped greatly in the logical argument of Chapter 5.
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Foreword by Professor K.C. Bowen
This report, by Mr. Yemi Adegoke, has been discussed with and 
approved by me. It will necessarily have some incompleteness due 
to the very short time available for work on a most complex problem, 
We are grateful to the many members of the committee and others who 
have spoken freely to us about the problems that face the Ladworth 
project, and we hope that this outsider view will be helpful in 
moving to the next stage of furthering its aims.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Following some discussions with certain members of the 
Ladworth Project Steering committee, Professor Bowen and I 
submitted a proposal to the committee [appendix A] in January 
1987 to carry out a study of the project with the stated aims
of "... assisting the project committee to clarify and make
explicit the purpose of Ladworth and assess the effectiveness 
of the committee's strategies for carrying out any stated aims" 
and also to "... attempt to identify and open for debate 
conflicting issues and come up with suggestions on possible ways 
of dealing with these".
An interim discussion report was submitted in March 
[appendix B] and circulated to Committee members, the document 
was discussed with us at the Committee meeting of April 30, 1987 
and the points raised were considered. This final report 
incorporates the views raised at that and previous meetings and 
attempts to achieve the aims set out in our proposal document.
This report is in six parts namely
(a) The Background
(b) The Ladworth System
(c) Identifiable problems
(d) Commentary
(e) Conclusions and Recommendations
(f) Appendices.
The report does not pretend to be an How-to-do-it manual 
nor claim to be a panacea for solving Ladworth's enormous problems, 
but it aims to serve as a broad guide on how to build on the 
foundation that has already been laid.
Thg report is written with the majority of committee members 
in mind and thus devoid of the various technical expressions or 
methods and techniques used during the course of the study. Readers 
who are interested in the complete methodological report should 
contact me at the University. It is not written to evaluate the 
performances of any individual or organisation connected with the 
project but rather as a document to appraise how the project's 
"corporate approach" to crime prevention/reduction could be improved.
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The Ladworth project is a bold and laudable one and any 
shortcomings implied by this report should be considered in 
relation to the major fact that there was no model to follow; it was 
an uncharted path and any mistakes should be regarded as part of the 
learning process.
2 BACKGROUND 
Historical
Ladworth Project was set up in 1985 in the wake of the riots in 
the City of Birmingham. It was the result of an initiative from the 
West Midlands (WM) Police and was financially supported by the Inner 
City Partnership Programme (ICCP).
The aims of the project are defined in a constitution (Appendix D) 
and a steering committee was constituted to run the affairs of the 
project. The committee is made up of 35 members and drawn from 
various interested parties operating in the community, with a conscious 
strategy of ensuring that the community is adequately represented.
The composition of the committee is based on the three identifiable 
sub-systems that makes up the Ladworth system: i.e. 7 elected
members (councillors) representing the "governors" or policy formulators 
for the project area; 6 representatives of the statutory agencies 
directly related to the project, representing the, "agents" or policy 
implementers in the project area; and finally 22 community/voluntary 
organisations elected at the AGM to represent the "governed" or the 
"clients" of the various policies.
The idea behind the composition is an attempt to ensure that 
(i) decision of the committee is truly representative of what 
the community wants; and
(ii) all the parties in the Project area could freely discuss the 
problems and difficulties in the area without any part being 
left in the dark about issues, e.g. as to why some actions have been
or have not been taken.
Most of the funding [75%] is derived from the ICPP and the remainder 
[25%] is obtained from the W.M. Police. This funding arrangement 
is agreed for three years after which funding sources become uncertain.
The current financial year (87/881 is thus the last year for which there
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is any certainty of funding.
Geographical
The project area covers disproportionate parts of 4 adjacent but 
politically separated areas of the city with a population of 86,000.
It covers a large part of Ladywood, a small part of Perry Barr and 
very small parts of Edgbaston and Small Heath. The area was defined 
and determined on the basis of the WM Police maps and covers parts 
of the Cl and C2 subdivisions of the Police.
This criterion in addition to other factors possibly available 
to the Police, e.g. levels of crime, tension etc. appear to be the 
raison dletre for the determination of the project area [Appendix C].
Political
The project started in the aftermath of the last riots; it 
seemed politically reasonable and popular to do 'something' that 
might prevent or minimise similar occurrence. The political 
representation on the committee reflects the geographical/political 
spread of the project area with councillors on the committee 
represting the various wards covered by the project area:
Ladywood 3 councillors
Edgbaston, Perry Barr,
Small Heath and the Police authority - 1 councillor each.
The chairmanship of the committee is permanently vested in the Ladywood 
ward due to the large coverage of this ward.
3. LADWORTH SYSTEM - STRUCTURE AND ORGANISATION
The main objective of the project is set out in section 2.1 
of its constitution [appendix D] and is "... to assist financially, 
and in an advisory role any activity within the area .... whose aims 
include the reduction of or the prevention of crime and the consequent 
improvement of the quality of life in the Project area .
The means of achieving the above objectives are stated in Section 
3 of the constitution and include the following :
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(a) "make grants and donations to activities in the defined area"
(b) receive grants and donations and otherwise raise money"
(c) promote and carry out or assist in promoting and carrying 
out research, surveys and investigations and publish the 
useful results thereof"
(d) " employ and pay any person to supervise, organise and carry
on the work of the project"
(e) " collect and disseminate information on all matters affecting
the said objects and exchange such information with other 
bodies having similar objects".
In this study, these and the other criteria were used to examine 
how well the project has performed in view of its stated objectives.
The evaluation is intentionally unquantified as such quantification 
might yield figures which are open to abuse and used to justify certain 
stances or actions not intended by either the author or the committee.
The management of the project is vested in the Steering Committee 
which is also empowered to determine and institute the structures to 
enable it to carry out these responsibilities. Two subcommittees were
formed by the Steering Committee to perform these functions ; the
subcommittees are
(i) the Resource Management Group
and (ii) the Crime Prevention GroupJ
Sub-commit te es were also formed at core area level of the crime 
prevention group to discuss local issues.
The study revealed that of the several means listed in the 
constitution available to the committee and its organs for realising 
the stated objectives [5 of which were mentioned earlier], in only 
one has the committee been successful. However, the efficiency 
with which the one successful task [that of making grants and donations 
to activities in the area] has been carried out is negated by the fact 
that it has been ineffective; the money has been meticulously and 
carefully disbursed but the impact could be said to be minimal.
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This report and two earlier ones by different members of the 
committee were commissioned by the committee and thus could be said 
to partially fulfil another one of the tasks but the others have 
been neglected. This has led to a situation where the project 
is viewed by virtually all the members and outsiders as a funding 
agency.
The committee by focussing primarily on giving grants has 
unwittingly become efficient but ineffective [doing the wrong things 
correctly] . That the available funds were not originally meant for 
disbursement could be gauged from the total grant which is very small 
compared to that available to other organisations/agencies
The administration of the project is provided by a sole 
individual [Mr. Keith Wakeman] with no administrative or 
secretarial backup: he occupies an office in the council building
[by courtesy of the Chief Executive] .
The Administrator attends the meetings of the committee and the 
various subcommittees with the only purpose of recording what transpired 
and getting it prepared for the next meeting. He also sends out 
details of the meeting.
The Crime Prevention group is run by another individual [Mr. Ted 
Shuck] , whom it should be pointed out is not employed by Ladworth, but 
whose brief as civilian Projects Officer for the WM Police includes 
Ladworth. It is Mr, Shuck therefore and the various sub-committees 
at the core area level (most of whom are not Ladworth committee 
members) that constitute the Crime Prevention Group.
The Resource Management Group also contains members with voting 
rights but who are not members of the committee with whom the final 
responsibilities lie.
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4. IDENTIFIABLE PROBLEMS AND CAUSES
There are obviously many problems facing Ladworth, but the most 
damaging ones [in the sense that its very future existence depends 
on resolving them] are identified as follows:
(i) inadequate awareness of Ladworth by the community;
(ii) lack of adequate support for the project by even those
members of the community who are aware;
(iii) distrust of some of the Project members objectives by the
community;
(ivj perceived ineffectiveness of the Project; and
(v) lack of clarity and uniformity in the perceptions and 
thereby working frameworks of the committee members.
These problems are closely linked with each other and no single
cause could be attributed to any particular problem. Some of the
causes are clearly outside the control of the Committee, but should 
be brought to the members' attention nevertheless. The factors 
judged to be the cause of the problems are:
(a) size of the Project area;
(b) structure/organisation of the Project;
(c) socio-cultural differences;
(d) resources; and
(e) ambiguity in the role definition and functions of the Project 
and its Steering Committee.
It is stated in the last paragraph that no single cause or factor 
could be identified as solely responsible for any particular problem; 
therefore, bearing this in mind, these problems will be discussed 
in relation to some factors that might jointly or individually have 
caused these problems.
Inadequate awareness of Ladworth by community
Many of the community/voluntairy organisations in the project area 
are unaware of Ladworth and, insofar as they become aware, it is seen 
by them as a funding agency, albeit of small amounts. The role of 
Ladworth or its objectives are hardly mentioned and thus it is treated 
as a funding agency of the last resort and not as an organisation
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wit±i other functions, such as advisory and information providing. 
Consequently, interaction between most of the community/voluntary 
organisations in the project area has been limited to applications 
for and allocation of money.
This lack of awareness could be attributed to the lack of 
adequate publicity on behalf of Ladworth and this in itself could be said to 
stem from various factors.
Size: the project area is very wide and thus it is difficult to liaise
with all the organisations that might be useful to achieve Ladworth's 
objectives.
Structure/Organisation : there is no identifiable structure to support
an awareness campaign and the project has no identifiable point of 
contact like an office - only recently has one person been committed 
fully to it.
Resources : there is no available manpower to canvass for support,and
members already involved are already sacrificing considerable time 
without pay (the money available is always disbursed in such a manner 
that nothing is left for publicity or campaigns).
Other factors could no doubt be added to these to explain the lack of 
awareness about the project in the community.
Lack of adequate support for the Project by the Community
There were more than 60 community/voluntary organisations and 
leaders present at the first AGM of the Project at which the Steering 
Committee was elected but since then their active participation or 
involvement has diminished dramatically. The situation could be gauged 
at any meeting of the committee where the number of community voluntary
bodies represented are few.
Without delving into the question of whether these community/ 
voluntary organisations are truly representative of the communities 
or whether their initial interest was kindled because of the likelihood 
of some grant from Ladworth, it is important to recognise that these 
organisations at least present an identifiable face and could be 
regarded as symbolic representatives of the community.
The lack of support for the project by the community could be 
attributed to factors such as the following.
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size of the project area has effectively made it seem 
remote to the local community and thus there is no sense of ownership 
or commitment to the project, as its impact is far removed from 
their daily experience.
Socio-cultural : the committee was designed in such a way as to give
the community/voluntary bodies a greater say than the others through 
their large majority of members on the committee with voting rights; 
control has, by default, passed to the professionals from the 
statutory agencies and professional community/volunatry body 
administrators, with the consequence that local people feel ill-equipped 
to participate fully in such a gathering.
Uncertainty about Ladworth: the community is yet to be convinced
about Ladworth's positive role and their part in it; "How relevant 
to their lives is the project?"; "In what ways can it be of help 
to them?"; as a funding agency, it has only very small grants to give, 
therefore, "what else does it do and why is it in the community interest 
to support it?"
There are other factors as well, e.g. most of the committee members 
live outside the project area and therefore are not subject to 
first-hand experience of the situation.
Distrust of some Project members' objectives
This is one of the major problems facing the project because , 
within the committee itself, there is some distrust of fellow 
members' organisational motives, ranging from suggestions that some 
organisations might be using the Project as a kind of Trojan horse 
infiltrating into the community, to ideas that other organisations 
might be using it as a Public Relations exercise to enable them to 
say that something is being done while, in reality, all they do at 
meetings is to explain why things are not being done.
This distrust is obviously created by experiences and past 
interactions and also caused by differences in perceptions as well 
as socio-cultural differences. It is even more pronounced outside 
the committee, where community/voluntary organisations speak of learning 
not to trust statutory agencies on any issue until work has been 
completed and they can see things for themselves.
308
Perceived Ineffectiveness of the Project
Many members contend that their greatest problem is the conclusion 
by the community that the project could not make noticeable impact 
on the situation. This pessimistic view is supported by the fact 
that the committee has no means of following up the decisions reached 
to ensure a successful completion of initiatives. The members agree 
that the project's effectiveness is very limited but point to 
the factors that contributes to this state of affairs, factors like 
size and resources - the very limited resources of money, manpower 
and time against the very large project area. Structure, 
organisation and ambiguity in role definition also make the 
effectiveness of the project a hard task, although perception of this 
generally is rather vague.
Lack of a common framework for reference
It became apparent during the study that Ladworth means different 
things to the different parties involved. Each party uses its own 
criteria to determine what is 'best' for the project and to portray 
its perception to outsiders as to what the project is about. 
Consequently there are conflicting images of Ladworth in the community 
(and in the committee). The project is under continual pressure to 
accommodate and even become what individual members make it out to be. 
This situation is, in part at least; a consequence of the ambiguity 
surrounding the role and functions of the project.
5. COM^ffiNTARY
The ideas behind the Ladworth project are strategically and 
psychologically well conceived; strategically, it could provide a 
forum for the 'governors'/'rulers', their 'agents' and the 
'governed'/'ruled' to meet in informal surroundings at the local 
level for discussions about local problems, interests, difficulties 
etc in areas like crime, housing, waste collection, environment etc. 
(unemployment was specifically excluded as being too wide a subject), 
with a view to taking collectively agreed action and thus fostering 
understanding, trust and co-operation.
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Psychologically, people are more likely to cooperate with 
governments and their agents if they know that they are playing 
a part in the decision making process or that their views are 
taken into consideration and their problems properly perceived 
and regarded. A project like Ladworth is thus like an integrating 
or problem-solving structure where all the parties in a problem- 
situation, jointly and on an "equal" basis, attempt to formulate 
and adopt common and acceptable strategies/approaches for solving 
the identified problems.
All the parties interviewed during the study [including those 
parties who are not actively involved] expressed their hope for 
its survival. Before analysing the problems facing the project, 
data was obtained from several parties through a series of 
interviews, attendance at meetings and by observation and inspection 
of records and documents relating to the project. The data collected 
was then used to generate and formulate the questions in the interim 
report which was later used as a discussion document [appendix B] 
between the committee and ourselves. The following comments are 
based on the responses given by various parties in the project 
and those who are not involved with the project but are in the project 
area; while the conclusions in the next section are derived from 
the answers given to the questions in the interim document.
Size,structure and Organisation
The structure of Ladworth at present is a loose collection 
of interested parties with no developed relationship. Although 
formed in 1985, there was no person employed specifically to 
administer it until late 1986, thus for more than one year after 
its formation, it was administered as one of his other projects by 
Mr. Ted Shuck, Civilian Projects Officer for the W.M. Police.
The new administrator has no secretarial or organisational 
backup and uses the city council offices, relying on the services 
of the council and other organisations. The impression an observer 
gets is that there is no clear structure to Ladworth: the committee
appears to be a super-structure built and operating on an incomplete 
foundation.
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The functions of the Administrator are currently limited 
to recording minutes of meetings, his role could usefully be 
expanded if he had some administrative/secretarial backup.
The total dependence of Ladworth on one source of finance 
means that a stoppage of the grant could lead to the dissolution 
of the project because of the association of Ladworth, in the 
minds of community/voluntary bodies, with giving of grants (even 
without a grant there is much for the committee to do) .
It is clear from the amount of the grant and from the early 
documents dealing with the plans for the project that the money 
was not primarily meant to be used as grants but to be used to 
run the project itself i.e. to employ staff, sponsor projects, 
initiate studies etc and give only small greints to support these.
The decision to use most of the available funds as grants to 
community/voluntary bodies appears to have been due to various 
reasons :
(i) it was seen as a way to generate community groups’ support;
(ii) chcinges in the original personnel led to the situation where
the new personnel lost sight of the main purpose for the 
money; and
(iii) the idea that, "because it is the people's money", they
should be allowed to decide how it should be spent.
Socio-Cultural Difference
The committee has tried to involve local community organisations 
in its management and operations but the response has been 
disappointing. One of the reasons for this could be the assertion 
by some community organisations that "most of the committee members 
live outside the project area, and are middle-class professional"; 
in other words, the committee are part of 'them' and not part of 'us' , 
and therefore "they cannot really understand 'us'".
Individual members of the committee are, based on personal 
interactions, respected and trusted, but this is not carried over to 
the project. It is the transfer of this personal recognition 
to Ladworth that has proved elusive. Because of the distrust of 
other Project members, therefore, the community bodies currently 
actively involved in furthering the objectives of Ladworth remain 
very much unreprœentative of the project area.
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The Ladworth structure was originally conceived as a 
strategic and policy directing structure rather than to manage 
the tactical and operational role it is now playing. The 
envisaged composition reflects this assertion.
The size of the project area has effectively cut off any 
kinship that could be felt for the project by community/voluntary 
organisations and a major realisation is that the current size 
could not be managed effectively with the current structure.
This is all reflected in the proposals made in the Conclusions.
Role Clarification
Despite the defined functions of the committee as stated in 
Appendix D, there is considerable uncertainty about its role.
The major function currently being carried out by the committee 
is that of reviewing and discussing reports from the two 
subcommittees [resource management and crime prevention] rather 
than being the initiator of activities.
One apparent cause of role confusion is that most Committee 
members are not fully aware of what the committee was designed 
to do. They tend just to follow the general flow of discussions 
rather than initiate policy topics for discussion; with the 
result that individual rather than community problems are being 
addressed.
The role of the committee has in several instances become 
operational rather than strategic but without the structure or 
organisation to carry out operational functions.
Resources
The committee's functions directly or otherwise appear to 
revolve around the grant received from the ICPP and WM Police, and 
Project Committee has made no appreciable effort to attract finance 
from other sources. Time is another resource that has to be 
carefully managed; one recurrent complaint from the less active 
members is that meetings seem to go on till late at night over 
issues which need not take such a long time and are relatively 
unimportant.
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Conclusions and Recommendations
The following conclusions are partly based on the questions
raised in the interim document earlier mentioned [appendix B]
and discussed with the committee, they are listed under four
categories [structure, research, committee & general].
On Structure
1. The present structure is inadequate, ineffective and 
inefficient.
2. The structure is unrepresentative of the system.
3. The structure of the Committee is not designed to cope 
with a project of this size and a new management structure 
is desirable.
4. There are alternative structures which could prove to be 
more effective and efficient.
5. The size and complexity of the project is such that fully 
effective management by a single committee is not 
practicable and there is thus a need for a break-up of 
the size into local community groups co-ordinated at the 
Ladworth committee level.
On resources
6. The available resources are obviously inadequate for the 
purposes for which they are being used; they were not 
initially intended for these purposes.
7. Most of the past attention and resources [with notable 
exceptions] has been directed to issues and problems which 
are peripheral to the project's objectives.
8. There has been no sustained effort to seek and obtain grants 
from other sources e.g. local business.
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On the Committee
9. The committee is uncertain of its role and concerns itself
mostly with operational level issues rather than broad policy 
issues.
10. The potential of the committee is not properly utilised by
(i) the committee members because of their uncertainty about 
what they are supposed to do and
(ii) by the community because of the composition of the committee.
11. Despite the grants given to community bodies in the project
area, there has been no conscious corporate effort by the committee 
to increase its impact and influence in the area and thus to be 
perceived as a focal point for help and support.
12. Some committee members [in particular elected members and 
statutory agency representatives] regard Ladworth objectives 
as peripheral to their duties and therefore do not give the 
project the support and attention it deserves.
13. The purposely informal arrangement of the committee meetings has 
unfortunately discouraged some statutory agencies, representatives 
who claim to find the meetings irrelevant to their needs and 
badly time-managed.
General
14. There is no publicity material about Ladworth.
15. There is no attempt to co-ordinate resources and knowledge within
the committee of members with comparable responsibilities. ,
16. Information flow between the members is erratic and is mostly 
confined to the monthly meetings, vhen time is never sufficient.
17. There is no clear policy or planning for bringing influential 
community leaders [e.g. religious leaders] into the project on 
an active basis.
18. There is no regular feedback of information or report on activities
from the committee to non—represented project members [to sustain
their interest and support for the project].
19. There is no formal means of data and information exchange between 
members to enable them to learn from each other.
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20. There is no monitoring of the value, for the aims of the 
Ladworth project, of the use of resources allocated by the 
committee [this is an issue of importance as information 
rather than one of monetary control.]
21. Some organisations and individuals are not actively involved 
because of [11,12,13,14 and 18].
22. Some organisations/individuals are actively involved for various 
reasons among which are
(i) sincere belief in the project;
(ii) interagency co-operation;
(iii) part of their duty; and
(iv) it is better to be 'in' than 'out'.
23. The status quo has proved unsatisfactory cind needs to be 
reviewed/replaced.
24. The project is currently being defined by the action of the 
committee rather than the influence it can bring to bear in 
the project area through its organisation.
25. No outsider or non-committee member is suitably informed about 
Ladworth, and decisions on involvement cannot properly be made.
26. Ladworth means different things to the different parties because 
their perceptions were formed from their individual viewpoints 
not from the project's viewpoint.
27. The perceptions of the parties have to be modified for the future 
progress of the project.
The recommendations fall into the four"categories used earlier, namely
structure and organisation, role, the committee, and general.
Structure and organisation
(a) A new structure should be set up to replace the current one.
[A diagrammatic representation of a possible structure is 
at appendix E].
(b) The project requires an identifiable presence [e.g. the 
administrator's office needs to be made known to the public].
(c) The relationship between the project members [both committee 
and non—committee members] requires classification.
(d) The project area should be broken down into smaller units 
[e.g. 4 or any feasible number of units] .
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(e) The units should be administered locally with the local 
representatives of the agencies, the local councillors 
and the community/voluntary bodies.
(f) Honorary secretaries should be elected to liaise between the 
local units and the administrator.
(g) The administrator should act as the co-ordinator between the 
local units and the main project committee.
(h) There should be some administrative/secretarial backup for 
the project.
(i) The committee would be better named as the"Management Committee".
NOTE : It has been stated by some individuals that too complex a
"sub-committee" structure is undesirable. The Appendix E structure 
is as simple as possible in order to meet the seen needs (see Role 
of the Committee) . Its formality need not be bureaucratic 
provided that essential links and communications are ensured.
In this sense, it could be seen as an informal rather than a formal 
extension of the existing Ladworth Steering Committee.
Role of the Committee
The committee's purposes, in addition to those roles currently 
stated in the constitution, should explicitly include and place 
emphasis on the following:
a) to stimulate community initiatives, e.g. by sponsoring events 
like campaigns against muggings, grafitti, drugs etc. or
by organising competitions between schools (where everyone gets 
some sort of prize or recognition) or creating artists' boards 
at strategic places for grafitti 'artists';
b) coordinate and support such initiatives that are in accordance 
with its aims and objectives;
c) to serve as a source of information for local organisations with
similar objectives;
d) to bring and involve decision makers of various agencies in the
project area into the Project;
e) to act as an informal but representative body in the Project
area for seeking official assistance and support from the council, 
statutory agencies, local businesses etc. for projects in the area;
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f) to promote the awareness and involvement of the community in the 
reduction of anti-social behaviour through anti-crime campaigns, 
by publishing and circulating newsletters etc;
g) to provide when necessary and where there is no other service, 
direct small grants and advisory support to get small sub-projects 
started;
h) to seek from various organisations including the business community, 
sponsors for projects that will be noticeable in the area and 
acknowledged as improving the quality of life and contributing to the 
reduction of crime or opportunity for crime;
The commitjiee should accordingly be dissolved and a new one reconstituted. 
The principal features of the framework at Appendix E are its breakdown 
of the structure into more manageable and locally homogeneous units, 
ones in vdiich individuals should feel that their interest and interests 
were being looked after.
Resources
a) Resources should be used on projects initiated by Ladworth rather 
than on externally suggested projects.
b) Other sources of funding should be vigorously sought and 
exploited.
c) Resources should be set aside for publicity and sponsorship of events
d) Allocation of resources as grants should only occur as a last resort.
General
a) The project should set up a newsletter to enable a full flow 
of information and exchange of ideas in the project area on 
experiences, difficulties etc. and to inform the community of the
project's activities.
b) An office should be acquired for meetings so that Ladworth has 
a clearer identity (ideally this should be close to the
Administrator's office).
c) Liaison with neighbourhood offices, and with projects outside 
Ladworth, should be an integral part of the project.
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It is reasonable to conclude that the operations of Ladworth could 
improve if the suggested structural readjustment could be undertaken, 
if only because, in the words of one interviewee, the current structure 
and status quo is "too big to fight small battles and yet it is too 
small to fight wars".
If the committee decides to implement these suggestions, in part or whole, 
it may be possible to give further advice but no major time-consuming 
effort can be promised.
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a p p e n d i c e s
Appendix A - Project Proposal
Appendix B - Interim Report
Appendix C - Map of Project Area [Cl  ^C2 command area maps]
Appendix D - Ladworth Project Constitution
Appendex E - Proposed structure for Ladworth project.
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APPENDIX A
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University of W ndon
r o y a l  H O L L O W A Y  A N D  B E D F O R D  N E W  C O L L E G E
Department of Mathematics
Egham HiU
Egham
Surrey TW20 OEX 
Tel: Egham (0784) 34455
Proiec^proposal submitted to Ladworth Project Steering Committee
We propose to work with the Ladworth Project Steering Committee and carry 
out a study relating to the following aspects of the Ladworth Project:-
(a) the aims and objectives of the Project;
(b) the interactions between the members of the Steering Committee; and
(c) formal communication and other links between the Project and its clients.
The study will be carried out using various analytical tools developed for 
the study and analysis of human activity systems. It will involve,
(i) interviews with a sample of the following involved parties:
(a) clients;
(b) ex-officio and elected members of the Steering Committee; and
(c) organisations, statutory agencies and individuals [e.g. councillors] 
who are in any way connected with the project; and
(ii) examination of data in documents pertaining to the project, as advised
by the Committee.
The large number of interests and individuals involved with the project and 
the relatively small financial resources available imply that firm control 
is essential in judging what can be done and how it can be made effective.
It is inevitable in such complexity that many different perceptions of the 
role of the Committee and of the purposes of its various activities will 
exist.
We believe that although all activities that we are so far aware of are
potentially relevant to an originally stated aim of the Project, namely
"crime reduction" or "crime prevention", it is far from clear on what criteria 
secondary aims are chosen that may lead to impact on crime. It is possible 
that a new statement of aim is required, at this stage, e.g. a more general 
social betterment programme might be a more useful primary aim of the Committee
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Telex : 935504 Fax : 0784-37520
The aim of our study will therefore be to assist the Project Committee to 
clarify and make explicit the purpose of Ladworth and assess the effectiveness 
of the Committee's strategies for carrying out any stated aims. A corollary 
to this is that the study will also attempt to identify and open for debate 
conflicting issues and come up with suggestions on possible ways of dealing 
with these.
The time we have available for this study is 5-6 months; our priority will 
be to establish the principles of a way-ahead that can be put before the 
Committee by June 1987. The work will be conducted through regular 
interactions with, and reports on progress to, the Committee.
'Yemi Adegoke
Professor Ken Bowen [Supervisor] 
January 1987
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Appendix B
LADWORTH PROJECT - An Interim Report 
by
'Yemi Adegoke
The accompanying diagrams are to enable the committee members to 
follow the presentation and do not represent any definite statement 
on Ladworth. The figures will be used as communication aids to 
assist in the clear depiction of the Ladworth Project (i.e. its 
structure, relationships and perceptions), in the light of its 
stated aims and objectives.
FIG.l represents in a block diagram form the structure of the 
Project as at present. It depicts the two groups performing the 
Project's main activities. Various questions arose out of this 
diagram and it is the answers to these questions that will be 
considered in our final report about the structure of Ladworth's 
future.
FIG.2 reflects the relative position of the Committee in the 
Ladworth environment cind raises questions on the relationship between 
the Project and the community, especially in the matter of community 
involvement with the project. The emphasis of this diagram and 
the subsequent questions is. on the community because of the stated 
aims and objectives of the Project i.e. "to reduce/prevent crime
within the community" and "to improve the quality of life in the
community". The answer to the questions raised in FIG 2 will be 
used to devise possible means of improving participation.
FIG.3 looks at a process that voluntary organisations probably follow 
before deciding whether to actively involve themselves with Ladworth 
or otherwise.
The answers derived from the questions raised by the diagrams will be 
used to assess how well informed about Ladworth some voluntary 
organisations are, and how their perception of Ladworth could be 
improved and thus their involvement increased.
FIG.4 is a schematic representation of the perceptions of the parties 
involved in Ladworth. The emswers to the questions raised by the diagram
would assist us in formulating a structure that may provide a more
unified and acceptable framework for Ladworth activities.
(This is a slightly modified verson of the earlier submission to the 
committee)
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L.S.C.
C.P.G.
Ted Schuck
V.O.E.M.
R.M.G.
FIG 1 LADWORTH STRUCTURAL REPRESENTATION
S.A. - Statutory Agencies
E.M. - Elected Members (councillors)
V.O. - Voluntary Organisations
L.S.C. - Ladworth Steering Committee
R.M.G. - Resource Management Group
C.P.G. - Crime Prevention Group
C.A. - Core Area
Questions Arising from Fig 1
a) How effective is the structure?
b) How efficient is the structure?
c) How representative is this structure?
d) How could the structure be improved?
e) Are there alternative structures?
f) Are the aims and objectives:
(i) explicit
(ii) clear
(iii) consistent?
These questions should be answered in relation to the stated aims and objectives 
of Ladworth.
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v.o.
S.A.
E.M.
V.O. S.A. E.M,
Ladworth Committee
Ladworth Environment
FIG 2 LADWORTH PROJECT STATUS QUO 
Questions about the project arising from Fig 2
a) Why are some organisations and individuals not actively involved?
b) Why are some organisations/individuals actively involved?
c) How could active participation be improved?
d) Is the status quo satisfactory?
e) How could the status quo be improved?
f) Is the project to be defined by the actions of the committee or by
the influence within the Ladworth environment?
(Involvement in the committee need not be a sole measure of involvement 
in the project as is implied by the last question).
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Questions arising from Fig 3
a) Is the perception box [the database] suitably informed about
Ladworth?
b) How logical is the analysis?
c) How objective is the assessment? (comparator)
d) Follow-up questions
(e.g. if the answer to question (a) is negative, 
what could be done to modify the perception box?)
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FIG A PRINCIPAL ACTORS’ PERCEPTIONS
Client Police, Community .
Actors S.A.s, Council, V.O.s,
Transformation Improvement in the quality of life, crime prevention/ 
reduction.
Working
Framework Funding, forum for complaints, cooperation with others.
Owners Police, Community,
Environmental
and Wider 
System 
Constraints
Distrust, competition, political differences .
Fig. Aa Typical V.O.s' perceptions
Client
Actors
Transformation
Working
Framework
Owners
Environmental 
and Wider 
System 
Constraints
Police, community, other S.A.s.
V.O.s, Police, S.A.s, Council.
Improvement of life, crime reduction - soc.serv, NACRO, etc 
Crime reduction/prevention. improvement of life - housing, 
Police etc.
Interagency co-operation, funding?
Police, community.
Geographical boundaries, inter-agency competition, 
funds.
Fig. Ab Typical S.A.s' perceptions
Client Community, Police, S.A.s.
Actors V.O.s, S.A.s, Council,
Transformation Improvement of life, crime prevention/reduction.
Working
Framework
Forum for discussion? Funding?
Owners Police, Community, S.A.s, Council.
Environmental 
and Wider 
System 
Constraints
Geographical/ward limitations, political differences, 
funds.
Fig.Ac Typical Elected members' perceptions
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Questions arising from Fig 4
a) How identical or otherwise are these perceptions?
b) On what basis were the perceptions formed?
c) In the light of present Ladworth activities, how accurate
are these observations/perceptions?
d) How could the identified constraints be removed or their
effects minimised?
e) In the light of the answers to the above and to the answers
to
(g) Fig 1,
(g) Fig 2,
(d) Fig 3,
are these perceptions satisfactory for the future progress 
of the Ladworth project?
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APPENDIX D
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cxNsmuricN - final draft
1. NAME
The name of the project is "The Ladworth Project" hereinafter called "the 
Project".
2. OBJECTS
2.1 The Project is established to assist financially, and in an advisory role 
any activity within the area shown on the attached map, whose aims include
. of'
the reduction/ or the prevention of crime and the consequent improvement 
of the quality of life in the Project area. Activities assisted may be 
with the victims of crime, with known offenders, with those thought to be at 
risk of offending,or in the wider community* The assistance preferred 
is to be without distinction as to sex, race or religion.
2.2 The Project shall bring together representatives of voluntary organisations, 
government departments, statutory authorities and other relevant bodies and 
individuals in furtherance of the objects of the Project.
3. POWERS
In furtherance of the said objects but not otherwise the Project may
3.1 make grants and donations to activities, in the defined area using
the procedures set out in the financial constitution.
3.2 receive grants and donations and otherwise raise money.
3.3. promote and carry out or assist in promoting and carrying out
research, surveys and investigations and publish the useful results
thereof,
3.4 collect and disseminate information on all matters affecting the
said objects and exchange such information with other bodies having
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similar objects.
3.5 undertake, execute, manage or assist any charitable trusts which 
may lawfully be undertaken, executed, managed or assisted by the 
Project.
3.6 purchase, take on lease or in exchange, hire or otherwise acquire
any property and any rights and privileges necessary for the 
promotion of the said objects and construct, maintain and alter any
buildings, or erections necessary for the work of the Project.
3.7 make regulations for any property which may be so acquired.
3.8 sell, let, mortgage, dispose of or turn to account all or any of
the property or assets of the Project.
3.9 employ and pay any person to supervise, organise and carry on the
work of the Project.
3.10 do all such other lawful things as are necessary for the attainment 
of the said objects.
4. MEMBERSHIP, COMMITTEES OFFICERS
4.1 The project will be managed by a Steering Committee selected at an
Annual General Meeting. The Steering Committee will comprise an 
equitable balance of representatives from
(i) Properly constituted voluntary organisations operating 
within the Project's geographic area.
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(il) local councillors (3 nominated by the Ladywood Area Sub Committee 
and councillors nominated one each by the Small Heath, Edgbaston, and 
Perry Barr Area Sub Committees, plus one member of the West Midlands 
•Police Authority)
and (iii) officers representing statutory agencies.
4.2 The Steering Committee may appoint and determine sub-committees terms 
of reference, powers, duration and composition. Sub committees shall 
be subject at all times to the authority of the Steering Committee.
4.3 The Chairperson of the Steering Committee shall be an "elected member" 
of the Ladywood Area sub committee and be appointed annually by the 
Steering Committee members following an annual General Meeting.
In the absence of the Chairperson the Steering Committee shall elect 
a temporary Chairperson from amongst themselves for that meeting.
The Steering Committee shall appoint other officers it deems appropriate, 
All such appointments shall be in an honarary capacity.
4.4. The Steering Committee may co-opt additional persons as members of
either the Steering Committee or its sub-committees, but such members 
will not have voting rights on the Steering Committee.
5. FINANCE
5.1 All monies disbursed on behalf of the Project shall be applied to
further the objects of the Projects and for no other purpose,provided 
that nothing herein contained shall prevent the payment in good faith 
of reasonable and proper remuneration to any person employed by the 
Project, or the repayment of reasonable out of pocket expenses.
335
5.2. The accounts and general financial arrangements of the Project
shall be governed by the financial consitution.
5.3 An audited statement of the Project's accounts will be presented
at each Annual General Meeting.
6. MEETINGS
6.1 The first General Meeting of the Project shall be held not later 
the 31st October, 1985. An Annual General Meeting of the Project 
shall be held not later than the 30th June each year at a date, 
time and place that the Steering Committee shall determine.
At least 21 clear days notice shall be given in writing to each 
organisation represented on the Steering Committee, and public 
notices shall be posted inviting residents of the Project area 
to the meeting.
6.2. The purpose of the General Meeting and subsequent Annual General 
Meetings shall be to receive reports relating to the Project 
and to elect the members of the Steering Committee as determined 
in clause 4.1 (i) and to appoint those members as determined 
by clause 4.1. (iii) above.
6.3
Meetings of the Steering Committee or its sub committees may 
be held at such times and places as are designated by the Steering 
Committee, any of the above meetings can be open to the public 
if the Steering Committee so decides.
6.4 The Steering Committee may call a Public Meeting or declare 
any of its meetings open to the public.
6.5 QUORUM
At any meeting of the Steering Comittee a quorum will consist
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of at least 1/3 of its voting membership and must include a 
representative of
(i) the voluntary organisations
(ii) the local councillors (as set out in clause 4.1 (ii)
and (iii) the statutory organisations
7. DISSOLUTION
 ^  ^ Steering Committee by a simple majority (two thirds) decide
at any time to dissolve the Project it shall call a special meeting 
of all voting members of the g teering Committee of which meeting 
not less than 21 days notice (stating the terms of the resolution 
to be proposed thereat) shall be given. If such decision shall 
be confirmed by a simple (two thirds) majority of those present and 
voting at such a meeting the Steering Committee shall have power 
to dispose of any assets held by on behalf of the Project.
7.2 In the event of the Project being dissolved any funds will be disbursed
within the Project area in accordance with the stated objects of 
the Project.
8. ALTERATION TO CONSTITUTION
Any alteration of this Constitution shall receive the assent of not less 
than two thirds of the voting members of the Steering Committee present and 
voting at a meeting specifically called for the purpose. Provided that 
notice of any such alteration, setting forth the terms of the alteration, 
shall have been received in writing by each organisation represented on the 
Steering Committee not less than 21 clear days before the meeting at which 
the alteration is to be brought forward (provided that no alteration shall 
be made which would have the effect of causing the Project to cease to qualify 
as a Charity at law).
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C.P.S.C. P/I.S.C.
L.M.C.
R.M.S.C,
Administrator
S.H.C. L.C.
P.S.C.
PROPOSED STRUCTURE FOR LADWORTH
Kev: P.B.C.
S.H.C.
L.C.
E.C.
L.M.C.
P.S.C.
R.M.S.C
C.P.S.C
P/I.S.C
Perry Bar Committee 
Small Heath Committee 
Ladywood Committee 
Edgbaston Committee 
Ladworth Management Committee 
Projects Subcommittee
- generates initiatives
- promotes ideas
- initiates projects
Resource Management Subcommittee
- seeks funds
- finances projects and publications 
Crime Prevention Subcommittee
- help for Core Areas
- coordinates C.P. schemes
- advisory and logistics support for groups 
Publicity/Information Subcommittee
- collects data from
Core Areas
V.O.s, S.A.s and Councillors
- collates and publishes newsletter.
R.H.B.N.C. 
LlBflARY
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